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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the history of the MPR between 1924 and 
1928, establishes a chronology of events and identifies the personalities 
involved. It describes the creation of political structures after 
Soviet models; the transfer of the Mongolian economy from the Chinese 
to the Soviet system; the growth of secular education; and the attempt 
to subject the organization and economic power of the Buddhist church 
to state control. These developments were strongly influenced by the 
Mongols' desire to remain independent of China and to assume the form 
and characteristics of powerful nation-states. However the heavy 
demands of allegiance to the USSR and the Comintern distorted native 
aspirations and compelled Mongols to give up ideas of Pan-Mongolism, 
Buddhist reform and an independent foreign policy. 
Until the end of 1926 modernization and the integration of 
the MPR into the Soviet system was gradual but from 1927 the Comintern 
ordered stricter measures of class discrimination, harsher religious 
policies and a more rapid construction of state capitalism. Some 
~ongolian leaders believed the demands unsuitable to Mongolian conditions. 
The Comintern fomented differences among the leadership and in 1928 
most former MPRP leaders were ousted on the charge of Right Deviation. 
The USSR's deteriorating foreign relationships and Stalin's plan for 
the rapid industrialization of the USSR were root causes of this 
development. Unquestioning loyalty of the MPR to the USSR was required 
for strategic reasons. Cooperative and state forms of capitalism would 
facilitate the transfer of more Mongolian products to the Siberian 
industries. 
The thesis draws the conclusion that the MPRP submitted to 
Comintern demands in 1928 through conviction, coercion and because there 
was no alternative ally prepared to guarantee Mongolian independence. 
It also points to the experience of the MPR as a suitable development 
model for nomadic, pre-industrial societies. The MPR may also be com-
pared with other states traditionally linked with China but now closely 
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PREFACE 
In 1921 Mongolian forces led by the Mongolian People's 
Party (MPP) and part of the 5th Soviet Red Army marched into the town 
of Niislel Khuree (Urga) and declared an independent Mongolian state. 
The Bogd Khaan, the most senior of the Buddhist clergy and a reincarn-
ation of one of Buddha's disciples, was made head of state as a 
limited monarch but real power was in the hands of the Party. When 
the Bogd Khaan died in 1924 the Central Committee of the MPP proclaimed 
a republic. Soon afterwards at the Third Congress of the MPP a 
power struggle among party leaders apparent since 1923 was resolved. 
Danzan, who had led the Party since its foundation in 1920, was shot 
as a traitor and many of his supporters were imprisoned or expelled 
from the Party. Power was transferred to younger leaders who favoured 
closer ties with the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The policies of 
national unity that had prevailed between 1921 and 1924 gave way to a 
programme which promoted the interests of the poorer sections of the 
population and discriminated against those of princely birth or of high 
rank in the Buddhist church. 
In the latter half of 1926, however, the Party showed signs 
of splitting into new factions. There was considerable dispute over 
the continued presence in central and local government of the former 
princes and officials who had served in the pre-revolutionary govern-
ment system. In 1927 and 1928 more radical members of the Party's 
central organizations, encouraged by the Comintern. orotested that 
the main leadership had promoted policies which allowed a native 
(iii) 
bourgeoisie to emerge. This was not in the interests of the 
poorer ards (commoners) and endangered the stability of both the 
Mongolian and Soviet states. Those responsible for these policies 
were held to be guilty of deviating to the right of a general 
party line of non-capitalist development laid down at the Third 
Party Congress. Under pressure from the opposition and represent-
atives of the Comintern these so-called Right Deviationists admitted 
that they were at fault. They were demoted or sent for political 
retraining and a new Central Committee was formed from members of 
the opposition and younger cadres. The new committee worked 
closely with the Comintern to draw up a new programme of political 
and economic policies. As a result the country moved into a period 
of severe class discrimination with the confiscation of property, 
enforced collectivization and the beginning of a systematic destruction 
of the Buddhist church. 
No detailed study of this period, monograph or review 
article, has been produced by historians of either the east or the 
west. There are, however, useful reviews in general histories 
although they were published about twenty years ago. The most 
scholarly general history by Mongolian historians was published in 
19691 and the best work in English, The modern histor~ of Mongolia 
by C.R. Bawden, in 1968. 2 American studies such as Robert A. 
3 Rupen's Mongols of the twentieth century and George G.S. Murphy's 
Soviet Mongolia4 are also useful but should be read with caution 
because they were written under the constraints to the examination 
of the history of Communist societies imposed during the McCarthy 
era. 
(iv) 
Mongolian and Soviet historians generally deal with the 
period 1924-1928 in a cursory fashion, especially the phenomenon they 
describe as the Right Deviation. This reticence is born of uncertain-
ty as to what the correct view of the period should be. In 1986 a 
leading Mongolian historian in private conversation said, "This is 
a difficult period. We do not talk about it ... The leaders condemned 
as Right Deviationists have never been fully rehabilitated. Any more 
rehabilitation would undoubtedly raise difficult questions about the 
motives of USSR and Comintern policies imposed on the Mongolian 
People's Republic from 1928. Since Mongolian-Soviet relations are 
still not open to critical discussion it is unlikely that the period 
1924-1928 and the Right Deviation will be examined by Communist 
historians for the time being. 
However this period is not worthy of study simply from the 
point of view of what it does or does not tell us about Mongolian-
Soviet relations. It also marks an important stage in the development 
of the modern Mongolian state and Mongolian society. This is the 
period when the shape and character of the present Mongolian People's 
Republic came into being. New forms and methods of government were 
instituted; the foundations of modern economic life were laid down; 
there was a planned attack on illiteracy, western-style schools were 
opened and a new set of guiding principles emerged to challenge 
Tibetan Buddhism. There had, of course, been earlier, piecemeal 
attempts at reform and modernization, notably between the revolutions 
of 1911 and 1921. However it was only after the foundation of the 
Republic and the ratification of the first State constitution that 
a planned pattern of change began to be implemented in both town and 
(v) 
countryside. The life of the average rural Mongol was not vastly 
changed during these years, but certainly fundamental changes were 
taking place in traditional Mongolian society. 
This thesis is a study in eight chapters of the history 
of the Mongolian People's Republic from 1924 to 1928. It attempts 
to describe major events in the development of the state from the 
time of the death of the Bogd Khaan to the ousting of the first 
republican leadership. The study covers: the political, admin-
istrative and economic developments of the period; the response 
of Mongolian society to the changes and the growth of opposition 
to them particularly in the Buddhist church; foreign policy 
issues, Comintern influence and the attitude of the MPR to Mongols 
living beyond its borders; and finally a chronology and analysis 
of the Right Deviation. 
Source Materials 
In spite of reservations about Mongolian scholarship 
covering the period in question, specialized monographs, articles and 
collections of documents in the MPR are important sources of inform-
ation. Of particular value are anthologies of contemporary documents 
and memoirs. The copious material in the Mongolian national archives 
is not open to western scholars and Mongolian and Soviet historical 
writings therefore provide valuable access to them. 
There is, however, a surprisingly varied amount of older 
source material of both a primary and secondary nature readily 
(vi) 
available, which can be found in T.E. EWing's bibliographical 
t · 1· 5 ar 1C es cover1ng the period 1911-1940, the bibliography of the 
MPR compiled by E.N. Yakovleva in 19356 and R. Rupen's biblio-
graphy of Mongols of the Twentieth Century published in 1964. 7 
Important primary sources are party documents, government resolu-
tions, laws, treaties and agreements. The most useful secondary 
sources are articles published in the contemporary periodicals 
(excluding newspapers) published in the MPR. The journal Khozyaistvo 
Mongolii published by the Bank in Ulaanbaatar from 1926 to 19318 
and the semi-official journals Novyi Vostok9 and Zhizn Buryatii lO 
are especially informative. Many of the contributors worked in 
Mongolian government and economic organizations or for Soviet 
trading organizations. Another valuable source is a volume of 
memoirs of party members published in 197811 which includes previously 
unpublished material on the Right Deviation. It has to be used with 
caution, however, because events and dates have occasionally been 
confused by the passage of time. 
It must be accepted that the study of early revolutionary 
Mongolia faces a shortage of materials reflecting the experience and 
lives of those whom the Party did not favour. Mongolian historians 
do not write biographies of such people, nor indeed do they public-
ize the short-comings of Party heroes. People who fell from grace 
have frequently been written out of official history. Studies 
published in the MPR before 1961, for instance, often omit the 
names of individuals from accounts or as signatories to documents. 
The political memoir and autobiography of the Diluv Khutagt, a 
Living Buddhawho trod a careful path in the 1920s, and was arrested 
(vii) 
and sent for trial in 1930, is of particular interest. His account 
was recorded by Owen Lattimore in the United States where the Diluv 
Khutagt died in 1965 but it was not published until 1982. 12 Before 
publication the information supplied by the Diluv Khutagt was only 
available through the writings of Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon 
who knew him personally. Besides being a warmly human account of 
personal experience, the book provides a rare glimpse of the period 
from the point of view of an individual who was neither a party 
member nor a poor commoner. 
During the course of my research I have tried to read as 
much as possible of the available, relevant literature. I have 
consulted works in several European languages and in Mongolian but 
the most valuable sources are in Mongolian and Russian. I believe 
my thesis to be the first study of the MPR in the years between 1924 
and 1928 in which this source material has been brought together. 
Transliteration and Spelling 
In transcribing Mongolian words and proper names from the 
Cyrillic I use the system of William A. Brown and Urgunge On on in 
their translation of the History of f4PR. This differs only slightly 
from the International Cataloguing Rules system for transcribing 
Russian Cyrillic, which I use for Russian words and names. There-
fore ~ is represented by j for Mongolian words and 
by zh for Russian words. Because this thesis is on Mongolian 
history I have chosen to use j and not zh for Buriat names such as 
Jamtsrano. The Mongolian letters • and ~ which are not used in 
(viii) 
the Russian Cyrillic alphabet are transcribed with 0 and u respect-
ively. 
I transcribe Mongolian from its spelling according to the 
Cyrillic alphabet because this alphabet is standard in the MPR.13 
Therefore personal names, titles and geographic names appear in forms 
different from those of other English language texts which transcribe 
from the old Mongolian script. I refer, for instance, to the Javzandamba 
Khutagt and not the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, Khiagt instead of Khiakta 
and ard instead of arat. 
Mongolian words describing Mongolian objects and ideas have 
been transcribed according to the Mongolian spelling even when anglicized 
versions exist, e.g. ger instead of "yurt", togrog and not "tugrik". 
Ulaanbaatar is preferred to Ulan Bator, which is a transcription of 
the Russia spelling for the capital of the MPR. "Lama", however, 
is retained in preference to the Mongolian lam because "lama" is a 




OUTER MONGOLIA UP TO 1921 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the territory of 
Inner Asia which lies between the Gobi desert and Eastern Siberia was 
a part of the Manchu or Ch'ing Empire of China. It was known to the 
world as Outer Mongolia and the majority of its inhabitants were nomadic, 
Khalkh Mongols. In 1691 the secular and religious leaders of the Khalkhs 
had submitted to the Manchu Emperor, Kang Hsi, in return for protection 
against their enemies, the Western or Oirat Mongols who lived to the 
1 
west of them. Other groups of Mongol peoples living to the south 
and east in the region of Inner Mongolia had been absorbed into the 
Manchu Empire some decades earlier. The terms Outer and Inner Mongolia 
indicate the location of these areas vis-~-vis China. However, the 
Buriat Mongols who live in the region of Lake Baikal in Siberia were 
never subject to Manchu rule. 
For administrative purposes Outer Mongolia was made up of 
four aimags or provinces, each of which was subdivided into a number 
of khoshuus or banners. A prince who was a descendent of Chingis 
Khan ruled each khoshuu on behalf of the Emperor. The princes were 
given titles, privileges and salaries, including exemption from state 
taxes, and in this way they were controlled and kept loyal to the 
dynasty. 
During the Manchu period Mongolian society was made up of 
2 
ruling and non-ruling princes, ards or commoners and Buddhist monks 
or lamas who might be of princely or common birth. Some ards called 
khamjilga paid no state taxes but were tied in service to the ruling 
princes as domestic servants and cared for the herds of their wealthy 
masters. Others, the so-called free ards,paid the taxes that the 
princes levied on the ~mperor's behalf. Free ards had also to perform 
various types of corvee services called in Mongolian alba. Alba 
included the provision of horses to maintain a state postal relay 
service (ortoo), border guard duty (kharuul) and other military 
services and periods of duty in the seal office (tamga) of the local 
administration. The khoshuu princes of each aimag had regular 
meetings in the aimag assembly (chuulga). There were also some higher 
administrative institutions staffed by Manchus and Chinese but these 
rarely interfered with the conduct of affairs at local level. The 
high degree of localautbnomy in Outer Mongolia was the key to the 
long-lasting relationship of the Khalkhs and the Manchus. 2 
The secular aristocracy was not the only source of native 
power in Outer Mongolia, however. A large proportion of the male 
3 population, approximately ~ by 1900, were lamas who were outside the 
secular administrative system. Altan Khan of th~ Tumet was the 
'--
first Mongol prince to abandon Shamanism and adopt Tibetan Buddhism 
or Lamaism in the sixteenth century and most Mongols of Inner and 
4 
Outer Mongolia followed his example before submitting to the Manchus. 
The princes of the Church, the incarnations of Buddhist saints, had 
J not only religious prestige but great political and economic power. 
The Mongolian incarnations were called khuvilgans and khutagts and 
1 . 5 by the twentieth century there were 140-150 of them in Outer Mongo lao 
3 
The most powerful and holy was the Javzandamba Khutagt6 and in the 
world of Tibetan Buddhism he was surpassed only by the Dalai Lama 
and the Panchen (Tashi) Lama of Tibet. His monastery called Ikh 
Khuree (Great Monastery) on the banks of the Tuul River in northern 
central Khalkh became the focus of the religious, cultural and 
commercial life of Outer Mongolia and was one of the few settlements 
in a land of nomads. The Russians called the town Urga, others used 
the Chinese form of Ikh Khuree, Da Khuree, but many ordinary people 
.0 7 
called it simply Khuree. 
The political prestige of the Javzandamba Khutagt derived 
not only from his religious status, but from the fact that the first 
incarnat'ion, who was recognized in the seventeenth century, was the 
son of Gombodorj, the Tusheet Khan. 8 There were, eventually, four 
khans of Outer Mongolia. They gave their names to the four aimags 
and they were the highest ranking of all the princes. The discovery 
of the Javzandamba Khutagt gave added prestige to the Tusheet Khans 
and at the same time established the line of the incarnation among 
the highest in the land. This was further reinforced by the recognition 
of the second JavzandambaKhutagt in Gombodorj's grandson. 9 
The Manchu Emperors regulated the power of the Javzandamba 
Khutagts by granting them titles and privileges and by reserving 
the right to confirm each incarnation discovered. The Javzandamba 
Khutagt was given a seal and there were 13 other high ranking khutagts 
who were similarly honoured. Seal-holding incarnations had special 
privileges including the right to have families of ards in their 
service. These were called shav'nar and like the khamjilga they 
4 
paid no state taxes or alba. The shay' nar of the Javzandamba 
Khutagt were so numerous that a special organization was established 
to administer them. This was called the Ikh Shay' (literally the 
"Great Disciple") and it was comparable to an aimag. However, it had 
no fixed territory and the ard families under its jurisdiction were 
scattered throughout the four aimags where they tended the vast herds 
10 of the Ikh Shay' and the Javzandamba Khutagt. 
For two centuries the Manchus and Khalkh Mongols coexisted 
within a system that guaranteed the traditional relationships of 
Mongolian society, the continuity of the nomadic, herding lifestyle 
and the prosperity of the Buddhist religion. The price the Mongols 
paid for this guarantee was loyalty and a willingness to defend the 
Inner Asian frontiers of the Empire. In the eyes of the Mongols this 
relationship was one of alliance. Then in 1908 the Imperial govern-
ment announced that a series of reforms known as the New Administration ~ 
were t b t d d t 0 t M I " 11 o e ex en e 0 u er ongo ~a. They were already being 
implemented in China and Inner Mongolia and it was clear that they 
spelled the end of the special relationship of Manchu and Mongol, 
the end of autonomy and isolation and the end of all that was traditional 
in the life of the Mongols. In 1911 the Khalkhs drove out Manchu 
officials and Chinese soldiers from Ikh Khuree. They declared Outer 
Mongolia an independent state and crowned the Eighth Javzandamba 
12 Khutagt Emperor. 
The leaders of this uprising claimed they acted to protect 
the Mongolian way of life, its traditions and religion. This revolut-
ion was essentially nationalist not social, one of the earliest 
5 
nationalist revolutions in Asia, yet neither at the time nor sub-
sequently did it attract any great attention outside. A theocratic 
state headed by a living Buddha seemed, on the surface, to have little 
in common with the democratic model of a nation state which ~as 
attracting considerable interest in Asia and Africa at this time. 
Nevertheless the leaders of the revolution did have something more in 
mind than the mere preservation of tradition. A central government 
organization was set up consisting of five ministries and a western-
style parliament with two chambers. The Khuree settlement was renamed 
Niislel Khuree (Capital Monastery) because of "the custom to name the 
cities in which the emperors of the nations of the world reside as the 
'capital, .. ,,13 There was even a decree instructing government ministers 
to wear western clothes! It is clear from this that, directly or 
indirectly, the ideas of nationalism and the nation state as they spread 
from western Europe to Asia and the colonial world had reached the 
Khalkh Mongols. However vaguely these ideas were understood, they 
found a fertile soil in the Mongols' own aspirations for independence. 
The Growth of National Awareness 
In the 19th century a variety of internal and external 
pressures caused widespread poverty, vagrancy and banditry among 
Mongols of both Outer and Inner Mongolia. By 1900 traditional 
society was assailed by further dangers. The reasons why the Khalkh 
Mongols chose to end their allegiance to the Manchu dynasty are 
basically fourfold: widespread poverty and crippling debt; fear 
of cultural annihilation as a result of reforms; the influence of 
6 
new ideological models acquired variously through contact with Inner 
Mongols, Russians, Tibetans and perhaps also Japanese; persistent 
agitation by Inner Mongols like Khaisan:4 who was a leading figure 
in the events of 1911. 
The Manchus exercised a policy of isolating the Mongols 
from the other peoples of their Empire in order, it is claimed, to 
preserve the supposedly military character of the Mongols in case 
they were needed to defend the empire. It was believed that too close 
an association with the sedentary, agricultural Chinese would soften 
15 the Mongols. Chinese were forbidden to colonize the Mongol territor-
ies, Chinese traders were not allowed to take their wives and families 
there, marriage between Chinese and Mongols was prohibited and Mongols 
16 
were not permitted to use the Chinese language. These restrictions 
were increasingly disregarded as the Chinese trading presence in 
Mongolia expanded. Even so the Mongols were reluctant to adopt Chinese 
customs and ideas, and Confucianism made little impact with Buddhism 
remaining dominant in Mongolian life. In general, the Mongols regarded 
as 
their herding, nomadic existence~superior to the Chinese lifestyle. 
The Mongols' isolation was, however, breaking down to some 
extent by the 19th century. Tibetan lamas and traders, in addition 
to the Chinese, were common visitors, and Russians also, with whom the 
Mongols had been acquainted for many centuries, came in increasing 
17 
numbers as the Tsarist Empire and its fur trade expanded eastwards. 
On the other hand western European traders, travellers and missiona~ies 
were rarely seen. This meant that new cultural influences now 
affecting other parts of Asia had limited impact among the Mongols 
7 
and then mostly at secondhand. Nevertheless, the Khalkh Mongols, 
like other small groups of less developed peoples were caught up in 
the global strategic changes brought about by the trading and colon-
izing activities of Europeans, especially from the middle of the 19th 
century. 
Nationalist consciousness and the desire for independence 
wene given impetus by the Mongols' deteriorating relationship with the 
Manchu imperial government. When the Khalkhs submitted to K'ang-hsi 
in 1691 they did not consider themselves dependent subjects so much as 
allies. The Manchus themselves recently emerged from a tribal society 
understood this kind of relationship and how to exploit it. They 
imposed their control on the Mongols by granting honours and autonomy 
rather than through coercion and subjection. As they became more 
settled and sinified, however, the Manchus began to develop what 
Owen Lattimore has called "an 'anti-historical' conception of the 
Empire, treating China as the centre and base and the frontier 
d ' 11 'I' , ,,18 ominlons which had origina y been the base, as aUXl larles. 
A second reason for the change in the Manchus' attitudes was 
the change in the nature of the internal and external problems facing 
the imperial government. In the 17th century control of the Inner 
Asian frontiers was the key to the stability of the Chinese state. 
By the 19th century, agents of the states of western Europe were 
pressing on the eastern seaboard and the Russians were gathering on 
the north eastern frontier. These newcomers were all clamouring for 
a stake in the Chinese economy. At the same time there ~as 
considerable unrest within the Empire itself. As the Chinese popu-
8 
lation increased there was an imbalance between land and population19 
which gave rise to a succession of rebellions during the 19th 
century. 
Mongols of both Outer and Inner Mongolia were affected by 
these developments. Higher taxes were levied and Mongolian soldiers 
20 
were called up to subdue the rebels. While the latter was by no 
means popular the former was e~peci~ly hard because_payments were 
~manded: in sibrer in§t~t~~_in Ji vestock as was customary in 
e~lj,er p~riods. 
.,--
The Mongolian economy functioned mainly on a J 
barter system and therefore the silver had to be obtained from 
Ch ' t dId h ' t t h' h 21 ~nese ra er-money en ers w ose ~nteres ra es were ~g. At 
the same time, Chinese farmers who were also suffering from economic 
hardship began to move, illegally, into Inner Mongolia. Traditional 
grazing grounds were appropriated and even purchased from Mongolian 
princes causing further hardship to the Mongolian ard herdsmen. 22 
Mongols who understood the causes behind these circumstances and 
events began to question the stability of Manchu rule and ask them-
selves whether the time had not come to end the Manchu-Mongol alliance. 
In 1900 the Boxer rebels took up arms against Europeans in 
China only to suffer humiliating defeat. 23 Foreigners occupied 
Peking and demanded huge indemnities in recompense for loss of life 
and property. Only now did the Chinese realize how close they were 
to losing all sovereignty over their country and the entire Chinese 
population threw itself into a frenzy of activity to repay the 
national debt and stabilize the economy.24 The imperial government 
was on the point of collapse and only saved itself by acceding to 
9 
demands for political, economic and educational 25 reforms. In 
1906 it was announced that these reforms were to be applied in Inner 
Mongolia also. They included extensive administrative reorganization, 
economic development, education and unrestricted colonization by 
Chinese. The Inner Mongols were left in no doubt that their life-
style, traditions and religion were in jeopardy and from this time 
nationalist activity and resistance increased considerably.26 
The Khalkh Mongols were not slow to take warning either, especially 
/ after 1908 when the imperial government decided to extend the reforms 
to Outer Mongolia. 
The events and circumstances described above are major 
causes of the Khalkhs actions in 1911 but it is also possible that 
the appeal of new political conceptions of the independent nation-state 
played a part. The Mongol tribes of both Outer and Inner Mongolia 
had long recognized a familial relationship. On several occasions 
over the centuries there were attempts at unification under a single 
khan, usually involving force. The idea that Mongols belonged to 
one family was a powerful if somewhat romantic notion that was 
particularly potent among certain groups at least until the Second 
World War. It was romantic insofar as the mass of Mongols had 
always resisted being under the control of one or other of their 
groups. For the Khalkh Mongols the idea of a nation-state was much 
more realistic. Descendants of one tribe, they inhabited a single 
territory, spoke one language and could claim a political unity 
27 
going back to the days of Gersenz in the sixteenth century. 
The political structure established after the 1911 revolut~on is a 
strong indication that the nation state model was not unknown to the 
10 
Khalkhs, but it seems likely that they acquired such ideas from a 
variety of sources. 
The Chinese were greatly influenced by the Japanese in the 
acquisition of western political concepts. The Inner Mongols learned 
of these ideas from the Chinese andpassed them on to the Khalkhs. 
But we should not rule out the part played by Tibet. The Khalkhs had 
close religious and commercial links with Tibet. In spite of the 
less than friendly attitude of the government of the 13th Dalai Lama 
towards the British some political concepts were gleaned from the 
British administration of India. When the Younghusband Expedition 
/ occupied Lhasa in 1904 the Dalai Lama took refuge in Outer Mongolia. 
According to a Buriat nationalist writer some Mongolian nationalists 
had plans for a joint Mongol-Tibetan movement to throw off Manchu 
rule. The Dalai Lama was to head this movement but the Javzandamba 
Khutagt apparently objected to the Dalai having control of many 
28 thousands of Mongols. Relations between the two incarnations were 
very cool at this time also because the Dalai Lama took offence at 
the Javzandamba's dissipated lifestyle. 29 When the Dalai Lama 
eventually left for Peking the idea of a Mongol-Tibetan liberation 
movement fell apart. There is however scant evidence to suggest 
that the Khalkhs acquired political ideas directly from either 
Japanese or western Europeans although Mongolian historians have 
1 . 30 recently made a case for influence by the 1905 Russian revo ut1on. 
11 
Independence and Pan-Mongolism 
Through whatever agencies the Khalkhs acquired the models 
of the state they set up in 1911, their ultimate goal was clearly 
not a Khalkh state but an All-Mongol state. In December the Javzan-
damba Khutagt, or the Bogd Khaan as was his title as head of state, 
sent out a message to all ruling princes and leaders of Mongols 
living beyond the bordersof Khalkh announcing Mongolian independence 
and inviting them to unite under his kingship.3l Some were unable 
to accept his terms and made representation to the new republican 
32 
authorities in Peking seeking greater autonomy for themselves. However 
35 of the 49 khoshuu princes of Inner Mongolia did declare initial 
33 
allegiance to the Bogd Khaan. A number of rebellions flared up 
in Inner Mongolia and in 1913 the government of Niislel Khuree sent troops 
to assist fellow Mongols against the Chinese. 34 This war had to 
be abandoned because the Mongolian government ran out of funds and the 
Russians refused any support. Nevertheless some princes nomadised 
with their subjects into Khalkh and individual Inner Mongols and Buriats 
from Siberia moved to NiislelKh~ree. For a brief period they had 
high hopes of a fillurisrnng Mongolian state with Khalkh as its centre. 
Many of these outsiders were given posts in the government and the army. 
Of one such Buriat, Ts. Jamtsrano who founded a school and published a 
newspaper in Niislel Khuree, it is said: 
and he was 
"He placed full confidence in the new 
upsurge in the Mongolian state ..... " 
" ... profoundly convinced that a new time 
of prosperity was dawning in Mongolia, 
12 
and that popular education would soon 
be rising to the same level as among othe~ 
people." 35 
The idea of Pan-Mongolism - one state embracing all Mongols -
appealed to most groups of Mongols at one time or another but it was. 
in truth. a dream with little likelihood of realization. In many areas 
of Inner Mongolia the Chinese exceeded the Mongolian population. 
That part of Siberia which was inhabited by Buriats was quite firmly 
under Russian control. There was an age-long reluctance of one group 
of Mongols to submit willingly to the leadership of another. As 
Owen Lattimore remarked in 1934: 
"the average Mdngol cannot think of Mongol 
unification except as the result of a war 
between Inner and Outer Mongolia t036 determine the right of leadership." 
The Khalkhs rapidly became suspicious of the Inner Mongols 
who had joined the Bogd's government and by 1915 many Inner Mongols had 
lost their jobs and returned home. 
Although fiercely nationalistic Buriats were keen to be a 
part of the Bogd Khaan's Pan-Mongolia the government of Niislel Khuree 
was reluctant to accept Buriatia as genuinely Mongol territory. 
The Buriat way of life and their language had become markedly different 
from those of other Mongols and. in addition. the Khalkhs were tradition-
ally very suspicious of the Buriats. This attitude was especially 
apparent in 1919 when a White Russian leader Grigorii Semeno~ who was 
believed to be part Buriat. attempted to form a Pan-Mongolian govern-
mente He assembled a group of Buriat and Inner Mongolian nationalists 
13 
at Dauria where the Chinese Eastern Railway joins the Trans-Siberian 
Railway. The conference decided to form a federal state comprising 
Khalkh, Buriatia, Inner Mongolia and Barga, which is in present-day 
Heilungchiang Province. An !~~er_ Mongolian incarnation, the.Niis ./ 
Gegeen, was chosen as Prime Minister and other posts were reserved 
for representatives of the component regions. The conference had 
some Japanese support, including financial, and it was decided to 
seek international recognition for the new state at the Paris Peace 
Conference. However the Khalkh Mongols refused to be involved in a 
movement that was dominated by Buriats and the Bogd Khaan had no 
intention of ceding power to a lesser incarnation from Inner Mongolia. 
Without the Khalkhs and also because of the withdrawal of Japanese 
38 
support soon after, the Dauria government rapidly collapsed. 
Pan-Mongolism also conflicted with existing Russian interests 
in East Asia. In the summer of 1911 the Russians had given their 
t t th M 1 · 1 t" 39 suppor 0 e ongo 1an revo u 10n as a result of an appeal by 
leading Khalkh Mongols. Afterwards they gave both practical and 
economic assistance to the new government and made representation to 
the Chinese government on the Khalkhs' behalf. However when the 
~ Treaty of Khiagt_was signed by the Mongols, the Russians and the 
" 40 
Chinese in 1915, the Mongols were only given autonomy under Ch1na. 
The Russians did not press for full independent status because they 
were already bound by a series of secret treaties contracted ~tsh the 
Japanese between 190~.3md 1910, un<!~~ whi~~~~e_.n~~~.t:~rn part ~f-~he 
. - ---
Chinese Empire was_<!iv.~ded ~!lto sp!t.eres of influence. Manchuria and 
parts of Inner Mongolia were in the Japanese sphere and Oute~ Mongolia 
fell to the Russians. 4l Furthermore Russian trade with the Chinese 
/ 
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was growing. The Russians had considerable investment in the 
Chinese Eastern Railway and were loath to put these interests in 
jeopardy by making excessive demands on behalf of a country where 
their economic prospects were not so high. Needless to say the 
Russians' unwillingness to support Mongolian government forces 
fighting in Inner Mongolia in 1913 and Russian reluctance to press 
for full Mongolian independence made them very unpopular in the eyes 
of Mongols but because the Russians were the Mongols' only allies, apart 
from the Tibetans,42 they were in no position to argue. 
The Autonomy is Abrogated 
The autonomy lasted until 1919. During this time progress 
in reform was hampered by internal disputes. Government planning was 
rudimentary and budgetting non-existent. Many of those in power were 
exceedingly conservative and wanted no change at all. The energies 
of the Bogd Khaan and his circle of high lamas were spent in a 
power contest with the hereditary ruling princes. High government 
officials who were not lamas were dismissed and important opponents 
were in some cases poisoned. In this way the state lost its 
partially democratic character and became a theocracy after the 
fashion of the Dalai Lama'S Tibet. 43 State funds were squandered by 
the court and the lamas condemned as against religion such things 
as progressive education, newspapers and the exploitation of natural 
resources. The khoshuu princes who comprised the upper house of 
the Mongolian parliament believed that the only way to end this state 
of affairs was to turn to China. By now any appeal to Russia was out 
of the question because of the 1917 Revolut~nand Ci~il War. 
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'~In 1919 the princes negotiated with the Chinese High 
Commissioner Chen I to end the autonomy. Together they drew up an 
agreement of 63 articles which reaffirmed Chinese sovereignty but 
offered safeguards for Mongolian hereditary rule. 44 Outer Mongolia 
was returning, in effect, to its status under the Manchu Emperor 
and the religious leaders were eliminated from the secular affairs 
of government. The upper house was unanimous in its support of this 
move. 
The Chinese government dispatched an army forthwith under 
general HsU Shu-cheng to implement the agreement. In fact Hsu 
ignored the agreement and instead embarked on a series of reforms of 
his own. These included major Chinese colonization and the complete 
absorption of Mongols into Chinese society. The princes lived to rue 
the day they agreed to end their country's separate status.
45 
By now it must have seemed to many Khalkh Mongols that the 
autonomy had been a total disaster. In fact the period from 1911 to 
1919 was an important time in the transition of a herding society, 
subject to an alien and sedentary empire, to an independent industrial-
agricultural state. By setting up their own government, seeking aid 
and alliances from non-traditional sources and by welcoming the assist-
ance of outsiders with special skills, Russians, Buriats and Inner Mongols, 
the Khalkhs laid themselves open to an entirely new set of experiences. 
Outer Mongolia had moved decisively into a sequence of change. 
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At first, that change was limited to Niislel Khuree. These 
new opportunities became open to a wider range of people within society. 
Poor but able-bodied youths were offered employment in the Bogd's army. 
The literate could find work in the ministries and other organizations 
of the government. The Buriat Ts. Jamtsrano opened a progressive schoo1 46 
and published a newspaper called Shine Tol' (New Mirror).47 The latter 
caused a tremendous stir in Niislel Khuree. Lamas were shocked by 
statements such as that the earth was round and they ordered the 
editor to confine himself to topics of general interest and in line 
48 
with religion. Soon afterwards the school and the paper were closed 
down but another newspaper the Niislel Khureenii Sonin Bichig (Capital 
49 
Monastery News) was published from 1917. It is not possible to 
assess fully how new ideas were influencing the citizens of the Mongolian 
capital at this time because primary sources such as these newspapers 
are not available to western scholars. Nevertheless the autonomy 
must have given thoughtful people a glimpse of a new kind of life 
possible in a state where the government works for the interests of the 
nation, and not just for its own advantage. 
Among the people affected by these influences were the govern-
ment officials who made up the lower house of the Mongolian parliament. 
They were exceedingly angry when the princes ended the autonomy and 
dissolved the parliament. Some offuem began to meet in the ger (tent) 
of Danzan, an official in the Ministry of Finance. There they discussed 
how they might reverse the decision and they also plotted, though 
.. 50 
without success,to assassinate Hsu Shu-cheng. A second group was in 
the habit of meeting in the ger of Dogsomyn Bodoo, a lama who worked in 
the translators' school run by the Russian embassy. They knew Ts. 
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Jamtsrano, the newspaper editor and also some of the refugees of the 
1905 and 1917 revolutions who had recently formed a soviet and a 
trades union in the Mongolian capita1. 51 Bodoo's group is said to 
have discussed social and political ideas and was well acquainted 
with the facts of the 1917 Russian revolution. The two groups,known 
as the East Urga Group (Danzan's) and the Consular Hill group (Bodoo's), 
eventually merged to form the Mongolian People's Party {MPP}. 
The Party came into being after members of the two groups 
met I.V. Sorokovikov, a Comintern agent who visited the Niis1e1 
.0 Khuree Soviet in 1920. The Mongols, knowing what was understood in 
the west by a political party and wishing to make the best opportunity 
of this meeting, made somewhat exaggerated statements about their 
"party" (in Mongolian nam, which also means "group"). They told 
Sorokovikov that it had existed for two years, had about 500 members 
( ) f 0 ffo 0 1 52 and also had the support of another party nam 0 mlnor 0 lCla s. 
Sorokovikov was clearly unaware of these exaggerations and at a 
second meeting he assured them of the Soviet government's willingness 
to assist their struggle for national liberation. They should, he 
said, make representation to the Soviet Russian consul in Troitskosavsk, 
just across the border from Khiagt. 53 
The possibility of this assistance gave the impetus to 
54 
form a party and this took place on 25 June 1920 in Danzan's ger. 
The party oath comprising an introduction and nine articles stated 
emphatically that the abrogation of the autonomy was against the 
wishes of the people. It went on to define the aims of the party 
thus: 
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"the goals of the Outer Mongolian People's 
Party are: to liquidate the foreign 
enemy which is hostile to our religion 
and race; to restore lost rights; 
to improve sincerely the internal govern-
ment; to give total attention to the 
interests of the poor and lowly masses; 
to preserve forever our internal rights; 
and to live~ neither oppressing nor being 
oppressed. ,,:>6 
At the same meeting lots were drawn and Danzan and 
Khorloogiin Choibalsan, who had been a member of the Consular Hill 
group and knew Russian, were chosen to make the dangerous journey 
to Soviet Russia. 56 
The story of the delegation and its journey has been 
studied extensively by scholars in Mongolia, the USSR and the West 
and needs only to be mentioned briefly here. 57 Danzan and 
Choibalsan were eventually joined by five others, Bodoo, Chagdarjav, 
SUkhbaatar, Dogsom and Losol. Several written representations were 
made to the Soviet authorities defining the aims and requests of the 
delegation and of the MPP. The delegates asked for material assist-
ance in order to fight for national autonomy, by which they meant 
independence, yet as in 1911 the ultimate aims of the party were not 
clearly defined and there is evidence of some disagreement among the 
leaders. In fact, before they joined the other delegates, Bodoo and 
Chagdarjav had drawn up an Alternative Appeal which speaks of the 
existence of two distinct groups or parties. One, to which the 
authors obviously belong, is described as democratic-republican, 
spreading national-revolutionary ideas. The other is a nationalist-
conservative party comprising princes and minor officials. On the 
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latter's request the two have united to fight for national independence, 
on condition that help is sought from Soviet Russia. 58 The 
appeal does not go so far as to say whether the nationalist-conservatives 
are identical with the East Urga Group or whether they merely embrace 
the sympathetic mass of officialdom in the Mongolian capital. The issue 
was probably deliberately blurred in the same way that the Party had 
originally been described to Sorokovikov. However there were, at 
times, sharp disagreements between the two Group leaders, Danzan and 
Bodoo, which are only partly explained by personal antagonism. At 
one stage the partisans of each group even took to walking on opposite 
sides of the street until the Russians pointed out that such behaviour 
59 
could seriously affect the success of their requests. 
In spite of Sorokovikov's assurances of help, the Soviet 
government made no haste to do anything positive until the Civil War 
spilled over into Mongolia. This happened when the White Russian 
Baron Ungern von Shternberg invaded Mongolia in November 1920 intending 
to turn the region into a base from which to attack the young Soviet 
state. 60 
By this time HSll Shu-cheng had returned to China to attend 
to other problems and played no further part in the history of Mongolia. 
Ungern drove out the Chinese soldiers who had been left in Niislel 
Khuree and so gained brief popularity with the Mongols. This approval 
soon turned to horror as the Mongolian population was subjected to a 
reign of terror by the White Russians. Ungern's troops treated the 
local people without mercy; they conscripted soldiers and requisitioned 
whatever they wanted from the Monglian population with great cruelty. 
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The Moscow government feared for the security of Siberia, 
the Far Eastern Republic and that vital artery, the Trans-Siberian rail-
way. Appeals were made to China to deal with Ungern but China was 
too involved with problems of its own and did nothing. Only now did 
the Russians take practical steps to provide the MPP with material 
assistance. 
By this time five of the original seven delegates were 
trying to build up the party organisation in Troitskosavsk, in Siberia 
just north of Khiagt, and to recruit a Mongolian army. They were 
completely cut off from the party organization in Niislel Khuree 
including Bodoo and Dogsom who had been sent back to continue party 
work there. Danzan who, with Chagdarjav and Losol, had undertaken 
negotiations in Moscow, was still trying to obtain what the Soviet 
government had promised. In February news came that Ungern and his 
forces were again in Niislel KhUree and it was clear to the Party-in-
exile that the time had come to make use of whatever resources it had 
'f b f ,61 1 the country was ever to e ree agaln. 
From 1-3 March 1921 about 30 people who were either party 
members or sympathizers met secretly in Khiagt to lay their future 
62 plans. Danzan chaired the meeting on the first two days, which 
is an indication of his leading position in the Party, and Sukhbaatar 
chaired the final session. Much of the discussion was given over 
to military matters. An army command comprised SUkhbaatar who was 
Commander-in-Chief, Namsrain Belegsaikhan, Chief of Staff, Danzan 
and two Russians, nominated by the Red Army. Damdiny Sukhbaatar 
(1893-1923) was chosen to lead the Mongolian army because he had 
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served in the forces of the autonomous state. He was the son of 
exceedingly poor parents who had migrated to Ikh KhUree in search of 
work where he was fortunate to be given some education. After the 
revolution of 1911 he joined the army and was trained as a machine-
gun unit commander. He had a distinguished record in both training 
and service in the war in Inner Mongolia in 1913 and later as a border 
guard. Sukhbaatar was undoubtedly a talented soldier and he was 
also extremely popular with his men, many of whom were to join him in 
the liberation forces. 63 
The meeting was also an important event in the history of 
the MPP because it gave formal definition to the aims and aspirations 
of the Party. On the opening day, Danzan as Chairman declared the 
following three objectives: the elimination of disorder, the defence 
of the Buddhist religion and the achievement of independence. At 
the closing session two documents were passed as resolutions of the 
meeting. Ts. Jamtsrano was the author of the documents, the first 
of which was a "Proclamation of the Mongolian People's Party to the 
People of Outer Mongolia" and the second a statement of Ten 
Aspirations~4 later known as the Khiagt Platform 9 which served as a 
party programme until 1925. 
The introduction to the Proclamation was couched in Marxist 
terminology and comprised what T.E.Ewing has described as 
"an orthodox Marxist-Leninist diagnosis 
of the World War and an exegesis of 
Communist political philosophy." 65 
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It was followed by a call for national liberation and social eman-
cipation of poor and weak nations such as Mongolia and Tibet. The 
Proclamation itself, however, is expressed in traditional Mongolian 
bureaucratic language. It states that ards throughout the land are 
in agreement to "sincerely and resolutely take possession of their own 
land and rivers" and aim to "open the great road of progress, to 
66 
restore the state which was destroyed." In similar language the 
Ten Aspirations express a desire for social change as well as 
preserving Mongolian traditions. 
"Our People's Party will examine what will 
become of such questions as external and 
internal government (policy), religious 
beliefs, long established Mongolian customs 
and ways of life, the present world situ-
ation and the future. We will resolve 
them in conformity with the long-term well 
being and progress of the Mongolian nation. 
However, if we consider it appropriate to 
stop those things which are not beneficial 
to the masses, which are harmful or not in 
accordance with the current times, or which 
are dying or already backward, then we will 
if possible alleviate them; otherwise we 
will not refrain from liquidating them by 
using harsh measures.,,67 
The record of the meeting at Khiagt, which was later known 
as the First Party Congress, shows that the leaders of the revolution 
of 1921 really had a foot in two ideological camps: that of the 
traditional intellectual world of Mongolia and the iconoclastic, 
levelling world of Marxism. At the most basic level, the demands 
made in 1921 were little different from those of 1911:- national 
independence, the protection of Buddhism and the unification of the 
Mongol peoples. (The last named is also included in the Ten 
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Aspirations). However the new leaders were no longer princes, 
important officials and lamas but what might be described as rising 
intellectuals. Some of them were also exceedingly poor and very 
young; they included men under 20 and few were over 40 years old. 
To such people the Marxist promises of a fairer share of the world's 
goods and a right to determine one's own destiny were very appealing. 
However, their grasp of the full context of Marxist thought was 
limited. Only one or two of the educated Buriat members of the Party 
could have been familiar with the Marxist classics because none were 
translated into Mongolian until 1925. This is why we find a policy of 
protecting religion going hand in hand with more overt Marxist ideas. 
Even though there were underlying contradictions in the aims 
of the MPP at this time the Comintern was willing to support the Mongolian 
revolution as a matter of policy. The theories of revolution upheld 
by the Comintern were formulated in the context of the advanced industrial 
societies of Europe. The belief was that in such countries the pro-
letariat would rise up to overthrow capitalism. However Asian and 
African societies, where the proletariat was rudimentary or non-existent, 
were also finding in Marxism the inspiration to rebel against the ties 
of colonialism. 
The international Communist movement had no wish to support 
the growth of capitalism in such countries only to have to overthrow 
it again. The theory had to be expanded to include the type of revol-
ution occurring in countries like these. Therefore the United Front 
policy of support for national liberation movements was accepted by 
the Second Comintern Congress in 1920. The struggle for independence 
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was expected to precede the rise of the proletariat and the class 
struggle. In such cases the Comintern would give its support to 
progressive groups such as the bourgeoisie who were seeking to break 
out of colonial and other dependent relationships. This explains 
why the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern worked so closely 
with the MPP at this time. There were at least three of its 
representatives at the Khiagt meeting and one of them, S.S. Borisov, 
an Altai Oirat, took the post reserved for a Comintern representative 
on the Central Committee of the MPP. 68 
The 1921 Revolution 
On 13 March a Provisional Government was formed. It was 
headed by Chagdarjav, a well travelled and educated lama, although 
he was replaced soon after by Bodoo who had returned from Niislel 
Khuree. There were five other Khalkh members and a further post 
was reserved for a representative from Uriankhai, the area to the north 
east of Khalkh which later became the Republic of Tannu Tuva. The 
members of the government were assigned no special responsibilities 
but were to work first to rid the country of foreign invaders. Later 
they should assemble representatives of the people who would elect a 
1 d t Of t°tutO 69 regu ar government an ra 1 y a cons 1 10n. The Provisional 
Government issued decrees and sent letters to men of consequence to 
elicit their support. Ards, princes and lamas flocked to join the 
freedom-fighters as the northern districts of Mongolia were liberated. 
The armed struggle began in earnest on 18 March when the 
border town of Khiagt was wrested from Chinese soldiers by a handful 
of Mongols against enormous odds. 70 Immediately afterwards the 
Provisional Government moved into the town and renamed it Altan Bulag 
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(Golden Spring). Fighting continued throughout April and fresh 
appeals for assistance were made to the Russian authorities. 
In May the Russians finally responded by sending a detach-
ment of the Fifth Red Army to assist the destruction of Ungern's 
forces. On 8 July Sukhbaatar led his victorious troops into Khuree 
followed by the Russians. Two days later, former ministers of 
the Bogd Khaan's government handed over their seals of office, 
symbols of their ruling power. The Bogd Khaan was restored to 
his throne but real power was in the hands of the Provisional 
71 Government. Bodoo was the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 
Danzan the Minister of Finance, Da Lama Puntsagdorj the Minister 
of Internal Affairs, SUkhbaatar the Minister for the Army and L. 
Magsarjav Minister of Justice. 72 
On the surface the Mongolian state was restored to its 
position at the end of 1911 and for many this was a cause for great 
rejoicing. But the world around this state was vastly changed from 
what it had been in 1911. North China was a battle ground for 
numerous warlords; in Russia and Siberia Bolsheviks ruled; and 
between Lake Baikal and the Pacific, a new pro-Soviet state, the 
FarEas~n Republic (FER) was enjoying a brief existence. 
Within Mongolia itself the success of the revolution brought 
fresh factors into play. The 1911 revolution had placed Inner 
Mongols in prominent government positions. In 1921 it was sympath-
izing Buriats who filled these posts. Some of them were working on 
active instructions from the Comintern because of their revolutionary 
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background and ability to speak Russian. They were not 
just Comintern agents, however. Those who made some 
of the greatest contributions to the Mongolian state in the 1920s 
were, in fact, fierce nationalists and Pan-Mongolists and were an 
interesting and dynamic feature of the decade. 
A second factor was the change in the power structure. 
Although the Bogd Khaan was the titular head of state, secular 
power was to be in the hands of an elected assembly. However, 
equality in the representative process was to be within limits. 
The new leaders and their supporters were profoundly disillusioned 
both by theocracy and by the princes who so willingly sold out to 
the Chinese in 1919. Yet out in the countryside the influence 
of princes and lamas was deeply entrenched and when the euphoria of 
driving out the foreign invaders died down, they began to form factions 
in opposition to the new regime. 
A third consequence of the 1921 revolution which makes it 
very different from the 1911 revolution was the strengthened alliance 
with Russian Bolsheviks and the international Communist movement. 
It must be said that the Mongol revolutionaries entered into this 
relationship of their own free will but they could scarcely have fore-
seen the kind of obligations it would eventually place on them. 
This was to be the single most important factor in the political, 
economic and cultural development of Mongolia and at the same time 
it was to isolate Khalkh Mongols from China and other world states 
just when they were ready to widen their external relations. 
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All these factors played a formative role in the state 
whose foundations were laid in the 1920s. However before any real 
development could take place the regime had to attend to two urgent 
tasks. It had to legitimize itself and establish its right to 
rule above that of all other claimants. It also needed to clarify 
to itself and the Mongolian people what it aimed to do for Mongolia 





THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY: 1921-1923 
The Mongolian State Seeks Recognition 
Once the Provisional Government was installed in Niislel 
Khuree the new regime made efforts to secure the recognition of 
the Mongolian state abroad. The Soviet government was requested to 
mediate with China on Mongolia's behalfl and a series of represent-
ations were made to Peking before a formal agreement was reached 
in 1924. 2 For a long time the Chinese were unprepared to discuss 
what they considered internal affairs with another state. The 
presence of Russian soldiers and advisers in Mongolia was looked on 
as an occupation by unwanted, outside forces. The Soviet negotiators' 
task was made no easier by the fact that they were also seeking recognit-
ion of the Soviet government and this gave the Chinese added bargaining 
power over Mongolia. The Peking government did not, however, attempt 
to use force to recover Mongolia. 
In September 1921 the Mongolian government sent a declaration 
of independence to the diplomatic representatives of other states in 
f I I · 3 Peking and expressed a willingness to open riend y re at10ns. This 
was generally ignored because most governments accepted Chinese claims 
to Mongolia without question. However it did not hinder the American 
Consul in Kalgan, Samuel Sokobin, from paying a visit to Niislel 
Khuree in September where he was handed a note in person by the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bodoo. The note stated: 
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"In strengthening the internal conditions of 
the country the People's Government has 
made a proposal to all governments to 
establish friendly relations with them. 
Respected Minister! 
Knowing your high government enjoys the 
confidence of the people, we make this 
our appeal to you; the Bogd Khaan, the 
government and the people wish to conclude 
with your government a treaty of friend-
ship, to exchange diplomatic representatives, 
to establish and develop further trade 
relations in the interests of both our 
states."4 
Although the Americans refused to recognize the Mongolian govern-
ment a number of American government officials visited Mongolia 
between 1921 and 1924 and American companies traded there. 
Only the Soviet government was prepared to open formal 
diplomatic relations with the Mongolian government. In the autumn 
of 1921 a delegation travelled to Moscow to sign what Mongols now 
considered to be the first equal treaty in the history of Mongolia. 5 
The delegates were Sukhbaatar, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, B. 
Tserendorj who was appointed deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
July, Danzan Minister of Finance, the Da Lama Shirnendamdin, who 
represen ted the Bogd Khaan and Erdene Batkhan a Buriat who acted 
as interpreter. 
Under the treaty which was signed on 5 November 1921 all 
previous treaties between the contracting parties were declared null 
and void. The two sides recognized each other's government as the 
only legal government and agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives. 
The principle of extraterritoriality was abolished and each agreed 
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to give no shelter to people or organizations hostile to the other. 
Provision was made for future agreements on border limitation, post, 
telecommunications, railway services and trade, and a number of Russian 
owned enterprises in Mongolia, including the telegraph station at 
Niislel Khuree and the Khiagt tannery, were handed over to the Mongolian 
government. After the treaty was signed arrangements were made for 
the Mongols to receive a Soviet government loan of 1,000,000 roubles 
6 to be repaid in products. The Mongols, for their part, made a 
donation of 1000 head of livestock for war and famine relief in Siberia 
as a mark of gratitude for the Red Army's assistance in driving out 
the Chinese and White Guard forces. 7 
Before they returned home the Mongolian delegates were granted 
an audience with Lenin who gave them some personal advice. 8 He 
recommended that the MPP struggle against foreign imperialists and 
look on the friendship of the Soviet people as the best guarantee of 
their independence. He also advised that cooperatives be formed in 
order to develop the national economy on non-capitalist lines. When 
asked if the MPP should become a Communist party he told them: 
"I do not advise you to do so because 
a party cannot just be changed into 
another." 
He explained that a Communist party is by nature a party of the pro-
letariat and said, 
"You must work hard to establish your 
government, economy and culture until 
a proletariat is created from the herding 
masses which later on will help to trans-
form the people's revolutionary party into 
a Communist party. To change simply the 
name is dangerous."g 
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The use of the term "revolutionary" to describe the MPP is 
curious since it was not incorporated into the Party's title until 
1924. However the record of this conversation is not contemporary but 
was compiled from the recollections of Tserendorj and B.Z. Shumyatskii 
which were published in 1926 and 1930 respectively.10 Indeed the 
details of the meeting with Lenin do not appear to have been made 
public in Mongolia at all before then and his advice was only recog-
nized as especially valuable after the serious political upheavals 
of 1924. 
Establishing a Government Structure 
Within Mongolia itself the new rulers were faced with the 
task of establishing order and control. When the Bogd Khaan was 
restored to his throne he retained his power over religious affairs 
but in secular matters he was little more than a figurehead. After 
the death of his mother in 1887 the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt had led 
a life totally unsuitable for a man of his religious calling which 
11 
gravely offended the religious sentiments of other church leaders. 
He drank to excess, indulged in female companionship, fathered a 
son and went blind from syphilis in 1915. As a political leader his 
autocratic rule and squandering of public funds12 had lost him much 
confidence among the secular ministers and officials. But, because 
he was the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt, holy incarnation of one of the 
Buddha Shakyamuni's disciples, he was still worthy of the utmost 
respect in the eyes of the faithful. Any disrespect to the Bogd Khaan 
was calculated to bring the gravest of suspicion on the regime, 
as it well knew. 
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The Bogd's position as the head of state was clearly 
defined in the document called the Oath-taking Treaty signed on 1 
November 1921~3 He was to have no secular power whatsoever, not 
even the right to veto legislation, but was required to agree to what~ 
ever decrees the Prime Minister put before him. In the case of war 
the government might make decisions without informing him at all. 
The final clause of the treaty declared: 
"This law has been promulgated in order 
to strengthen the Mongolian People's 
government, that religion may flourish, 
to promote harmony in internal affairs 
and honour abroad. Therefore the Bogd 
Khaan and the government have sworn a 
sacred oath to honour and keep this law." 14 
How impressed the high lamas of the Bogd's court were with the Party's 
methods of promoting religion we shall shortly discover. 
Real power and the making of decisions lay in the hands 
of a party whose membership was extremely small. A brochure 
published in1928l5 suggests that by September 1921, there were no 
more than 164 members, although it had the support of a successful 
army behind it. The leaders of the Party, the Central Committee, 
had been elected at the March meeting in Khiagt. Danzan, founder 
of the East Urga Group and chief delegate of the 1920 delegation to 
the Soviet Russia, was chairman and Dar'zavyn Losol and Tseren-ochiryn 
Oambadorj were members. 
16 Consular Hill Group. 
Losol was a former lama and member of Bodoo's 
Oambadorj (1899-l932) was one of the young 
Mongols educated in Irkutsk during the autonomy. He came in contact 
17 
with the party while working as a telegraph clerk in Khiagt. 
A fourth seat on the Central Committee was reserved for a represent-
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ative of the Comintern~ S.S. Borisov, an Altai Oirat who ~orked for 
the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat, was the first occupant 
but he was replaced shortly by Elbegdorj Rinchino. 18 
Ro hO 19 1nc 1no was one of the most important figures in the 
Mongolian power structure until 1925. He was born a Buriat about 
1885, received a Russian education and attended the University of 
St. Petersburg. He was acquainted with various political groups 
in Siberia, including Populists, Social Democrats and Communists 
and played a part in the upsurge of Buriat consciousness at the 
beginning of this century. It is likely that Rinchino influenced 
the development of the political ideas of that section of the Party 
which had been educated in Irkutsk. Choibalsan lodged in his home 
and Dambadorj knew him. Rinchino's association with the MPP dates 
from 1920 when he acted as interpreter for the delegation of that 
year. After the Provisional Government was installed in Khuree 
he was especially responsible for directing the new regime towards 
the Soviet state and the international Communist movement. According 
to the Diluv Khutagt, Rinchino was "taking the lead in directing 
all Party and Government matter~'in December 1921. 20 
Leading Party members also filled the ministerial and high 
executive posts of the government. In addition to Bodoo, Sukhbaatar 
21 
and Danzan there were D. Chagdarav, the deputy Prime Minister, and 
L. Magsarjav the Minister of Justice,22 both of whom were ~embers of 
the Consular Hill Group. The former was a wealthy lama and close 
friend of Bodoo. He appears to have been highly educated, well 
travelled and experienced as a business man. The Diluv Khutagt 
34 
was none too complimentary about him, however, calling him 
"light-thinking, deficient in care 
and caution, and heedless in anything 
whatever and by running about and 
talking with one person and another 
had come to lead a great many people.,,23 
The Provisional Government also attracted the services of men who were 
sympathetic to the Party's outlook and had useful administrative skills. 
The Oa Lama puntsagdorj24 was a senior administrator in the Ikh Shav'. 
He had some influence with the Bogd Khaan and was said to have a 
grudge against the Erdene Shandzudba Badmadorj, head of the Ikh Shav' 
administration. Puntsagdorj was made Minister of Internal Affairs 
in the provisional Government. Balingiin Tserendorj (1867-1927)25 
was the deputy foreign minister. He had served in the F~reign 
Ministry during the autonomy on whose behalf he visited St. Petersburg 
in 1913 and attended the 1915 treaty talks in Khiagt. Tserendorj was 
one of the signatories to the abrogation of the autonomy but after 
1921 he became very anti-Chinese. He was one of the outstanding public 
figures in Mongolia in the 1920s. The ministries and other public 
bodies were manned by many of similar background. These professional 
officials were able to read and write the Mongolian script and had 
valuable administrative experience. Their services were essential to 
the MPP. 
It was intended that the Mongolian state should eventually 
have a constitutionally elected assembly of representatives of the 
people. Because groups of White Guards were still disrupting some 
parts of the country the authorities in Niislel Khuree deferred 
26 
elections for a year and summoned a prOVisional assembly instead. 
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The National ProvisionalKhural, orthe Provisional Little Khural 
as some historians describe it, (khural means "assembly", "gathering" 
or "meeting") first met on the 28 October 1921. 27 The newspaper 
Uria reported: 
"Now, representatives of the four 
aimags and Ikh Shav', ministers, deputy 
ministers and executive officials of 
the five ministries such as Internal 
Affairs, representative officials of 
the army and the people's education 
office and representatives of the Youth 
League and army offices meet every 
Tuesday and Thursday. They criticise 
conditions in the state and among the 
masses and discuss matters concerned with 
future improvement. The beis28 Dugarjav 
has been elected chairman-and Bavaasanjav 
(Bavaasan] vice-chairman. "29 
The National Provisional Khural was an advisory body. It 
had a fixed composition of 60 members and it was stipulated that 
five ards and one prince must be chosen from each of the four aimags and 
the Ikh Shav,.30 This was to guarantee that 92% of the membership 
was ard. The assembly continued to meet until January 1924 when 
it was dissolved, presumably because elections for a regular Khural 
31 
were underway. A contemporary Russian observer Anatolii 
Kallinikov remarked: 
"the general structure of the Kh~~al 
proved on the whole, to be tame" 
but there is probably truth in the assessment of the Mongolian 
historian Shirendev that the Khural was 
"an important step in having the 
broad masses participate in 
national affairs •.... "33 
36 
The Provisional Government had already begun issuing 
decrees before it was installed in Niislel Khuree and many of the 
reforms ordered were at the expense of the hereditary ruling 
princes. They were deprived of their ranks, salaries and numerous 
privileges. They were forbidden to wear ceremonial garments or 
buttons of rank on their hats and could no longer use public 
services such as the horse relay service or ortoo for private 
34 
needs. In 1922 they lost the right to the service of khamjilga 
who were declared free ards. 35 The behaviour of princes as admin-
istrators was closely scrutinized and many were turned out of office 
for bad government or for treating their subjects cruelly. They 
and princes who died in office were gradually replaced by elected 
t t o 36 lth h ~o t f ° ft represen a 1ves, a oug at ~1rs sons 0 pr1nces were 0 en 
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elected in their place. Those princes who did retain their positions 
found their traditional autonomy over khoshuu affairs sorely hampered 
by the presence of special government representatives. 
The special representatives (in Mongolian toloonii tushmed) 
were assigned first to the aimags and the Ikh Shav' and then to some 
khoshuus. Their tasks were to make known party policy, to ensure 
that government decrees were carried out, to set up local party 
organizations and supervise the change to an elective system of local 
government. In the Ikh Shav' they also kept a close watch on 
expenditure on food and religious services which the government aimed 
to reduce. Some special representatives helped to set up schools 
in the countryside and all were involved in the census of 1923. They 
were given seals of office and generally enjoyed great power; in 
disputes with the khoshuu princes their word was final. 38 Curiously. 
37 
not all of the special representatives ~ere party members. 39 
As the princes felt themselves constrained and threatened, 
rumours began to circulate that people like Sukhbaatar were unable to 
direct national affairs. 40 Some left the country in the hope of 
persuading the Peking government4l or Chang Tso_lin42 the warlord in 
Manchuria to overthrow party rule. Others merely grumbled. There 
were, however, some princes who were sympathetic to the ideals of the 
MPP. They renounced their former ranks and privileges, cut off 
their queues and offered their services to the government. Among 
to survive 
them were Navaannerin the former Tsetsen Khan,43 lastiof the four 
khans of Khalkh, and Khatanbaatar Magsarjav44 a minor prince and military 
leader who covered himself in glory in the 1911 and 1921 revolutions. 
In spite of this support and that of enlightened churchmen the forces 
of opposition to the regime were building up. From December 1921 
a series of plots were brought to light, evidence of forces within the 
aristocracy, the Church and even in revolutionary circles which 
challenged the Party's right to rule. 
Handling Opposition 
The first challenge came from the Church. In December 1921 
the Saj Lama Jam'yandanzan, who was head of the Bogd Khaan's personal 
bodyguard, was arrested· on the eve of allegedly attempting to seize 
45 power. He was accused of intending to reinstate the Bogd as 
unlimited monarch with the aid of a force of 300 Tibetans. ~hen 
soldiers searched his ger (tent) they discovered some weapons and a 




Otherwise evidence for 
38 
the plot is thin. The Bogd Khaan denied all knowledge of it and 
pleaded for leniency. Danzan the P arty chairman agreed and the Saj 
Lama was pardoned. 
If the Saj Lama was guilty his actions were directed 
towards righting a specific wrong done to his master the Javzandamba 
Khutagt. However the churchmen were beginning to smart under the 
effects of new laws that affected them personally; their privileges 
were curtailed, they were forbidden to tax the faithful and they lost 
the right to the services of shav' nar who were freed like the khamjilga. 
Pardonning the Saj Lama may have been a diplomatic move to prevent a 
general hardening of the religious opposition. On the other hand the 
"discovery" of this plot may have been a ploy to distract public 
attention from a potentially more dangerous problem within the Party 
which involved the Prime Minister Bodoo and the recently formed Youth 
League. 
The Mongolian League of Revolutionary Youth was formed in 
August 1921 on the model of the Soviet Komsomols. The members were 
aged 16-25 and they were expected to assist in the work of public-
izing party and goverment policies, engage in cultural and educational 
work and become the party members of the future. Choibalsan was elected 
secretary and within a month 70 members, mainly from the ranks of 
46 
radical, young, lower officials,were enrolled. For some years the 
League was completely separate from the Party and was more closely 
influenced by the Youth Comintern than the Party was by the Comintern 
at this time. It is likely that the Russian Starkov, who had been a 
political education adviser to the Mongolian army, was closely involved 
39 
with the League,and also Rinchino. 47 There were representatives of 
the League on the Provisional Little Khural and various other govern-
ment bodies and the League enjoyed more power than would normally be 
considered appropriate to people of that age and experience. Con-
sequently it rapidly grew into a monster child, threatening the very 
party. that gave it birth. 
Late in 1921 Bodoo was drawn into arguments with the Youth 
League, apparently over the amount of Russian influence that could be 
permitted in the Mongolian state. He antagonized League members by 
calling them "little children" and said they were not mature enough to 
get involved in government affairs. 48 Bodoo was well known for his 
hasty temper. During the 1920 visit to Russia, Danzan had called him 
49 
a "difficult man, proud and haughty." However, according to Serge 
Dalin, a Comintern official who wrote a short book on the Youth League 
in 1924, it was not only Bodoo who was irritated by the younger group. 
Dalin suggests that the entire party leadership was at loggerheads 
°th °t 50 Wl 1. The MPP therefore tried to split the League by attracting 
its less radical members onto its own side. Then the train of events 
becomes unclear. In January of 1922 Bodoo retired from his government 
posts along with his close friend the deputy Prime Minister Chagdarjav. 
The immediate reasons are puzzling. A biography of SUkhbaatar states that 
Bodoo forced women to abandon their traditional elaborate headdresses 
51 
and forbad them to wear more than a small amount of gold jewellery. 
By so doing, it is claimed, he tried to push the revolution faster 
and further than other, wiser Party members were prepared to. Sukhbaatar 
was most upset that women should be treated in this fashion. He 
arranged a meeting to return the confiscated jewellery and declared 
40 
that Bodoo's resignation was no loss either to the Party or the 
52 government. 
On the face of it, it seems as if the Party had almost 
caused its own downfall. In view of a similar train of events in 
1924 when Danzan was ousted from his position of power we ~ay 
wonder whether the affair was not engineered or at least ~anipulated 
by Rinchino, with or without Comintern advice. The Diluv Khutagt 
said that in December 1921 Bodoo had quarrelled with the Comintern 
t t ' 53 represen a lve. There were certainly issues that the two men 
disagreed on. Rinchino did not approve of Bodoo's approach to the 
USA to open diplomatic relations, for instance. 54 Was Bodoo driven to 
resigning in order to install someone who was more cooperative and 
generally popular as Prime Minister? It is unlikely that such 
questions will ever be answered. 
Bodoo was replaced as Prime Minister by the Jalkhanz Khutagt 
Damdinbazar, one of the most senior incarnations who was extremely 
55 
able and popular. Although he has been scornfully portrayed as 
little more than a figure-head56 he was in fact an experienced 
57 
politician who had held high public office during the autonomy. 
He is said to have shown genuine concern for the Mongolian nation and 
58 
was opposed to theocracy even though he was a churchman. Even 
more important he was able to get on with people as the Diluv Khutagt 
recalls: 
~ ... the young fellows who on entering 
the Party had cut off their queues and 
hair and changed their hats and clothes 
were in awe of the Jalkhanz Gegeen and 
41 
some of them were unable to face him; 
but when some of the men got up in the 
new style met the Gegeen and the Gegeen 
did not reprove or blame them or any-
thing of that kind, their minds were set 
at ease and those who had joined the 
Party were not hindered (in meeting him) 
it is said.,,59 
Fears for the safety of the government continued however and 
in 1922 the security services were formed. The army already undertook 
intelligence work and this was extended in May when what is described 
as a "secret office" was formed within the Military Council. The 
Chairman of the Council was Rinchino but SUkhbaatar is credited with 
the initiative for this particular office. 60 It was also Sukhbaatar who, 
some time after, sent soldiers to dispose of a serious threat to security 
. th t th J L Db" t 61 ln ewes, e a ama am lJan san. 
"Ja Lama" was an assumed title for the man was probably not 
a lama at all. He was in fact a Kalmuck62 adventurer who claimed to 
be the incarnation of Amursana, an Oirat prince-hero of the eighteenth 
century. He had visions of setting up a Western Mongolian (Oirat) 
state and had been stirring up trouble in the Khovd region for years. 
He was a cruel yet appealing figure who played on the religious and 
nationalist feelings of the Western Mongols. His reappearance in 
Western Mongolia after 1921 was unlikely to mean anything but trouble 
for the government of Niislel KhUree. 
Sukhbaatar therefore sent out a party of soldiers to deal 
with the Ja Lama. They disguised themselves as lamas, tricked their 
way into the Ja Lama's presence, and there they slew him. As they 
made their getaway it occurred to them that ordinary people. to '.hom 
42 
the Ja Lama seemed almost immortal, would not believe that he was 
dead so they went back, cut off his head and returned with it to 
N"" 1 1" 63 lIS e Khuree. 
In July 1922 the Office of Internal Security, the Mongolian 
Secret Police, was formed. 64 Its chief was a Mongol called Baldandorj65 
who was assisted by a Soviet adviser, Andrei Sorokin. 66 Other Russians 
employed by the office were Batorun67 who had previously worked with 
Sukhbaatar· and Baljeron68 who knew Rinchino. The brief of the Office 
of Internal Security was to struggle against so-called feudal-theocratic 
plots. 
The Secret Police acted quickly. By August, 40 men had been 
arrested and tried for counter-revolutionary activities and 15 were 
69 
shot. Among them were a number of former Party and government 
members including Bodoo, Chagdarjav and Puntsagdorj. The main charge 
was that they had plotted to overthrow the existing government and 
restore the previous one under the unlimited monarchy of the Bogd Khaan. 
The Minister of Internal Affairs Puntsagdorj was said to have used, 
occasionally, the words "Bogd Khaan Unlimited Monarch" in official 
70 documents. Bodoo was accused on many accounts: he aimed to set up 
a reactionary government under China and while Prime Minister had had 
71 
treasonable contacts with Sokobin, the American Consul in Kalgan, 
72 Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese and the Ja Lama. 
The methods of the Secret Police were not guaranteed to 
give the accused a fair trial. No real evidence was ever produced 
to substantiate the charges of ~ and we cannot be sure that this 
43 
"plot" ever really existed. It is possible that the whole affair 
was part of the manoeuvering of the Mongolian state closer to the 
USSR and the Comintern by Rinchino and his supporters. 
These were dangerous times for people who were not wholly 
with the regime and coercive measures were used to pacify the 
population. Only this can explain how a small number of special 
government representatives, for instance, could control the vast 
country areas where the Church and traditional economic and social 
structures were entrenched and support for the regime was less than 
enthusiastic. Some western observers speak in terms of a reign of 
73 
terror with prisons full and people disappearing without trace. 
In 1923 yet another plot was exposed involving former 
ruling princes and high lamas. It was taken very seriously and many 
74 
\\ere executed. It was alleged that in the summer of that year a 
scribe called Tserenpil drew up a false document in the name of lamas 
and princes and sought to obtain aid from Japan in order to reinstate 
the theocracy by means of a coup on the lunar New Year's Day. About 
thirty people were implicated and the leader was said to be a high-
ranking incarnation, the Manjshir (Manjusri) Khutagt. .0 Sukhbaatar, 
who died in February 1923, is said to have been troubled in his last 
hours by a vision of Tserenpil running riot in the streets of 
Khuree. 75 When the plot was discovered, although many were condemned, 
the Manjshir Khutagt was completely exonerated. It was later alleged 
that his innocence was engineered by the Jalkhanz Khutagt and the 
deputy Prime Minister Tserendorj. 
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Although potential counter-revolutionaries could be kept 
under control by terror and coercion, the continuing discord between 
the MPP and the Youth League was less easy to deal with. Both organ-
izations were members of the international Communist movement and 
had advisers posted to their Central Committees. The MPP asked to 
join the Comintern in March 1921 and was admitted as a sympathizing 
76 
member with consultative rights soon after. The Youth League 
joined the Youth Comintern, also as a sympathizing member, in December 
1922. 77 
The dispute centred around what was the correct revolutionary 
policy for the Mongolian state and part of the problem was that the 
Comintern and the Youth Comintern were giving out conflicting advice. 
There were similar disputes between the RCP and the Komsomols in the 
Soviet Union for the same reason. However there was an additional prob-
lem that was peculiar to the Mongolian situation. The MPP was a young 
and inexperienced party with a very small membership. It had scarcely 
time to establish what its ideology and policies were before it was 
plunged into the daily administration of a state. Although the Youth 
League also contributed to public service it had generally more time 
than the Party to devote to political theorizing and debate. Hence 
the Party was pF.agmatic while the League was more radical. 
The Youth League began to move into a position of complete 
independence and opposition to the Party in 1922. The question of 
independent status was discussed at the League's First Congress in 
78 d July 1922, and a resolution in its favour was passed at its Secon 
Congress in July 1923. 79 The MPP was not prepared to let this go 
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unchallenged and hastily summoned a congress of its own at the very 
time the Youth League was meeting. 
At the time this congress was described as the Party's 
First Congress but in 1924 the Khiagt meeting came to be regarded 
as the First so the 1923 congress is now called the Second. It 
was later claimed that leading members of the Party objected to 
holding such a meeting at this time. The MPP was inadequately pre-
pared, funds were low and certain leaders who should have attended 
80 
were out of the country. Rinchino himself was away in Moscow for 
"d" " 81 econom1C 1SCUSS10ns. According to the Russian historian, Zlatkin, 
the congress met because of Comintern pressure. 82 
A slim volume of congress proceedings was published in the 
MPR in 1974. 83 It is by no means complete; most of the discussions 
are missing and it tells us little more about Party and League relations 
84 than is known from other sources. It does name the presidium 
officials and gives names and ages of all the delegates however. The 
chairman was Dorj, aged 29, of Zasagt Khan Aimag. His deputies were 
Dejid-Osor, 28, of Altan Bulag and Danzan. Other members of the 
presidium were Mishigdorj (31), Natsagdorj (18), Gombodorj (37) and 
Avirmed (25).85 All but Danzan and Natsagdorj, who later achieved 
fame as the MPR's first modern poet failed, apparently, to make any 
further mark in the history of the MPP. What we do not know is how 
many of the delegates and members of the presidium were also members 
of the Youth League and if they attended both the Party and the League 
Congresses. It is surely of significance that the representative 
of the Comintern at the Second Party Congress, Zorigt, (i.e. the Russian 
Starkov) was actually an official of the Youth Comintern. 86 
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The two main items on the agenda of the Youth League's 
congress were the question of the League's status and the ~atter of 
transforming it into an organization of ards. A resolution was 
passed which declared the League completely independent of the Party. 
The League maintained that the MPP was holding back in the struggle 
against feudalism and theocracy and therefore it could not allow itself 
87 to be linked with the Party. It agreed to undergo a purge to get 
rid of members who were not of ard origin. This was duly carried out 
and it is recorded that by May 1924 90% of the Youth League members 
were ards although there is no statement of the proportions before the 
88 purge. 
The Party Congress also passed a series of resolutions 
in the interests of ards. The Leninist principles of party membership, 
as laid down by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, were formally 
accepted89and in . accordance with this resolution a purge was ordered. 
There was a discussion of the document the "Ten Aspirations" (the 
Khiagt Platform) and a few minor changes were made to render it more 
90 
appropriate as a party programme. Economic changes were discussed, 
1 I " d 91 though with little thought as to how they cou d be rea lze . A 
significant resolution was passed on the Mongolian Central Cooperative 
however. This organization was formed in 1921 when Chinese trading 
was at a standstill. The main investors were wealthy princes and 
churchmen, the Bogd Khaan 92 being the largest, and few were party 
members. The Congress resolved that the cooperative should be turned 
" t" 93 into a mass organlza lone Finally there was a call for strengthening 
friendship with the Soviet Union and liquidating all who tried to 
d h " 94 destroy that frien s lp. 
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There seems some doubt as to whether the resolutions of 
this congress reflect the genuine wishes of the Party. At the Third 
Congress a year later it was reported that the resolutions were 
rumoured to be the work of two or three people and few of them had been 
. d t 95 carr~e ou. One useful outcome of the Second Congress was the 
reorganization of the Central Committee. 96 It was enlarged to 15 
members and there were to be three departments dealing with general 
matters, propaganda and organization. The general department would 
be concerned with finances, discipline and publicizing meetings. 
The propaganda department would train and organize propagandists, 
publish books and journals, supervise and criticise the government 
and arrange cultural events. The organization department would set 
up cells and offices and keep membership records. Those elected 
to the Central Committee were Danzan (known as Japan-Danzan), 
Tserendorj, Rinchino, Danzan, Dorj, Dorjpalam, Darndin, Natsagdorj, 
Buyannemekh, Jantsrano,Dambadorj, Oejid-Osor, Ravdan, Narnjiljav 
and Dugarjav. The five candidate members were Losol, Bavaasan, Gombo, 
Monkh-ochir and Mishigdorj. Baataryn Danzan (1875-1930) was 
chosen as chairman of the Central Committee. 97 He is better known by 
his niCk-name, Japan-Danzan, which alluded to a visit he made to 
Japan in 1916 and distinguished him from S. Danzan the Commander-in-
Chief. Japan-Danzan was formerly a lama and minor official of the 
pre-revolutionary government. He had apparently renounced his religion 
and in 1921 he joined the MPP. A Soviet article of 1925 described 
him as a leader of the Party's left who had cherished the hope of a 
Mongolian republic since 1915. 98 
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The final act of this congress was to set up a joint Central 
Committee commission with the Youth League to examine the relation-
ship of the two organizations and to try to reconcile them. 99 Eventually 
an Eight Point Plan was drawn up which was something of a compromise. 
The Youth League was declared to be independent in its internal affairs 
and it had the rigttto criticise the Party. The Party was to 
help and direct the League whose members were permitted to transfer to 
the Party at the age of 21 and obliged to at 25. Unfortunately, when 
this document was presented to the Youth Comintern, it did not approve 
of it and so the issue was still unresolved by the summer of 1924. 100 
Sununary 
The Party and government that came to power in 1921 was a 
loose unity of progressives of all social groups. They had a notion 
that certain injustices in the Mongolian social and political orders 
must be corrected and they wanted to see a strong and flourishing 
national state. As they laboured to find ways and means of achieving 
these desires and as the danger to their state from external sources 
receded arguments and disagreements resulted in factionalization. 
The struggle between Danzan and Bodoo over policies and who was the 
real leader of the Party was resolved in 1922. Danzan won and Bodoo 
lost his life. In this struggle the catalyst, though not the primary 
cause, was the Comintern, through its agent Rinchino. 
In spite of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet 
Union the influence of the Russian authorities over Mongolian life was 
less than that of the Comintern in these years. There was a ~apid 
49 
turnover of Soviet diplomatic agents and not all of them or the 
Russian advisers in Niislel Khuree were popular with the Mongols. 
Furthermore, the Russian trade presence was minimal until a trade 
agreement of 1923 opened the way for Soviet trading organizations 
to compete with the Chinese traders who had flocked back once the 
fighting had stopped. (See Chapter 5). 
As the Party continued to strengthen its position through 
legislative and coercive means the Comintern, in line with its own 
changing policies, made use of the continuing disruptive behaviour of 
the Youth League to alter the character of the MPP. The resolutions 
of the Second Party Congress mark the beginning of "ardization" -
the process of making the Party and government the sole province of 
ards of the lowest economic groups. This was to break the hold on 
the MPP of nationalists and the intelligentsia of Niislel Khuree 
officialdom, whose leader was Danzan. While Danzan and his circle 
were still in control little was done to implement the Congress 
resolutions. Therefore Danzan had to go. From 1923 Rinchino and 
Danzan sparred with one another in the Central Committee and in the 
Military Council. Before they broke out into an open fight, however, 
the Party experienced a stroke of good fortune in its search for legitimacy: 
the Bogd Khaan died. 
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CHAPTER TIfREK 
1924 MONGOLIA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 
The Bogd Khaan died, apparently, of a malignant disea~of 
the throatl at the age of 54. 2 The high lamas of his circle had 
begged permission to levy for a service to pray for his recovery but the 
Central Committee refused. 3 He passed away at 4 a.m. on 20 May 1924. 
His corpse was carefully embalmed and gilded after which it was placed 
in a temple where the faithful could venerate it.4 
Under normal circumstances holy incarnations did not produce 
heirs. However the Bogd Khaan had taken a consort called Oondogdulam. 
She had been crowned with him in 1911 and had been given the title Ekh 
D . 5 aglna. The couple had adopted a son and tried, without success, to 
have him recognized as the Bogd Khaan's heir. However, nothing more was heard 
of the boy after the autonomy. 
The Ekh Oagina died suddenly in 1923. It is rumoured she was 
strangled on the Bogd Khaadlinstruction~ but since she had been deeply 
involved in the intrigues of the court, it is equally possible that the 
lamas of the court disposed of her in the course of their own factional 
manoeuvrings. The Bogd Khaan took another consort after her death but nothing 
6 
ever came of his plans to found a dynasty. 
The usual practice on the death of a Javzandamba Khutagt ~as for 
the high lamas to ask permission of the Manchu Emperor to initiate a 
51 
search for the next incarnation. Since the time of the Third Janzan-
damba Khutagt, all such incarnations had to be born in Tibet within 
nine months of the death of the previous one. The discovery was subject 
to the approval of the Emperor. Because the MPP had, in effect, assumed 
the authority of the Manchu Emperors, application for a search was made 
to the Central Committee as soon as the eighth incarnation died. The 
Party was faced with two alternatives: to recognize a Ninth Javzandamba 
Khutagt and endure all the consequences of lama regency 'during his 
minority, or to end the monarchy altogether and risk offending the 
religious sentiments of the general population. 
The Declaration of the Mongolian People's Republic 
The Central Committee procrastina~ and on 30 May it announced 
7 
that the time was not ripe for searching for a new khutagt. A week 
later on 7 June it ended the monarchy and declared the state a republic, 
to be called the Mongolian People's Republic (Mffi). The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs was told to spread the news throughout the land and an 
announcement appeared in the Party and government newspaper Ardyn Erkh 
("People's Rule") on 25 June. 
The state was to have no president and supreme power was 
vested in an elected national assembly called the Great Khural (Ikh 
Khural) . 1911 was still considered to be the date of the foundation 
of this state but the numbering of the years from 1911 were no longer 
to be according to the Bogd Khaan' s reign ti tIe "Elevated by the Many" 
(Olnoo Orgogdson). They were to be numbered, ins~ead, according to the 
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year of the Mongolian government. Hence 1924 was to be the 14th Year 
of the Mongolian Government. Finally, 11 July, the anniversary of 
the 1921 liberation of Khiagt, was made a public holiday. In this way 
the importance of both 1911 and 1921 for the independent Mongolian 
t t . d 8 s a e was recogn1ze . 
On 27 June the government announced that the hall ~hich had 
been built for the Sogd Khaan to hold civic ceremonies and ~eceptions 
would be transferred to the government and adapted for the use of that Great 
Khural. The bUilding, together with gold, silver and nephrite seals 
and documents, symbols of the Sogd Khaan's secular authority, were transferred 
to the government with great ceremony. The seals and papers were 
brought by car from the palace to the government building where 
army cadets, their swords unsheathed, mounted a guard of honour and 
government ministers waited to receive them. To the sound of music 
which was customarily played whenever the Sogd Khaan went abroad, the guard 
saluted and the precious items were carried in. After a careful 
inspection they were sealed in an iron box and borne away to await the 
instructions of the Great Khural. The music continued playing and ~he 
9 guards marched off down the street. 
The transfer from monarchy to republic was carried out with 
dignity and there is little evidence of open opposition. The idea 
of a republic was not, of course, a new one. Bodoo had described 
his party as "democratic-republican" in his Alternative Appeal of 
192010 and in a speech at the First Great Khural in November 1924 
Tserendorj suggested that establishing a republic was conside~ed in 
1921. 11 The Youth Comintern wri ter Oalin att ributed the "painless" 
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establishment of the Republic to three years campaigning by 
12 the Youth League. That may have been true in the capital, but out 
in the countryside few objected because they did not know about it. 
the Third Party Congress in August a representative of the Youth League 
called Gombojav remarked: 
"But what is a Republic? Surely this is 
still unknown in the provinces. I hope 
that the delegates when back at home will 
explain to the people the aim and meaning 
of the new form of government. 13 
What was the subject of some dispute was the question of whether or 
not to have a president. Some believed a president to be little 
different from a monarch, and therefore it was decided to follow the 
example of Switzerland and the Soviet Union and have supreme power 
vested in an elected assembly instead. 14 
The Fifth Comintern Congress 
The Bogd Khaan's death was indeed timely for it coincided 
with a change in Comintern policies concerning member parties. This 
was form~ated at the Fifth Comintern Congress which met in Moscow 
15 from 17 June to 8 July. This Congress marks the beginning of the 
dominance of the international Communist movement by the RCP, replacing 
that of the German party. A slogan of "bolshevization" for all member 
parties was adopted which implied that they should become part ies of 
the masses, Marxist in spirit, working for the victory of the proletariat 
over the bourgeoisie and taking instruction from the Cominte~n. They 
were, in effect, to conform to the ideas and practices of the RCP, an 
obligation which reduced the opportunities for dissension and increased 
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the danger of deviation and opportunism. The principle of ''bolsheviz-
ation" was drawn up with European parties chiefly in mind. In multi-
party states where the Communist party did not enjoy state power it was 
possible to "bolshevize" and at the same time continue the United Front 
policy as a means of working for socialism by overthrowing social 
democracy. In a country like the MPR, however, where only one party 
existed and that party controlled the state, the policies of the 
United Front and "bolshevization" had different implications and could 
be expected to cause friction not only in the Party but also throughout 
government and society. 
A delegation of Mongols travelled to Moscow to attend the 
Comintern Fifth Congress. Among them was Dambadorj, head of the 
Central Committee's organization department. 16 Rinchino may also 
have been present and Sodnombaljiriin Buyannemek~17 the chairman of 
the Youth League, who attended the Youth Comintern Congress which 
followed the Fifth Comintern Congress. Most of the speeches at the 
Comintern Congress were delivered in German and it is unlikely that 
any of the MPP delegates understood them. They would have presented 
a report on conditions and events in the MPR, however, and received 
instructions to carry out when they returned home. From later events 
we can assume that the Mongolian delegates were given three specific 
instructions; to remove from party membership those people such as 
former princes and lamas who were not genuine ards, to redefine 
foreign policy and make the alliance with the USSR its central feature, 
and to clarify the nature of Mongolia's future economic development. 
Buyannemekh was told to effect a reconciliation of the Party and 
Youth League. 
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Party Organization and Recruitment 
Both the Party and the League had developed in numbers and 
organization since 1921. In 1923 and 1924 there was a concerted member-
ship drive and many small groups of members or cells were formed in 
both organizations. The cells were attached to government and 
public offices, the army, and the aimags and khoshuus of the country-
side. They were linked with the Central Committees of the parent 
organization through aimag and town committees. 
There are many descriptions of the founding of cells in 
memoir literature and they show that people from all ranks of society 
were being enrolled at this time, including former princes and lamas . 
.. Budjavyn Choindcnof Tusheet Khan aimag has recorded how the 120th cell 
was founded in the summer of 1924. 18 
"After explaining the ai,.~ and tasks of 
party members Sudevdonol and the others 
drew up a list of people being considered 
for enrolment to party membership. Among 
them were princes, officials and scribes 
who were clamouring to join and I myself 
was one of those who \\ere seeking to join 
the Party. 
After the princes and officials had voluntarily 
renounced the privileges they had previously 
enjoyed they were put on the list. An 
investigation was made of those listed. They 
were made to swear the oath and then sign 
their names. There were about twenty of them. 
. . . 
Those elected to Party membership assembled 
in the ger and Sudevdonoi opened the first 
meeting of the cell. This became the 120th 
cell of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party. The day our cell was set up the weather 
was bright and beautiful and my heart was 
overflowing with joy. I have not forgotten 
it to this day.,,20 
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The Third MPP Congress 
In August 1924 representatives of some 121 party cells and 
offices arrived in Niislel Khuree to attend the Third Congress of the 
MPP. This Congress has come to be regarded as a watershed in the 
history of the MPR and in the development of revolutionary MPR because, 
in the words of the official History of the MPR the Congress: 
"advanced formally for the first time 
as the MPRP(r(pp) general political line 
the historical inevitability of the non-
capitalist development path."2l 
Karl Marx studied the societies and states of Europe and 
reasoned that states move towards Communism through a series of 
inevitable historical stages. He predicted that the capitalist stage 
as it existed in his lifetime would be overthrown by the oppressed 
proletariat and replaced by socialism. However when Lenin realized 
that the largely pre-capitalist societies of Asia and Africa were 
looking to the 1917 Russian Revolution and the international Communist 
movement for inspiration to fight for independence he reasoned that it 
was nonsense to insist that they should, after liberation, create a 
capitalist industrial economy, only to have to overthrow it again to 
reach the socialist stage. Therefore he taught that: 
" •..• backward countries can with the aid of the 
proletariats of the advanced countries shift 
to soviet institutions, can pass through 
specific stages of development, and can shift in-
to communism by by-passing the stage of capitalist 
development. "22 
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In 1966 the MPRP (MPP) Institute of Party History published 
a series of documents compiled in honour of the 40th anniversary 
23 of the Third Party Congress. Although Mongolian leaders after 1924 
stated frequently that the MPR was'~ypassing capitalism",the main 
economic activity, livestock herding, continued to be organized on a 
private basis and it was not until after the Second World War that 
"bypassing capitalism"became a major factor in economic development. 
By the 1960s livestock herding was collectivized and large amounts of 
aid and practical assistance from the USSR, China and the CMEA led 
to considerable growth in industry and agriculture (crop-raising) on 
explain 
t t d b 0 24 Tho /.. a s a e-owne aS1S. 1S may why the documents of this particular 
Congress have been made widely available. 
The records of the Third Party Congress have been drawn 
from archival material, contemporary Mongolian press accounts and 
contemporary Russian reports. They give a detailed account of the daily 
events of the Congress, some insight into the personalities of its 
leading participants and a picture of the changes beginning to affect 
Mongolian life. In particular they show how the policy disputes and 
power struggles within the Party itself and between the Party and Youth 
League were resolved. 
There are other useful sources on the Third Congress. A 
contemporary English translation based on the Russian text of the Third 
Congress protocols was published in Tientsin in the 1920s. 25 This 
version has a few passages omitted from the Mongolian text but it does 
not include the account of the violent argument that broke out on 26 
August and ended with the shooting of Danzan the Chairman. Two recently 
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published memoir accounts have added further insight. These are by 
Tsedenbaljiriin Tseveg, a Secretary of the Congress and Batyn Bayar, 
who sat on the commission which investigated Danzan and sentenced him 
to death. 26 
The Congress opened with greetings from the various Party 
and government departments, the USSR and the Comintern and then the Congress 
officials were elected. Danzan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was 
voted Chairman of the Congress and a former prince,Minjuu~ was the D.eputy 
Chairman. There were three Congress Secretaries, Dorjpalam, a member 
of the Central Committee, Bavaasan, a senior government secretary and 
27 Secretary of the Youth League and Tsedenbaljiriin Tseveg of Tsetserleg 
MandaI aimag (formerly Sain Noyan Khan aimag). There was also a 
d d " 28 Control Commission of five, Bayar, Gongor, Davaajav, Gonsojav an Dam In. 
A large part of the Congress was given over to reports of 
party and government departments and other public bodies, which were 
followed by lengthy discussions. Many problems were brought to light 
including a shortage of public funds, the lack of experienced 
cadres, poor communications between Niislel Khuree and the rural areas, 
widespread illiteracy and the low level of political awareness. Many 
recommendations were made, including a large-scale reorganization of 
government departments and office~ and the resolutions of the Third 
Congress became the basis of the agenda of the First G~eat Khural 
which would assemble at the end of the year. 
Much of the work of the Congress was conducted in a good-
humoured way, aiming to find practical solutions to problems and 
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conditions facing the Mongolian government and society. Nevertheless, 
underneath this lay unresolved internal disputes and disagreements which 
had existed for a year or more. In addition there were angry feelings 
aroused by recent acts of the Soviet government and the new Comintern 
demands. The Congress was stirred up by three issues especially; 
foreign relations, the transformation of the Party by purging and 
recruitment into a party of the poorer ards, and the question of how 
the economy should be developed. 
Of these three issues the delegates as a whole felt most 
keenly about foreign relations. Mongolia's ties with the USSR had 
increased considerably since 1921, and the Soviet government gave 
financial aid, practical assistance and favourable trade conditions. 
Yet in spite of the 1921 friendship treaty and the Second Party Congress 
resolution in favour of Mongol-Soviet friendship, there is ample evidence 
from remarks made at the Third Congress to show that the Russians were 
not universally popular in the MPR. Their trading methods were strange 
to the Mongols,they were seen to be interfering in Mongol affairs and 
many Mongols thought them rude and overbearing. For example it was 
said of one Russian who worked for the Mongolian customs service: 
"Mr. Vollosovich is to the Customs a kind of 
'genius of the mountains', a bogey to frighten 
the children. True, it is not always 
pleasant to work with him, but he is doubtless 
an inestimable worker." 29 
The Mongols were most angry about the section of the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of 1924, which referred to the status of the Mongolian 
state. Article Five read: 
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"The government of the USSR recognizes that 
Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the 
Republic of China and respects China's 
sovereignty therein."30 
Chicherin, the Soviet Commisar of Foreign Affairs, had attempted to 
counterbalance this by stating: 
"We recognize the Mongolian People's Republic 
as part of the Chinese Republic, but we 
recognize also its autonomy in so far-
reaching a sense that we regard it not only 
as independent of China in its internal 
affairs, but also as capable of pursuing 
its foreign policy independently.,,3l 
From the USSR's continuing relationship with the MPR, it is clear that 
the Soviet government- accepted the wording of the 1924 Treaty in order to 
safeguard its own interests in China. It had no intention of allowing 
the Chinese government a foothold north of the Gobi. Nevertheless the 
Mongols deeply desired that full independence be publicly acknowledged. 
When the Soviet Ambassador A.I. Vasil'ev greeted the Third Congress he 
was forced to choose his words very carefully. 
" ... it is clear to me that you Delegates 
at the Congress and you members of the 
People's Party are the brains of the whole 
of Mongolia and the real masters of this 
coun try. ,,32 
This was outright flattery, as were his words of acknowledgement of 
his election as honorary member of the Congress: 
"Your election is the best appreciation of 
the work I have done in Mongolia. But for 
the future too, my principle remains the 
same: Vou, Mongols are the Masters of the 
country and whoever comes he~e, be it from 
North and South, must be only a guest. 
The masters are you, only you.,,33 
However Vasil'ev took pains to point out that the ~bility and stren2th 
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of the MPR was dependent on that of the Soviet Union implying that 
the MPR could not afford to quarrel with its ally. 
Vasil' ev was also constrained to explain his government's 
policy towards Uriankhai which was another bone of contention between 
the two countries. Uriankhai was on the northwestern border of the 
MPR and had been a part of the Ch'ing Empire. Although its population 
was mainly Turkish-speaking they had longstanding and close relations 
with the M9ngols of Khalkh. Some of the inhabitants of Uriankhai 
were Tibetan Buddhists and the Mongolian script and literary language 
was the only form of literacy. When the Mongols of Khalkh declared 
independence in 1911 the literate leaders of Uriankhai expressed a 
desire to link the future of their territory to that of Khalkh. How-
ever, Russian colonization in this area, sporadic in the late 19th 
century, was steadily increasing and by 1922 there were about 10,000 
Russians living in Uriankhai. From their ranks the Tannu Tuvan 
People's Party (TTPP) was born and in 1922 an All-Uriankhai Congress 
. 34 declared the country independent under the protectlon of the RSFSR. 
Thus the Tannu Tuvan People's Republic (TTPR) came into being. 
The new political organization was not popular with the 
35 
native population, however. Taxes were said to be high and 
soldiers were used to subdue opposition, for instance when the government 
stores in the Kemchik region were broken into. Many fled into the 
Khovd region of Mongolia. They told the authorities there that the 
government of Tannu Tuva intended to exterminate them and begged for 
protection and the annexation of Uriankhai. 36 The MongolicYl gove:-n-
ment protested to the Soviet government but the latter was not to be 
moved. 
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Vasil'ev acknowledged to the Third Party Congress: 
"We are friends with you, but sometimes 
there are quarrels and misunderstandings 
even between brothers." 37 
He said that a commission of "honest and reliable men" had been sent 
to investigate the matter. 
Whatever the Mongols' response to the Russian ambassador's 
words, it was Rinchino's task, as representative of the Comintern, to 
encourage closer relations with the USSR and the international 
Communist movement. He described the world situation as perceived 
by the Comintern, the crisis of capitalism and the inevitability of a 
Second World War. He dwelt on the threat of invasion of the MPR by the 
Chinese warlords Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu and said that Mongolia's 
only hope of survival was as a part of the international Communist 
38 
movement. He proposed that the resolution of the Second MPP Congress 
Mongol-Soviet friendship be repeated. Danzan objected, saying "a 
superfluous repetition can only be harmful." 
. d 39 carrle • 
However, the motion was 
This difference of opinion between Rinchino and Danzan was 
not unusual, reflecting what was a long-standing antipathy between 
the two men dating back at least to 1923. On one level it was a 
personal quarrel between two people, one of whom was very practical 
in outlook (Danzan) and the other (Rinchino) who based his ideas and 
decisions on the theories of Marx and Lenin. It was also a struggle 
for power, each contender having a circle of loyal supporters. A third 
aspect was ~he opposition of Khalk Mongols to Buriats and Russians holding 
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positions of influence. 
Danzan had successfully maintained his p osi tion as leader 
of the Party and the independence movement since 1920, and was 
rid of one serious contender, Bodoo, in 1922. In 1923, however, 
Danzan lost two influential supporters, Sukhbaatar and the Jalkhanz 
Khutagt, both of whom had died. At SUkhbaatar's funeral, Danzan had 
described his relationship with the Commander-in-Chief as being like 
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"twin lambs". Sukhbaatar's death was doubly disastrous for Danzan, 
however, because it caused him to overstretch his capabilities and 
so lose respect. Danzan became Commander-in-Chief, a post he was 
entirely unsuited to. According to a Soviet military adviser, 
Sorokovikov, he refused to pay any serious attention to military 
matters and the needs of his army.4l Danzan was also thrown 
into closer association with Rinchino at this time because the latter 
was Chairman of the Military Council. It was here and in the 
Central Committee that the two men attracted their factional support. 
According to Rinchino Danzan was supported "by twenty members of 
the government, five or six on the Military Council and seven or eight 
in the Central Committee. 42 As for Rinchino, his supporters 
presumably included a section of the remainder, members of the Youth 
League and a number of men whom he had known as schoolboys in Irkutsk. 
Most of what we know about the Danzan/Rinchino dispute 
comes from the documents of the Third Party Congress, although there 
are hints of it in other sources. They disagreed on the amount of 
contact the MPR should have with the Chinese, Mongol unification 
and whether or not the problem of lamas in the Party should be 
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discussed. They also differed over whether a photograph of 
Sukhbaatar should be hung in every Party office or not. 43 It is 
hardly surprising that they should have disagreed over the Comintern's 
instructions for the MPP in 1924. 
In his opening speech at the Third Congress, Danzan acknow-
ledged the contribution of the Comintern to the MPP and the Mongolian 
44 
state. However it was Vasil'ev and Rinchino who laid the greatest 
emphasis on the Party's obligations to the Comintern and especially 
the obligation to become a party of the masses. In accordance with 
this, Rinchino had produced a booklet called "The Future Form and 
Circumstances of the Mongolian 
ARevo~ution" and he summarized its recommendations for the delegates 
45 
of the Congress. He said that because the Party's ultimate goal 
was Communism its members should be left-wing ards who would wield 
power on behalf of the masses. Therefore the purge ordered by the 
Second Congress must be carried out. Danzan did not object to such a 
purge, but he was averse to full "ardization" (i.e. "bolshevization" 
in a Mongolian context) because, he said: 
" ... not all nobles are reactionaries 
nor all common people honest.,,46 
In his booklet Rinchino also advocated the development of 
state capitalism in trade and industry as a means of preventing the 
growth of private capitalism. After his theses had been discussed 
he proposed: 
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"Now we are free. We can arrange our 
life as it pleases us. There is no 
need to pass through all stages of 
capitalism. Better let us at once adopt 
the Soviet regime, without going under 
the yoke of exploitation." 
But Danzan replied: 
"Does this mean that the right of private 
property must be curtailed in Mongolia? 
Of course such a resolution can be carried 
I am ready to accept it ... But so 
far we have no capitalists in Mongolia 
and thus the question is not one of the 
present but of the future. Rinchino's 
proposal may be accepted, but practically 
it has no importance."47 
Rinchino then retorted 
. that the MPP had an obligation to 
follow the Comintern and that capitalism must not be allowed to 
develop, and once more Danzan was forced to back down in the face 
of Rinchino's argument and powers of oratory. 
It is curious how Danzan consistently gave way to Rinchino's 
proposals during the Third Congress and we must conclude either that 
the latter's supporters outnumbered Danzan's or that Danzan was con-
strained by the presence of outsiders such as Vasil'ev. In the 
Central Committee he had, according to Rinchino, openly abused the 
Buriat shouting: 
"Elbegdor j LRinchin01 is a cheat, Elbegdor j 
is a stirrer of the government put there by 
the Russians, Elbegdorj is the opponent of 
revolution, and an oppressive dictator."49 
On other occasions Danzan totally ignored Rinchino and only showed 
. d50 interest when the Chinese or his own supporters were mentlone 
. 
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Even if Rinchino's following at the Third Congress was 
greater than Danzan's, the latter still had great influence generally. 
Rinchino's future in the MPR and in the Comintern now depended on a 
successful adoption of the Comintern's instructions. This meant 
more than passing resolutions in favour of "ardization", state 
capitalism and Mongol-Soviet friendship. While Danzan stood in the 
way such resolutions could well be ignored as the resolutions of 
the Second Party- Congress had been. Therefore Danzan must be 
overthrown completely. The documents covering the events of the 
latter part of the Congress strongly suggest that Rinchino, having 
pressed every advantage in the Congress discussions and decision-
making, then exploited the bad relations existing between the Party 
and the youth League to destroy Danzan for ever. 
The youth League had already interrupted the Congress 
once, at the 12th session when some 400 arrived, allegedly, to 
51 greet the Congress. As the Congress building was small the 
delegates went out into the street where Buyannemekh, Chairman of 
the Youth League, addressed them on the League's behalf. He 
praised the Party, saying its aims and tasks were the same as the 
League's and assured the delegates: 
"There is no rupture, no misunderstanding 
between the Party and our Union. We are 
guided by the Comintern who issued 
identical instructions to you and to us. ,,52 
He admitted that some reactionaries existed in both organizations 
but insisted that both bodies were victims of "malignant rumours and 
calumnies,,53 and he welcomed the resolution of the Congress to purge 
the Party. Danzan accepted the good wishes of the League on the Congress's 
behalf and declared: 
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"What has happened today is very auspicious, 
showing the concord that reigns between both 
our organizations.,,54 
But before the League was brought under party control and true concord 
reigned it was to bring about the downfall of the Danzanist faction. 
Between the 17th and 18th session of the Congress there was 
a two-day recess. When the delegates reassembled Danzan failed to 
appear for three hours. He arrived armed and complaining of agitation 
against him in the army, cancelled the day's proceedings and left. 55 
The assembly was thrown into confusion and Dambadorj launched into a 
passionate outburst against the Chairman. 56 He accused Danzan of 
0.. 
hindering the work of the Congress, of having becom1Khan and of planning 
a military coup perhaps that very night. "Shall we live to see the 
morrow?" he asked. 57 
In the midst of this uproar a delegation of Youth League 
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members arrived, begging to put a serious matter before the Congress. 
During the two-day recess the Youth League was responsible for the 
arrest of several men, including Congress Secretaries and Dorjpalam, 
and Buyannemekh, Chairman of the Youth League for failing to attend 
0... 
a mili~y training session. The sessions were organized daily by 
the League Committee of Niislel Khuree but because absenteeism was 
increasing three members of the Office of Internal Security, Gombo, 
Bayar and Sanduijav,59 had been instructed to punish offenders with a 
two-day jail sentence. 
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That the Youth League should arrange a training session 
during the Party Congress at all, and require important officials 
to attend arouses suspicion that there were political motives behind 
the arrests. Bavaasan had antagonized the League by challenging its 
right to arrest members of the government, had sacked the League 
Committee of Niislel Khuree and secured the dismissal of Gombo, Bayar 
and Sanduijav from the security service. 60 Moreover in 1921 
Bavaasan had become Deputy Chairman of the Provisional Little Khural, 
a body which had very poor relations with the Youth League. 61 
As for Buyannemekh it was later said that he was a leader of the 
extreme left wing of the League, which for some strange reason, 
had allied with Danzan. 62 Dorjpalam was also a supporter of 
63 Danzan. 
The affair is further complicated by the fact that also 
during the recess, rumours of a Chinese attack on Khovd were circulating 
and Tserendorj the Prime Minister was extremely an~ry when Bavaasan 
who was to make a report on this. failed 'to turn up. Tserendorj took 
the League to task for interfering in matters they were too young 
to understand. He told them that they ought to put the Mongol nation 
first, chided them for factionalism in their ranks and for paying 
too much attention to Buriats and Russians like Rinchino and Starkov, 
when it was well-known that Rinchino and Danzan had a long-standing 
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argument. 
Rinchino had remained remarkably quiet until this point 
and he was now obliged to defend his position. Firt of all, he 
distanced himself from the Youth League and its bid for independence 
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saying that this was a dangerous policy and mistaken. Then he drew 
the attention of the assembly to what he described as a sickness within 
the Party. He held Danzan responsible for this and made a series of 
charges against the Chairman. 65 
The most serious charges were speculation and profiteering 
in collusion with the Chinese. When Danzan was Minister of Finance 
in 1922 he had cancelled an agreement to purchase flour for the Army 
from Verkhneudinsk and when the Army's supplies ran out in 1923 he 
b ht d I f th Ch · 66 oug more ear y rom e 1nese. He had established a motor 
vehicle transport service with a Chinese firm called Dalai Kho when 
Rinchino had negotiated a similar arrangement with the Soviet Union. 67 
He had also sent Mongolian soldiers to protect Chinese merchants who 
were buying skins in Tsetsen Khan aimag68 and he permitted another 
Chinese firm Ta Shen Kuei, a large Shansi trading firm, to collect 
69 debts which the government had annulled. 
Other charges concerned state security. Rinchino accused 
the 
Danzan of making a Chinese spy head Of~ Training Directorate in 1923 
while he, Rinchino, was abroad. This was said to have split the 
70 Service and fomented angry quarrels in the Party. Danzan was also 
said to have had contacts with unnamed Chinese so-called militarists 
from whom he had received a letter concerning a proposed meeting. The 
71 
existence of this letter was withheld for a fortnight. A further 
allegation, that Danzan, Bavaasan and the Gun Lamjav, Governor of the 
Khovd region had plotted to overthrow the gove~nm~nt is recordpd in 
. 72 Sayar's mem01r. 
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If Danzan's crimes were as serious as Rinchino implied it 
is surprising that he kept quiet about them as long as he suggested. 
What is most interesting, however, is the evidence of Bayar which shows 
that all these charges had already been discussed at a meeting of 
the Youth League, probably between the 17th and 18th sessions of the 
73 Congress. Also present at this meeting, if Bayar has remembered 
correctly, were Tserendorj, Rinchino, Choibalsan, Japan Danzan and 
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Dambadorj. Rinchino told the meeting: 
"Your criticism is not just a matter for 
the League's meeting. Choose some 
representatives ~d send them to the Third 
Party Congress." 
This is strong evidence that the real rea3)ns for the arrests were not 
absenteeism but a deliberate attempt to provoke a major crisis. 
Bayar's evidence should be taken seriously because he was one of the 
delegates chosen. 
Rinchino closed his speech of accusation offering the 
delegates two stark alternatives. If they went with Danzan, he said, 
they headed toward "disaster for the masses, national shame, a black 
hell of destruction." If they turned to the left they would choose 
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"freedom and the true shining sun of ard rule." 
After a moment's silence there was thunderous applause. Then 
DambadOrj heaped recriminations on Bavaasan and Buyannemekh. Bavaasan 
was accused of conspiracy in 1922. He was also alleged to have opposed 
elections for khoshuu chairm~n and the annulling of ranks and titles 
of ruling princes. He was a flatterer, said Dambadorj, of men in high 
. 77 places, such as Bodoo, Danzan and TserendorJ. 
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Of Buyannemekh it was said that he had, in partnership 
with Starkov the Youth Com intern advisor, caused a split in the 
Youth League over the issue of independent status. However Dambadorj 
did say that Buyannemekh was a true revolutionary and only guilty of 
being too easily led by others. 18 Since Rinchino's name had also been 
linked with Starkov's by Tserendorj, it is possible that Buyannemekh 
was left to take the blame for a misjudged policy that was actually 
implemented by Soviet citizens. If so, it would not be an isolated 
case, as we shall see in 1928. 
Rinchino and Dambadorj won the day. The Security Services 
were instructed to arrest Danzan and at one o'clock on the morning 
of 27 August Batorun announced the deed accomplished. 79 Later in 
80 the day a commission was formed to investigate the Youth League 
and the following evening the same commission was enlarged and instructed 
to investigate the charges against Danzan and the other detainees. 
Choibalsan, now acting Commander-in-Chief in Danzan's stead, headed 
the commission, which also included Tuvshintor an executive official 
of the Ministry of Justice and Nasanbat,a military commissar. There 
were also, significantly, three additional members of the Youth League, 
including TS. Tseveg. Thecommissian was ordered to complete its 
~ 81 in~tigation and report back to the Congress within 24 hours. 
The report was read out to the delegates on 30 August. 
Danzan was condemned on all Rinchino's charges and on further charges 
of promoting Mongolian capitalism and hindering the development of the 
Mongolian cooperative. Reference was made to s~cret documents revealing 
that Danzan was plotting counter-revolution but there is no mention of 
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the Congress actually examining any of them. He was sentenced to 
death by shooting and his property was to be confiscated leaving 
only enough for his widow and family to live on. From what we are 
told about this investigation, it seems unlikely that Danzan was 
given any opportunity to defend himself. 82 
Bavaasan was also condemned to be shot for holding the 
aims, doctrines and oath of the Youth League in contempt, refusing 
to attend compulsory military exercises and for threatening to shoot 
any Youth League member who tried to enforce attendance at those 
exercises. The report says he tried to destroy the Security Service 
and to take responsibili~y for military training away from the League's 
Khuree office. In addition, Bavaasan was found guilty of plotting 
against the state with a man called Tseren. 83 
Three other detainees, Dorjpalam, Buyannemekh and an unidentified 
Gombojav were given a lighter punishment. The Commission attributed 
their involvement in the affair to their "shortcomings" and 
they were sentenced to thirty days imprisonment but were not expelled 
from the Party. The report concluded with the statement that the 
sentences were intended as a warning to all those who associated with 
foreigners or exploited the ards and recommended that such people be 
purged from the ranks of the Party. 
There was silence after the reading of the report, a whisper 
here and there, and finally applause broke out. It was not until 
Minjuur the Deputy Chairman asked if the report should be adopted that 
delegates realised that the sentence had already been carried out. 
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Everyone was stunned. At this point the Soviet Ambasador Vasil'ev 
rose from his seat and pronounced his blessing on the act. On his own 
admission he had understood very little of what had been going on since 
he spoke no MOngol but now he comforted the delegates saying they had 
acted correctly and as was done in the Soviet Union. Their 
action, he assured them, would improve relations between their two 
countries. Delegates should go home and report to their localities what 
84 had happened. 
With the death of Danzan and the downfall of his supporters 
most of the old nationalist leadership was driven from the Party or 
subdued and the factionalism that had torn party and public organizations 
was ended. A new and younger leadership more willing to accept direction 
from the Comintern and the Russian advisers came to power. There was, 
however, one curious survivor in this upheaval, the 56 year old Prime 
Minister Tserendorj. 
During the course of the dispute over Danzan a number of 
potentially damning remarks were made about Tserendorj. It was alleged 
that Tserendorj tried to protect Bavaasan; that he was implicated 
in the abrogation of the autonomy in 1919; and that the secret letter 
concerning talks with Chinese militarists was seen on Tserendorj's desk 
although Tserendorj had assured Rinchino that he knew nothing of such 
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a letter. However Rinchino could not take on Tserendorj and Danzan 
at the same time. Tserendorj had immense popular support and was 
one of the outstanding statesmen of the 1920s. He was extremely 
hard-working and it may even be true to say that his experience in 
administration made him irrep1acab1e at the time. He also had a 
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reputation for being very anti-Chinese. Tserendorj underwent further 
criticism because of his past but he remained in office until his death 
in 1928 and was honoured with a state funeral. 
The Central Committee 
Before the Congress closed it elected a new Central Committee. 
Dambadorj became the Chairman while continuing to head the Organization 
Department. His close friend, Navaandorjiin Jadamba, who had been at 
school with him in Irkutsk, was made Deputy Chairman. Ganjuuryn 
Gelegsenge a pre-revolutionary government official was Party Secretary, 
and Khayankhyarvaa, who only joined the Party in 1924, was appointed to 
the Propaganda Department. Other important full members were Rinchino, 
Tserendorj, Choibalsan and An~ Amar, the Foreign Minister. There 
were also candidate members including D. Natsagdorj, acting Chairman 
of the youth League, Sanjiin Dovchin, who had been a local government 
officer before the revolution, Losol, Jamtsrano, another Danzan, Yanjmaa 
the widow of SUkhbaatar, who was the official women's representative, 
Navaandorjiin Nasanbat, a military commissar, and Magsarjav, Deputy 
Minister for the Army. The new Committee went away with instructions 
to investigate all Party members and transfo~m the MPP into a party of 
ards,to improve all party organizations and to draw up a new Party 
86 Programme. 
There were other members of the Central Committee whose names 
are not recorded in the documents. Of the fourteen who are named, 
half were below the age of thirty and four more under forty. The Chai~­
man was only 25 years old and his Deputy was the youngest member at 24. 
Those who were considered old were Tserendorj (56), Magsarjav (47) and 
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87 J amtsrano (44). Also significant is the presence of at least three 
who had been educated in Irkutsk, Dambadorj, Jadamba and Choibals~ and 
who had known Rinchino there. Furthermore Nasanbat was probably 
Jadamba's elder brother. 88 Some Central Committee members had been 
associated with the Party since 1921 but others like Amar and 
Khayankharvaa had joined in 1923 and 1924 respectively.89 
Rinchino's victory and continued presence on the Central 
Committee made the position of Buriats in the Party and the government 
secure for some years to come. Jamtsrano's position was unchanged and, 
as we shall see later, others like Erdene Batkhan, who was shortly to 
become Minister of Education, and Ishdorj of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs prospered and made a significant contribution to the new 
state during the next four years. Though Rinchino's supremacy was to be 
short-lived, the Buriat influence was sustained and Rinchino ~as replaced 
as Comintern representative by M.I. Amagaev. 
Without doubt those who gained most from the Third Party Congress 
were Dambadorj and Jadamba. They were to maintain their positions 
on the Party executive until ousted in 1928 as so-called Rightist 
Opportunists or Deviationists. Jadamba's name appears regularly during 
the years up to 1928, in particular as the head of various special 
and 
commissions,~e was clearly a useful committee man. He was also 
1 1 ·· 90 very popu ar and was capab e ln bUSlness. 
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The Third Youth League Congress 
A month after his success at the Third Party Congress Jadamba 
was made Ghairman of the Youth League when it met on 27 September for 
its own Third Congress. Other MPP Central Committee members elected 
to the League's Central Committee were Khayankharvaa and Navaaxserengiin 
Gonjoon, and Choibalsan joined the League's Control Commission. This 
Congress ordered a new League Programme to be drawn up anddeclared 
that the League must submit to party control and assist the Party. 
Members were told to make known how "reactionary force~'had been 
destroyed and to keep a close watch lest any similar tendency should 
arise in the future. The energies of the League members were to be 
channelled into literacy campaigns, the immediate objective being to 
make all Niislel Khuree members and 70% of the entire membership 
literate. Youth League members should also be involved in a wide 
range of cultural activities such as publishing and organising club~ 
and musical and dramatic performances. From this time it became 
mandatory for Youth League members to transfer to the Party by the age 
of 25. 91 
The First Great Khural and the Constitution 
The stage was now set for the final decisive act of 1924, 
the holding of the First Great Khural which would ratify the first 
Constitution of the MPR. Party and League members were sent out to 
all parts of the country to tell the people what was to happen and how they 
should choose their representatives. It was not a straightforward task 
because although people were instructed to vote for ards there were many 
princes who were elected and had to be disqualified. 
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For instance two princes in Bogd Khan uul aimag, Tseren-ochir 
of Tusheet Khan khoshuu and Dugarjav of Ikh Dulaan uul khoshuu were 
disqualified and fresh elections had to be held. 92 
In Niislel Khuree a committee was busy preparing the agenda for 
the Khural and another made practical arrangements for the meeting place 
and other facilities. Those delegates who had no friends or relatives 
in the capital with whom they could stay had to be lodged with Party 
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members or government employees. Meanwhile a commission of 20 
members was completing the draft of the Constitution under the direction 
of a Comintern representative Turar Ryskulov, a Kazakh, who had arrived 
•. 94 
recently in Niislel Khuree. Ryskulov had been associated with the 
Bolsheviks since 1917 and had seen service in Turkestan and in the 
Kirgiz (Kazakh) Republic.' Between 1922 and 1924 he was the Chairman of 
the Council of People's Commissars of Nationalities. Other members of 
the Constitution Commission included the Prime Minister Tserendorj who 
was Chairman, Luvsanchoi, Genden, Gonjoon, Givaabaljir, Jadamba, 
O b d Od RO hO 95 am a orJ an 1nc 1no. 
The First Great Khural opened to the sound of martial music 
on the 8th November 1924. The officials sat at a long table covered 
with a red cloth and round the hall hung pictures of Lenin and 
Sukhbaatar. Outside the building was a large painting of Lenin by 
a Mongolian artist and the Party and government buildings were 
decorated with red ribbons. Memoir accounts describe the delegates 
inside the hall as colourfully dressed in the traditional costume 
of their respective regions, Dorvods in white deels with black borders, 
Buriats with red-tasselled hats and Kazakhs with feathered hats. 
Many others wore sheepskin deels96 faced with blue cotton which indicated 
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their humble origins. 97 Only 77 of the 90 elected representatives 
actually attended the Khural and all were men. Seven of them "Nere 
listed as totally illiterate. Many were officials of central or local 
government. Six of the delegates are listed as taij (princes), 
including a Kazakh from western Mongolia. Nine were officially lamas 
but were employed by the state as teachers and local government 
officials. There was also one from an agricultural khoshuu "Nhich 
suggests that he was a lama of very low status. All the lama delegates 
were Party members. In fact only 13 of the 77 delegates were members 
98 of neither the Party nor the Youth League. Besides the elected 
representatives the heads of government also took part. All delegates 
had freedom of speech and could only be arrested with the Khural's 
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agreement. 
The Prime Minister opened the proceedings at 11 a.m. on 8 
November. Jadamba was elected Chairman and Olziitiin Badrakh,lOO a 
Do"rvo··d 1101 Ch " Mongo, Deputy a1rman. Gelegsenge and Dugarjantsan were 
general secretaries. The honorary presidents included Kalinin, 
Chicherin, Vasiliev, the Soviet Ambassador, Erbanov, Prime Minister of 
the Buriat Mongol Autonomous Soviet Republic (BMASSR), Ryskulov, and 
Dambadorj. Greetings were read out from national organizations, 
representatives of foreign states and organizations and telegr~ms 
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solidarity were sent to the Comintern and the USSR. 
The assembly was ratified as the embodiment of supreme govern-
ment power in the MPR. Then all the reports of Qovernment departments, 
local authorities and the various national and party organiza~ions were 
read out and discussed. Ryskulov, who in 1925 published a detailed 
article of the proceedings of the First Great Khural, observed that 
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the delegates felt free to express their feelings and make criticisms 
and proposals of their own. 103 Many of the issues discussed by the 
Third Party Congress were debated again. The Ministries of Finance, 
Internal Affairs and Justice were criticised and improvements ordered. 
In foreign policy the overriding importance of friendship with the 
USSR was emphasized. Much time was devoted to a discussion of 
economic development both from the point of view of improving the 
traditional livestock herding and also the creation of new industry 
and the exploitation of national resources like minerals and forests. 
The assembly declared in favour of developing a socialist state-owned 
economic sector in both town and countryside. Along with industrial 
development the congress recommended the formation of trade unions whose 
members would constitute the basis of a proletariat. Education was also 
reviewed in detail following the formation of a new Education Ministry 
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under Onkhotyn Jam'yan. 
The most important act of the First Great Khural was the 
ratification of the Constitution because it laid down the basis on 
which the MPR should be constructed and the direction for future 
political, social and economic development. It was modelled on 
the 1918 constitution of the RSFSRI05 ahd it compares closely ~ith the 
106 Constitution of Tannu Tuva of October 1924. Before the vote of 
ratification was taken the Chairman proposed that any questions on the 
Constitution be discussed first, but there is no record of any contro-
versia1 questions. 
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the 26th November. 
The Constitution received unanimous approval on 
In the first part of the Constitution, the fundamental laws 
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of the MPR were laid out beginning with the rights of ards. Mongolia 
was declared an independent People's Republic and there was no mention 
of Chinese sovereignty. The aim of the Republic was to end the so-
called feudal-theocratic regime and to set up a republican order whose 
supreme organ of power was a Great Khural elected by the people. 
The Khural would elect the government. All land, minerals, forests and 
water were the property of the people. All international agreements 
made before 1921 were abrogated. Private and institutional debts to foreign 
usurers were annulled. Economic planning was in the hands of the govern-
ment and a state monopoly of foreign trade was to be introduced gradually. 
The nation's freedom was to be protected by the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Army and all ard youths were to receive military training. 
Church and State were declared separate and religion a matter for the 
inawidual conscience. Freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, 
free education and equality without discrimination by nationality, race 
or sex were recognized. However individuals or groups could be deprived 
of rights if they used them to the detriment of the State. Former 
noble titles and the sovereign rights of incarnations were abrogated. 
Foreign policy was to be coordinated with the aims and interests of 
small, oppressed nations and revolutionary workers of the world who were 
struggling to bring an end to capitalism and aspiring to Communism. 
Nevertheless if circumstances demanded it, friendly relations with 
other foreign powers might be entered into. 
The Constitution then had a number of sections dealing with 
government structure and procedure. There are statements of the powers and 
responsibilities of the Little Khural, which held supreme power between 
sessions of the Great Khural,and the Council of Ministers. The system of 
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local government is described. There was to be a series of local 
assemblies elected by the local population at various levels which 
would elect their own officials each year. The Constitution guaranteed 
voting rights for all men and women from the age of eighteen, except those 
who lived by exploiting others, such as traders, usurers, former princes, 
Buddhist incarnations, lamas who lived permanently in monasteries, the 
insane and people who had been condemned of a crime such as theft by 
a court of law. 
A long section dealt with budgetary matters. The Great Khural 
had the power to approve government budgets and without its approval no 
expenditure was to be made. Local government, traditionally free to 
levy its own taxes, was to remain so but within certain fixed limits. 
Each assembly had to have its yearly and half-yearly budgets approved 
by the assembly of the level immediately above. 
In the Constitution's final section the seal, crest and flag 
of the Republic were described. They were all to feature the Soyombo 
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symbol. During the discussion on the Constitution a delegate called 
Sereeter had asked the meaning of this symbol which suggests that it was 
not widely known. The Prime Minister explained that it symbolized 
1 . . 109 the Mongo lan natlon. Also during the discussion, a resolution was 
passed renaming Niislel KhUree Ulaanbaatar (Red Hero). 
The passing of the Constitution was cause for loud cheers 
and celebration. In the lower hall of the Central Committee a 
banquet of cakes, kumiss and mutton was laid out for the delegates. 
Jadamba led the singing. After a number of traditional songs, Rinchino's 
wife sang the Internatsionale which her husband had translated into 
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Mongolian. The whole assem~ stood up in respect. Then Gonjoon, 
Sayar and others sang songs in praise of the Great Khural and the 
Red Flag which they had composed for the occasion, improvising in 
the Mongolian tradition. Outside in the main square people cheered 
loudly as the Constitution was read out. There was a military parade, 
a red banner bearing a picture of SUkhbaatar was presented to the leaders 
of the Kh 1 A f · 1 th d· 1 f f· 110 ura. s a 1na e ere was a 1SP ay 0 1reworks. 
The quest for a suitable political form for the independent 
state began in 1921 and ended in 1924. The death of the Sogd Khaan 
made it possible to throw off the last vestiges of the traditional 
political system and adopt a republican one with a constitution that 
was based on democratic principles. It was, however, democracy with 
fixed limits. The Mongolian term ardchlakh used to express "to 
democratize" is derived from the word ard. Ard is exclusive, in 
the same way that "People" is exclusive in Marxist terminology. 
Princes and churchmen were not included in this term. It was not 
difficult therefore to focus the attention of an undeveloped, largely 
unschooled people on the limits of the term rather than to extend 
its use to embrace the population of the entire nation as had seemed 
the intention in 1920 and 1921. To what extent the principle of 
"ardization" as applied by the regime's new leaders was a factor in 
producing the transformations of the next four years is one of the 
subjects to be examined in forthcoming chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BUILDING mE REPUBLIC - PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
1925 - 1927 
In 1925 the MPP took measures to transform itself into a 
class-based, hierarchical organization with a strong central authority 
and upholding clearly defined aims and ideology. The measures included 
purges and enrolment campaigns, a new programme and new regulations, the 
formation of a network of party cells and offices throughout the land, 
and extensive propaganda work in conjunction with literacy campaigns. 
The First Purge of the MPP 
In January 1925 the Central Committee formed a special commission under 
the leadership of Jadamba the Deputy Chairman to purge the Party as the 
Third MPP Congress had ordered. The commissioners included members of 
the Central Committees of both the Party and the Youth League and they 
were given the following instructions. 
"The task of purging the Party, which has the 
aim of improving the quality of the composi~ion 
of the Party, includes enabling poor and middle 
ards to enrol in the Party so that it becomes 
a party of poor and middle ards. When the 
purge is carried out, too high demands must 
not be placed on the poor and middle ~ and 
those workers engaged in handicraft enter-
prises. First of all it is necessary to purge 
the Party of former White Guards, officials of 
the old regime, enemies of the revolution, 
former feudalists and careerists making use l 
of party membership for their own benefit." 
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At this time ards described as poor owned less than 50 bod of 
livestock and the so-called middle ards between 50 and 300 bod. 
The bod was a traditional Mongolian unit of livestock and in the 
1920s one bod was equivalent to either one horse, cow, bull or 
2 yak or half a camel or seven sheep or 14 goats. 
As instructed, the commissioners subjected the poor and 
middle ards to cursory questioning only. Bat-Onoriin Olziikhutag, an 
employee of the Ministry of the Army, was asked why he had joined 
the Party and what he thought the Party should do in future. His 
answers were satisfactory and then he too joined the commissioners. 3 
Party members who owned more than 300 bod or who where high lamas, 
former princes or pre-revolutionary officials were closely examined 
and the purge was no pleasant experience as the following memoir 
shows: 
"It was really funny to see the important 
officials and aristocrats who had formerly 
held high positions like khoshuu prince, 
khoshuu tuslagch4 and zakhiragch5 coming 
into the examination ger frightened and 
looking cautiously about them. The thought 
that the authority of the people's 
revolution was immense emphasized their own 
lack of power. ,,6 
The purge continued throughout 1925 and into the spring of 1926.
7 
'!be Party Progra.ae of 1925 
In March 1925 there was a plenary meeting of the Central 
C . 8 ommlttee. Members were full of enthusiasm. They discussed a 
draft of the new Party Programme that was to reolace the Khiagt 
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Platform,and the draft Party Regulations. Th~y also drew up 
a series of measures for ardizing the Party and spreading ideology. 
Present at the meeting were Ryskulov who helped to compile 
the new Programme and Siren Natsov who had recently replaced Starkov 
as official Youth Comintern representative. Natsov described the 
meeting as a "turning point in the history of the national-freedom 
movement of the working masses of Mongolia" and this change of direction 
was marked by renaming the Party the "Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party "( MPRP) . 9 
10 The Party Programme reflected both the spirit of the 
constitution and the Comintern's instructions to "bolshevize" or 
"ardize" the Party. It comprised a brief preface and three sections. 
The first section on the world situation was a lengthy criticism 
of the evils and shortcomings of the capitalist system. The second 
section analyzed Far Eastern affairs and the MPR's place within them. 
Section Three contained the Party's plans for its own structure and 
development, and its policies for the political, social and economic 
organization of the Mongolian state. The central feature of foreign 
policy was a close political and economic alliance of the MPR with 
the USSR, together with relationships with Communist and revolutionary 
movements of the Far East and friendly links with ards (workers) 
worldwide. 
The Central Committee passed the Programme provisionally 
and submitted it to the Comintern for approval. The Comintern was 
not satisfied, however, and returned the document with instructions 
to rework the theoretical parts. In particular the Comintern demanded 
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that the role of the October Russian Revolution in the Mongolian 
Revolution of 1921 be given greater emphasis. The Party was also 
criticized for devoting a special paragraph (Paragraph 39) to the 
sufferings of Inner Mongols and for expressing its determination 
to support their struggle for emancipation on account of the close 
ties of tradition, lifestyle and language of the Khalkh and Inner 
11 Mongols. 
It seems likely that Rinchino and Ryskulov were held jointly 
responsible for Paragraph 39 since Ryskulov was the official Comintern 
adviser on the Programme and Rinchino was known for his support of 
Pan-Mongolism. 12 Furthermore at the March Plenum Rinchino made 
the mistake of referring to Semenov's Pan-Mongolist movement of 1919 
as "democratic".13 The Comintern and the USSR consistently condemned 
this movement saying it was opposed to the interests of ards because 
Semenov received support from Japan and they tended to view other 
manifestations of Pan-Mongolism in the same way.14 Until 1925 
the Comintern had neither opposed nor encouraged the Mongolian Party's 
Pan-Mongolist tendencies but from this time pressure was exerted to 
persuade the MPRP to give up its aim of unifying the Mongol peoples. 
15 This explains why the new economic advisor, M.I. Amagaev, a Buriat who 
was known for his opposition to sentiments of Pan-Mongolism, was 
appointed Comintern representative to the Central Committee in 
September. Ryskulov departed and Rinchino was completely eclipsed 
by Amagaev and he disappeared from the ranks of leadership of the 
16 MPR after 1925. 
Amagaev was a dominant personality at the Fourth MPRP 
Congress which opened on 23 September 1925 for eight days.17 He 
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launched an attack on Pan-Mongolism as expressed in the draft 
Programme, telling the delegates that the Party must fight not 
only for the interests of the Mongol tribes but for all backward 
and enslaved peoples of the world. 
"Outer Mongolia must not take upon itself 
the role of sole unifier of the Mongol 
lands and peoples, ignoring the wishes of 
the working masses of these people. The 
problem of unifying the Mongol peoples is 
a matter of the future voluntary association 
of these workers the day after the victory 
of their national revolutionary movement.,,18 
The Congress gave way and issued a statement saying that 
Pan-Mongolism was dangerous because it tended to upset the balance 
of the alliance between the MPRP and other such movements in the 
Far East, in particular those in China. This indicates that the 
Com intern or the USSR foresaw the possibility of Khalkh Mongols 
returning to the Chinese fold after the victory of the Chinese 
revolution. The Programme was amended to refer to the Mongolian 
national-revolutionary movement as only one of many such movements. 
A further amendment gave greater emphasis to the 1917 Revolution 
in accordance with the Comintern's wishes. A revised text of the 
Programme was to be circulated to all party committees for comment 
and then submitted to the Comintern for further scrutiny.19 It 
was hoped that the Fifth MPRP Congress would then be able to pass 
the Programme but it was not ready in time. The whole issue of 
the Party Programme indicates the constraints on independent policy-
making by the MPRP that Comintern membership entailed. 
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The Party Press 
The Central Committee's Organization and Propaganda 
Department was split in 1925 and the work of the new Propaganda 
Department, especially its literary work, expanded considerably. 
A party press publishrng newspapers and pamphlets had existed since 
1921. 20 From 1924 to 1925 the Party and government jointly produced 
a newspaper called Ardyn Erkh (People's Rule). It was supposed to appear 
each month in 3000 copies but that proved impossible because of 
shortages 21 of money and paper. In 1925 the paper ended its assoc-
iation with the government and was published by the Central Committees 
of the Party and the Youth League instead. .. It was renamed Unen 
(Truth) and carried articles of propaganda, general education and 
literature, and G. Navaanamjil was its editor for several years.22 
Papers for a more specialized audience also appeared. The 
Youth League brought out Mongolyn Khuv'sgalt Zaluuchuudyn Evle123 
(Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League) from 1925. There was a paper 
for school children, Pioner (Pioneer) and Busguichuudiin Sanal 
(Women's Viewpoint)24 for women. 25 None of these papers came out as 
frequently as intended. Busguichuudiin Sanal, for instance, was 
supposed to appear monthly but there were only 30 issues between 1925 
and 1936. 26 
The Central Committee also launched a programme of trans-
lation which, for the first time, enabled Khalkh Mongols to consult 
the Marxist-Leninist classics. 27 B. Ishdorj, a Buriat who worked 
for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, produced the first Mongolian 
translation of the Communist Manifesto with footnotes and commentaries 
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on difficult words. He found political and scientific terminology 
difficult to translate into Mongolian but "on the whole he was 
equal to his important task. ,,28 Many propaganda pamphlets were 
also being produced to explain party policies, the Party Programme 
29 
and why Danzan was shot, for example. It is not possible to 
assess how widely party literature was read in the 1920s, and it should 
not be forgotten that the party press could not compete with the amount of 
rival propaganda that the Church was able to put into circulation. 
Nevertheless, literacy campaigns led by the Youth League, were also 
an important part of party propaganda work at this time and as the 
number of literate party members increased so did the need for 
political and ideological reading matter. 
Training Party Workers 
Another initiative of the March 1925 Plenum was the Party 
Central School which opened in April 1925 for the education of party 
workers. There were various short courses for training propagandists 
for specialized work in the army or among women, for example, and an 
18 month training scheme for full-time party workers~OBy 1926 170 
students had completed various courses. Ma Ho-t'ien, a Chinese 
visitor to the MPR, described the school as it was in 1927.
31 
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men and 36 women were taking the 18 month course. Most were Khalkh 
Mongols but there were also a few students from Uriankhai, Barga, Inner 
Mongolia and some Buriats all of whom had passed an entrance examin-
ation. Tuition was free and in addition the students received 
board, lodging and a personal allowance of two Chinese dollars a 
month. Ten months were spent on general educational subjects and 
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the remaining time on politics and party principles. The school 
was equipped with display material on geography, history and ethno-
32 graphy, Buddhist statues, pictures of revolutionary heroes and 
political posters. A student of the second intake, Tsesenjavyn 
Choijil, volunteered to attend after his local party cell received 
a letter from the Youth League committee of Bogd Khan uul aimag 
asking for a member to be sent to the school. Choijil did so well 
in his first year examination that he was made an assistant teacher 
for the remaining period of his education. 33 
The MPRP sent other young people to the new political 
training institutes such as the Communist University of Toilers of 
the East (KUTV)34 which had branches in Moscow and Irkutsk. Here 
students from among the eastern nationalities of the USSR and from 
colonial countries received three years training in Ma~xism-Leninism 
and the history of the RCP, history, historical materialism, mathematics, 
t I , h' h' d h'l 35 na ura sC1ences, c em1stry, p YS1CS an P 1 ogogy. The instructors 
included leading Communists of the day and a woman student, Dugaryn 
Densmaa,remembers being taught by N.K. Krupskaya, Lenin's widow and 
ClaraZetkin, Chairman of the Women's Comintern. 36 Those students 
who were not Soviet citizens were taught mainly in English but the 
Mongols received their training alongside the Soviet nationals. At 
the Moscow institute they were given an interpreter and a Buriat 
37 
teacher called Badamyn Tagar assisted those who graduated in 1928. 
It is not clear how many Mongols studied at KUTV in the 1920s. About 
70 were sent to the USSR in 1925 and the numbers rose to 250 in 1926. 
However they include students attending institutions of general 
education, military academies and other vocational schools as well as 
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Graduates of KUTV and of the Party Central School were 
destined to play an important role in future political events in 
the MPR, including the overthrow of the Right Deviation in 1928. 
Party Congresses 
The MPRP continued to hold a congress annually from 1924 
until 1929. The proceedings of these congresses have been pub-
lished in the MPR but have not, unfortunately, been available for 
western scholars to study. The resolutions of the congresses 
h "bl 39 owever are acceSS1 e. There are also a Russian transcript 
40 
of the Fourth Congress, and partial reports in periodicals of the 
Fifth4l and Sixth42 and Seventh. 43 The records of discussion at 
the Third Party Congress revealed much about conditions in Mongolia 
and the opinions and outlook of party members in the early part of 
the decade. It would be desirable to compare this with the evidence 
of documents of later congresses but in the absence of such material 
the picture must be pieced together from other sources. 
Drawing Close to the Rural Masses 
The Comintern instructed the Party to "draw close to the 
masses" but the masses did not, in the beginning, receive its 
approaches with any great enthusiasm. When Amagaev visited the MPR 
in 1924 he was forced to the following conclusions: 
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"The broad masses of the population not 
so much consciously, perhaps, as 
instinctively feel that they are supporters 
of the present people's government but 
they do not actively display it. [ my 
emphasis: IN] In general the masses 
of the people of Mongolia are politically 
illiterate, not only have they no 
particular skill in public administration but they 
are at the mercy of tradition and the 
psychology of a herding lifestyle, the 
philosophy of which is margaashism 
(hope in tomorrow). Only the most 
advanced, developed individuals from 
among the masses are coming forward and 
entering the ranks of the People's 
Party and the Youth League.,,44 
Contemporary evidence for the next four years suggests 
that those attitudes were changing, but only slowly. Many of the 
rural ards who did join the Party and even those who held official 
positions did not involve themselves energetically in party work 
and complaints of margaashism45 were common. Instructions from 
headquarters were ignored and literature was often left undistributed. 
A delegate at the Fourth Party Congress described the situation: 
"All the delegates are in agreement that 
there is ignorance among the rural masses 
of the Party. But that is inevitable if 
there is no guidance and there are not enough 
sufficiently experienced people to carry out 
work in these areas. It is often the case 
that ..• you go to a cell meeting, travelling 
a distance of several ortoo on horseback. 
You arrive at the place and discover that 
there is not a meeting and so you go home again 
with nothing to show for it. There must be 
detailed instructions so that this does not 
happen. The CC (Central Committee) has let 
this circumstance slip out of sight ... 
It must be given serious attention. 46 
As Comintern representative Amagaev recommended that attention 
be given to political theory and the enforcement of discipline to 
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overcome the problems and he criticized delegates at the Fourth Party 
Congress for the time spent on the discussion of practical problems. 47 
This recalls similar criticisms of the pragmatist Danzan made by 
Rinchino at the previous congress. However the Fourth Congress took 
note of rural problems and passed a series of resolutions to improve 
the political education of rural party members and to encourage ards 
to enroll. There were to be local study groups and visits from full-
time, peripatetic party instructors, propaganda meetings for non-
b d 1 b . d' . d d f' 1 48 mem ers an c u s prov1 1ng mus1c, rama an 1 ms. 
Party membership was rising steadily at this time. By the 
49 
Fourth Party Congress the pre-purge membership of ~OOO was restored. 
It rose to 7,60050 in the spring of 1926, and reached 11,600 by the 
51 Fifth Party Congress in September. It is likely that about 4,000 
of the new members had actually transferred from the Youth League 
leaving about 3200 completely new recruits. 52 Not all of the latter 
joined voluntarily however. At a meeting of the Central Committee in 
March 1926 Badrakh who headed the Organization Department said that 
"local party organizations are often unaware of their rights and 
duties, interfere with the state organizations, forcibly recruit 
members etc." 53 It was fel t that the Central C ommi ttee should have 
greater control over the rural party and that improved communications 
could do much to promote that. Members of the Central Committee and 
the Little Khural were sent out to instruct local committees in their 
duties, to bring them under the closer control of headquarters and to 
. . 54 
encourage rural members generally to be more consc1ent1ous. 
When the Fifth Party Congress met in September 1926 Amagaev 
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expressed his approval of the work of the Central Committee over the 
past year but said that efforts to "draw closer to the masses" were 
55 
"feeble". Dambadorj the Party Chairman was less critical, how-
ever. He praised the party organization in Arvaikheer khoshuu 
of Tsetserleg MandaI aimag. This was the only khoshuu in the 
country to have a party cell in all of its 20 districts (Mon. sum).56 
When the Sixth Party Congress opened in September 1927, 400 
sums of a total 700 in the MPR had party cells. 57 This was dis-
appointing to the MPRP but was a considerable increase on the 121 
cells in existence in 1924. Although only 2% of the entire population 
was enrolled in the Party the actual figure of 11,58658 was almost vi 
three times the figur~~f~E~924. A large proportion of new members 
who enrolled after the purge of 1925 were illiterate and tha~ coupled 
with the rapid increase in membership over a very short perio~ put a 
great strain on the educational resources of the party organization. 
At the same time the MPRP had very extensive government responsibilities 
which also made great demands on its manpower resources, especially 
the literate, and therefore we should not be overly critical of its 
efforts in the countryside. Had the Comintern not pressed the MPRP 
to become a mass party so rapidly, it might have been able to use 
its resources more economically and perhaps attract members ~ore by 
the example of a dynamic organization and less by bullying unwilling 
and confused ards. 
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Organizing Youth 
In addition to its more general work of building up the rural 
party, the MPRP put considerable effort into setting up organizations 
for women, children, and workers and employees. The Trade Unions will, 
however, be discussed in the next chapter. From 1925 the Youth League's 
activities were directed and controlled by the Party, whose leading 
members dominated the Central Committee of the Youth League. Like the 
Party, the Youth League was purged in 1925 and new members were enrolled. 
By 1926 there were 5pOO full members and almost as many candidate members. 59 
As a result there was a high proportion of young people enrolled in 
political organizations and consequently available to work for the civil 
and public services. 
The MPRP also set up two organizations for younger children. 
In 1925 51 pupils of the Ulaanbaatar Middle School were enrolled in 
the Pioneers. There were two sections called after Marx and Lenin and 
f d · . 60 they met regularly with members of the Youth League or lSCUSSlon. 
In 1927 other Pioneer groups were formed in Altan Bulag, Khovd and the 
aimag centres. D. Natsagdorj, leading member of the Youth League and 
. 61 poet was the first chairman of the Ploneers' Bureau. An organis-
ation for even younger children, Baatarchuudyn Baiguulaga (the 
62 
Organization of Heroes) was started in 1926 for 7-10 year olds. 
Neither this nor the Pioneers could command a mass influence because 
they were based on state schools and the monasteries still dominated 
Mongolian education at this time. However a framework was established 
for training the young in political ideas which would come into its 
own when secular schooling provided by the state became the norm. 
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The Youth League was the chief training ground for future 
party members and it was also an important labour pool for the Party. 
Its members were active as propagandists, taught the illiterate to 
read and write and were involved in cultural work. Some toured the 
countryside performing concerts and plays. The plays had a high 
63 propaganda content. Princes and lamas were portrayed as cruel, 
greedy and oppressive but the representatives of the new regime were 
caring and provided opportunities for education and economic 
benefits for the poor. Youth League members were also used as propagand-
ists in the army and were expected to discourage soldiers from deserting. 
From 1925 to 1927 the Youth League was advised by S. Natsov of 
the Youth Comintern, a man like Amagaev, who adhered strictly to the 
Comintern's policies. In 1925 Sen Katayama, a Japanese Communist, 
also paid a brief official visit to the Mongolian Youth League. 64 
By this time the problems between the Comintern and the Youth Comintern 
had been resolved. The Youth Comintern was no longer an independent 
organization and did not issue orders that conflicted with those of 
its parent organization. However because the Youth League had dual 
responsibilities it was still theoretically possible for it to oppose 
the Party on ideological or policy issues. Indeed the existence of 
various sections within the international Communist movement was 
potentially a powerful tool for exercising the divide and rule principle. 
This was to happen in 1928 when the party leadership was accused of 
deviating. As in 1924 the Comintern was to make use of the Youth 
League and also the Trade Unions, which were members of the Profintern, 
to overthrow party leaders who challenged the suitability of the 
Comintern's directives for the MPR. 
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Wa.en's Groups and the &.ancipation o£ Women 
From its foundation in 1920 the Party accepted the principle 
of equal rights for men and women but there were no women party members 
until 1923 when Yanjmaa, wife of Sukhbaatar, and a few others jOined. 65 
In March 1924 five of them had a meeting with Dambadorj, Head of the 
Central Committee's Organization Department and as a result a Women's 
Section was formed in the Central Committee. It was to be responsible 
for the enrolment and political education of women, the promotion of 
literacy and general education for women, and women and children's 
health and welfare.66 
By August 1924 there were only 24 women party members, 67 
although 300 young women had joined the Youth league. 68 It was 
difficult for married women to find time for party activities and many 
women, married or single were hindered by family opposition. One 
early female party member gives some idea of the treatment women 
received. Dogoryn Puntsag was 24 years old when she joined in 1924. 
In the autumn she went to the capital and one day she met an official 
she knew. The man asked her how she could be flaunting herself about 
the city when her mother lay ill at home, and he urged her to hurry 
back at once. It was just a trick for when she arrived she found 
her mother in perfect health. The official chided the mother for 
allowing her daughter to get involved with the "Reds" and a lama 
uncle ordered her to send Puntsag to tend the herds. She was 
not to be given a horse, however, for then she could escape to 
Ulaanbaatar again. The "Reds", said the lama, would all go to hell 
after death. Whatever the mother's private opinion, she was obliged 
to search through her daughter's personal belongings and destroy her 
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books and her party membership card. Puntsag did not give up easily, 
however, and later became secretary of her local cell. She says she 
was not the only woman to suffer such treatment. 69 
Even within the ranks of the Party women had to overcome 
indifference to their presence since it took the men some time to get 
used to the idea that women could be literate, educated and contribute 
to public life. This was the 18 year-old Pagmadulam's experience 
when she reported on the Women's Section at the Third Party Congress. 
"The delegates, visibly bored, smoke their 
pipes desperately. The windows, for some 
unknown reason are shut: the room is full 
of smoke and stink; the delegates belch 70 
loudly passing the pipes to one another." 
Nevertheless party work among women developed steadily from 
1925 and there was always at least one female member of the Central 
C Ott Th Tho d C 1 d Y ° 71 ° 1925 T d 1 omm1 ee. e 1r ongress e ecte anJmaa; 1n soo 0 was 
elected72 and in 1926 she was joined by Erdenejav. 73 In 1925 the 
Women's Section was enlarged to a full department and the first adviser 
from the Women's Comintern, V. Tarantaeva, arrived in the MPR. 74 
A Women's Congress was held annually from 1924 and unlike 
the congresses of other party organizations, it was open to members 
and non-members alike. The participants discussed the resolutions of 
the Party Congress, the international revolutionary movement of women, 
women's affairs world-wide and the care of mothers and babies. They 
also elected representatives to various committees of the Party and 
the Youth League, the Trades Unions Council and other bodies.75 Delegates 
76 
at the Third Women's Congress in 1926 voted to join the Women's Comintern. 
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By 1928 there were about 1,073 female party members and a 
77 further ~OOO women in the Youth League. Several dozen women had 
attended short courses at the Party Central School for women's 
78 organizers and 160 were working for the Party and the League. They 
were also moving into other non-traditional areas of labour; 71 were 
in government service and 38 worked for the trade unions. 79 600 women 
were members of tailors' unions, many of them employed to make army 
Of 80 unl orms. Girls were taking their place at the school bench too. 
In 1928 there were 551 girls out of a total 2,915 children in primary 
school; 30 of the 103 pupils in middle school were girls and 22 were 
studying abroad, mainly at KUTV. 81 Party membership gave a few 
women the opportunity to travel and come into contact with women of 
other nationalities. International Women's Day has been celebrated 
in the MPR since 1924 but delegates were also sent to take part in 
the celebrations in Moscow. When Yanjinsuren, Tsoodol and Nansalmaa 
went in 1927 they also visited Soviet factories and saw the special 
facilities such as canteens and nurseries that were available to women 
82 there. It was the Party's efforts on behalf of women that enabled 
them to widen their experiences and take hold of their constitutional 
rights and so have a share in the running and enjoyment of their 
country. 
1be Organization of" Central GovenuDent 
Where the constitution was silent the Party Programme of 
1925 boldly stated: 
"The People's Party enjoys full power in the 
Mongolian People's Republic ... ,,83 
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The Great Khural in which supreme power was vested was elected for 
one year and assembled once only in that year. It was a body for 
discussion and for ratifying the laws and statutes that were drawn 
b th .. t· 84 up y e m~n~s r~es. Planning and policy making was in the hands 
of the Party. What was agreed in the Central Committee was generally 
passed by the Party Congress and on the basis of those resolutions the 
may 
agenda of the Great Khural was drawn up. ThisAexplain why the pro-
ceedings of party congresses have been published and republished while 
only the resolutions of the khurals have been issued in recent years. 
The full proceedings, apart from those of the First Great Khural, remain 
in the archives of the t@R. 
The Second Great Khural, 6-8 November 1925, had extensive 
discussions on local government, tax reform and the judicial system. 
It also ordered the dispersal of the personal property of the Eighth 
85 Javzandamba Khutagt. The Third Great Khural, 1-13 November 1926, 
devoted much of its attention to economic planning and passed tax 
86 laws. The FourthQreat Khural, 1-16 November 1927 resolved to improve 
and widen the scope of the economy. It decreed that a state bank be 
formed and that the Mongolian currency, the togrog, be transferred from 
87 
the silver to the gold standard. 
The delegates of the Great Khural elected from their number 
a Little Khural which met twice within the year and held supreme power 
between the sessions of the Great Khural. Initiallv there were 30 
members, including the 12 members of the government or Council of 
88 
Ministers, and from the 30 a standing presidium was elected. All 
members of the First Little Khural, except for two, were party members. 
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The exceptions were representatives of distant regions where the party 
89 organization had not yet penetrated. 
man of the Little Khura1 was P. Genden. 
From 1925 to 1927 the Chair-
He was an ard from Arvaikheer 
uul khoshuu in Tseterleg MandaI aimag and he was 29 years old in 
1924. 90 Little is known of his early career, nor that of his successor 
.'. 91 Damd1nsuren. The Second Great Khura1 enlarged the Little Khural to 
45 members
92 
and the Fourth Great Khural reduced the presidium to three. 93 
The government was relatively stable between 1924 and 1928. 
Tserendorj remained Prime Minister until his death in February 1928, 
Khatanbaatar Magsarjav was Minister of the Army until he died in 1927 
and Erdene Batkhan was Minister of Education from 1924 until 1928. 
The only minister to lose his post and leave the service of the state 
altogether was the Minister of Internal Affairs from 1924 to 1925, 
Navaannerin, the former Tsetsen Khan. He, apparently, fell a victim 
to class discrimination, failed to be reelected at the Second Great 
94 Khural and retired to a monastery. He was replaced by Anandyn Amar, 
who had been Minister of Economic Affairs since 1924. In 1926 there 
was a government reshuffle. Jadamba became Minister of Economic 
.. 
Affairs while continuing to be Deputy Party Chairman. o. Badrakh, 
Minister of Finance, was replaced by Sanjiin Dovchin and Dendev took 
the place of Naidansuren as Minister of Justice. Dorligjav was Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in the middle of 1926 but it is not clear how long 
he retained this position. Another member of the government was 
Amagaev in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Council. After 
1924 all government members were party members and often held senior 
95 party posts concurrently. 
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'ftle llinistr, of Justice and the Creation of Courts 
Before 1921 Outer Mongolia was subject to Manchu Law and an 
even older customary law dating back to the Code of Chingis Khan. 96 
Trials took placeat various levels of the civil administration from 
the khoshuu to the Emperor. Torture was commonly used both to try 
d t . h97 d an 0 pun1s an even if a plaintiff won his case he might find him-
self punished if he had brought the case against his own ruling prince. 
The monasteries were an entirely separate legal domain with their own 
law, judicial procedures and punishments which were quite as cruel as 
those of the secular system. 
The provisional government intended to publish a new code of law 
based on principles of humanity and equality. Princes and ards 
were to be treated alike, and torture was to be replaced by periods of 
imprisonment under humane conditions, although some forms of corporal 
punishment were retained. Certain political crimes and the refusal 
to obey military orders carried the death penalty by shooting. 98 
The old system of collective responsibility was abolished and only 
condemned persons were to be punished. Although Danzan's property 
was confiscated after his execution, the Third Party Congress 
ordered that his wife and childrenwere to be left with enough to 
1 . 99 1ve on. 
The new judicial system only came into practice by degrees 
and legal matters were handled under both systems for some time. The 
Ministry of Justice itself tried and sentenced serious criminal and 
civil cases. The Office of Internal Security dealt with political cases 
such as treason and in the countryside, many officials still worked to 
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the Manchusystem. Torture, though banned,was still practised 
especially by the monasteries as this report to the Fourth Congress 
shows: 
"At the Lama Gegeen monastery the Chairman of 
the Shav' khoshuu administration, the 
Shandzudba, tortured an ard who had galloped 
his horse in front of the L.ama Gegeen' s ger .. 
He burned his body with red-hot iron and threw 
him in gaol. Also at the Lama Gegeen monastery 
Genden, an official of the khoshuu administration, 
suspended an errand-boy by his hands because he 
had ridden the official's horse without per-
mission. And even as we sit here now, a 16 year-
old boy in Sain Shav' on the border of the 
khoshuu is in chains because he dared to run 
away from the monastery.lIlOO 
In January 1925 a Council for the Direction of Court Affairs 
was formed to organize a complete new judicial system and in June a comm-
ission was set up to put this system into practice. Members of this 
commission included the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, P.V. 
Vsesvyatskii, a Soviet legal advisor, and four others. lOl 
For some years the Party was more concerned with internal 
security than the behaviour of the common criminal and it is not sur-
prising that the first of the new courts was the Political Court which 
began to operate in 1925. Its chairman or judge was Choibalsan and 
other court officials included Baldandorj, Head of Security Services, 
and Dambadorj. This court was entirely separate from the Ministry 
of Justice but sentences had to be confirmed by the government 
and the Minister of Justice could appeal 102 against them. This 
was more generous than the justice meted out to Bodoo and Danzan but 
we do not know to what extent appeals were allowed. 
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The Second Great Khural discussed and passed a series of 
statutes concerning courts and judicial procedures. According to the 
statute on courts: 
and 
" •.• the fundamental aim of the new courts 
should be to protect the interests of the 
people and to protect the state." 
"courts maintain and protect the freedom 
obtained through the people's revolution ... lIl03 
Soon afterwards, a Provisional Court with a judge, state prosecutor 
and a representative for the accused began to function, which handled 
a variety of cases formerly dealt with by the Security Services. These 
included revolt against the state, sabotage against state 
property, bribery and forging currency.104 It is not clear how this 
court differed from the Political Court mentioned in the previous para-
graph. 
Between 1926 and 1927 the khoshuu, aimag and city courts 
were formed. They were annually elected bodies, except in khoshuus 
of ten or fewer sums, where tre chairman of the khoshuu acted as 
judge. The khoshuu courts handled small cases, for instance thefts 
of less than 20 bod of large livestock. The aimag courts dealt with 
cases involving larger sums, homicide and the infliction of injury. 
105 City courts handled both types of cases. 
In 1927 the Provisional Court was replaced by the Supreme 
Court. It was the highest court of appeal and its officers were 
appointed by the Little Khural. 106 The Council for the Di~ection 
of Court Affairs was then disbanded. The Ministry of Justice was relieved 
105 
of its judicial powers and responsibilities and reorganized into four 
sections; a general section which dealt with courts and investig-
ation, and notarial, prison affairs and legal affairs sections. The 
chief concern of the Ministry from now on was administration. l07 
Although the structure of the new system is well-documented 
there is little information on how it functioned in practice. There 
appear to be no published records of cases examined and therefore we 
have little idea of the nature and level of crime. Nor have investig-
ative procedures been described. A statute of 1927 ordered the 
appointment of public investigators to 12 centres. Their powers 
were considerable and included the investigation of crime, deciding 
whether there was a case to be brought, and the general supervision 
of court activities. None were appointed immediately, however, 
because of shortage of money and qualified personnel. lOB A six-
month course in legal studies was held at the College in Ulaanbaatar 
in 1926 but only lB graduated in the spring of 1927 and were sent to 
109 
work for the Ulaanbaatar Militia Committee and the rural courts. 
Next to nothing is known about the work of the militia at this time 
either. 
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Local Govel"'lWent in the Cotmtryside 
From 1925 the transfer of local government from the pre-
revolutionary system to an elective system was complete except in remote 
parts of the west and Dariganga and the use of the special government 
representati ves, the t;oloenii. tiishmed, was discontinued. 110 In country 
districts the lowest level of local government was the arv, a grouping 
of 10 families or households. Above the arv was the bag comprising 
5 ~ or 50 families, the sum with 150 families, the khoshuu com-
prising three to 25 sums and at the highest local level was the aimag 
or province with 15 to 30 khoshuus. In 1926 there were altogether 
12,000 ~, 2,400 bags, 800 sums, 120 khoshuus and six aimags. ll1 
The aimags and khoshuus had elected khurals and a varying number of 
full-time officials and employees. The sums elected their own officials 
112 but the bag officials were appointed by the khoshuu khurals. 
The khoshuus were formerly known by the names of the ruling 
princes and the aimags (once four) were named after the four khans 
of Outer Mongolia. After the Republic was founded the aimags and their 
a1 
districts were all renamed from the geOgraPhi2 features of their local-
i ties. From west to east the aimags were: 
1. Chand'man Uul aimag (formerly part of Zasagt Khan 
aimag) 
2. Khan Taishir Uul aimag (formerly part of ZasagtKhan aimag) 
3. Tsetserleg MandaI aimag (formerly Sain Noyon Khan 
aimag) 
4. Bogd Khan Uul aimag (formerly TUsheet Khan ~mag) 
113 
5. Khan Khentii Uul aimag (formerly Tsetsen Khan aimag). 
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The sixth aimag was Delger Ikh Uul aimag and was based on the secular 
population of the Ikh Shav'. In 1923 former shav' nar were organized 
into khoshuus with elective assemblies. The chief administrator of 
the Ikh Shav',the Erdene Shandzudba, became an elected official and 
he was assisted by a special representative appointed by the govern-
114 
mente In April 1925 the Ikh Shav' was abolished and replaced by 
Delger Ikh Uul aimag with 17 khoshuus which became subject to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. 115 Because this aimag did not have a 
geographical location the Second Great Khural wanted to abolish it 
completely and merge its population into the administrative districts 
where they actually lived. However this apparently caused some 
anxiety to the former shav'nar so the idea was abandoned for the time 
b . 116 e1ng. Shav' nar in the service of other khutagts were organized 
into separate secular khoshuus. If there were not enough families to 
make up a single khoshuu they were absorbed into neighbouring khoshuus.11 7 
In May the five subdivisions of Dariganga, an area formerly under 
the direct control of the Manchu court for the breeding and supply 
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of imperial horses, were united into a single khoshuu of 18 sums. 
Until 1927 local government was free to levy tax according 
to its needs without intervention from central government. D. 
Mikhel'man an official of the Mongol-Soviet Bank, described local 
financing as it was in 119 . 1926. The a1mag khural drew up the budget 
for the khoshuus and the khoshuu khurals for the sums. Income 
came from many sources: internal customs dues, granting patents, 
renting fields for crop-growing or haymaking and the lease of 
hunting and fishing rights. There was also some direct taxation 
but it was not uniform andCould vary not only from aimag to aimag 
108 
but from khoshuu to khoshuu. Where tax was levied it was based on 
the livestock a family owned and the rates were variable. Local 
government income was used to pay the wages of officials, khoshuu 
schools, ortoo, policing and local courts. There were no fixed 
rates however and salaries, for instance, varied so that the chair-
man of one sum might receive 75 Mexican Dollars (MD) a month and 
another only 25 MD. In 1927 local government finance was standard-
ized and a single tax was levied on all except lamas living in mon-
asteries. The rates on which the new tax was levied depended on the 
120 
amount of livestock a family or household owned. 
While the local government system of elected khurals and 
elected officials appeared orderly enough in theory, in practice it 
was rather confused during the first few years of the Republic. The 
special government representatives who had been responsible for helping 
local officials and residents to understand the policies and instructions 
of central government were withdrawn from 1925 to 1926, except in 
Dariganga where they remained until 1927 and many local officials were 
d . 121 left in great uncertainty about their proper ut1es. The new 
codes of law were slow to appear and instructions from central govern-
122 
ment often failed to reach their destinations. This was frequently 
because the initial recipient could not read the direction or because 
of the inadequacies of the ortoo service, although at the Fourth Party 
Congress Amagaev put the blame on the "shortcomings" of the Ministry 
123 
of Internal Affairs. 
In 1926 temporary travelling instructors were sent out by 
L:4 
central government to inform local officials of their duties. 
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Provincial government also made efforts to improve the efficiency and 
behaviour of local personnel. In 1925, for instance, the Khan Khentii 
aimag authorities sent the following advice to the khoshuu office of 
Khan Khentii uul. 
"First an official matter should be made the 
same as a household matter (i.e. it should 
be considered as very lm portant) ; one should 
attempt to be gracious to the masses from the 
bottom of one's heart. Second, as is stated 
in the classics, one must be honest to oneself 
and only then can one be honest to others. 
One should keep in one's heart the old saying 
'If you are not honest to yourself you cannot 
be honest to others.' One should be honest 
not for one's own sake and benefit in matters 
as small as a hair .... In general, one should 
not seek physical comfort and should avoid 
shelving official documents and piling them up 
and on no account should one slouch arbitrarily 
and haughtily in ones chair."l25 
Central government ordered numerous reforms of the ortoo 
from 1921 which were aimed at reducing the burden of this service 
on the ards. In the past princes and lamas had made use of it for 
personal as well as official reasons which demanded a considerable 
outlay in horses, gers and food from people who could ill afford to 
provide these things. Before 1921 an estimated 300 riding horses 
per day were in use on four major routes out ofNiislel Khuree while 
126 in the whole of 1924 only 21,315 horses were used. In 1925 there were 
further reductions and a part or a whole of the alba was made commutable 
127 into a money tax. 27 stations on the route from Ulaanbaatar to 
l(B 
the south-west transferred to a motor vehicle service run by the state. 
Although the changes in the ortoo made life easier for ards 
they did not make the service more efficient. It may simply have 
been that ards were being asked to make too many changes at once or 
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perhaps they did not feel the same responsibility towards the new 
government system as they had towards the princes and officials of 
the old system. Under the principle of equal treatment for all more 
people were being required to serve on the ortoo. Under a new law of 
1925 former princes and other wealthy people were to be the first to 
serve. However it was later alleged that they forced poor people to 
do so in their stead.129 
The Third Great Khural tried to improve the ortoo by 
laying down stricter specifications for the number of horses and 
gers to be provided at different stations. One sheep wasallocaUrlas 
food for seven people, a Tibetan doctor was to be on call to administer 
l~ first aid and a scribe was to check documents and keep records. 
However the Fourth Great Khural was still not satisfied with the service 
d d d f h · . t· 131 an or ere urt er lnvestlga lons. 
By 1926 Party leaders were beginning to put the blame for 
the inadequacies of local government on local officials who had been 
in service since ~ Manchu period:32It was assumed that these men were 
deliberately sabotaging the new system. There is little direct 
evidence to support this although as young party and Youth League 
members began to treat them as a class separate from the "genuine 
ards" some may have worked with little enthusiasm. In any case it 
was not merely the local officials who performed poorly. Local khurals 
were affected by the indifference of the electorate. In 1927 Oambadorj 
told the American reporter Anna Louse Strong: 
III 
"in practise, the Mongols do not wish to 
take the time and money for a trip to the 
assembly and so, in the last elections, 
only 30,000 people took part."133 
The simplest explanation of the problems of local government is that 
people needed time to adjust to the changes taking place. In spite 
of its shortcomings the new system was a considerable achievement and 
in less than a decade the traditional system of hereditary rule had been 
completely replaced by a structure that was . fairly democratic. 
Furthermore, by standardizing local government, subjecting it to the 
control of central government and, in addition, giving the country 
population a voice in central government, the regime established a 
structure that, in time, could do much to enhance the sense of nation-
hood and loyalty to the state among the citizens of the MPR. 
Urban Administration 
Not all Mongols lived in the khoshuus of the countryside. 
Large numbers of lamas lived in monasteries and for administrative 
purposes they continued to exist as separate from the secular population 
during the 1920s. There was also a settled secular population. 
During the last decades of the 19th century many poor people left their 
native khoshuus and came to settlements, especially Khuree, in the 
hope of making a livelihood. By the 1920s secular city dwellers also 
included employees of the government and of the public and cultural 
organizations. In 1921 Ivan Maiskii published the following estimates 












These towns were subject to considerable upheaval in 1921 and the 
reports of the 1924 census give no figures which can be compared with 
those of 1918. The Second Great Khural recorded a figure of 61,000 




Russians 1,772 135 
In that year the (entral Committee had decided that those Mongols 
who lived permanently in the city and had no home in the countryside 
should be regarded as residents of the City District. 510 such 
households or 1,497 individuals were registered and a further 4,321 
1 . d t 136 households or 11,533 individuals were isted as temporary reSl en s. 
It was clear to the government that towns were to play an 
increasingly import~nt role in Mongolian society as permanent centres 
of administration, industry and culture and would therefore require 
a system of local government that took this into account. Until 
1924 the Ministry of Internal Affairs took charge of the day-to 
day business of Niislel KhUree, not including the monasteries. 
Then a provisional City Administration was set up and the city divided 
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into 23 wards, again excluding monasteries. There was an elected 
khural of 45 representatives who chose a cha~man and secretaries by 
secret ballot. 137 In 1925 the Chinese trading centre called 
Naimaa khot or Maimaicheng became a district of Ulaanbaatar and was renamed 
138 Amgalanbaatar. The regulations of the City Administration passed 
by the Second Great Khural defined its structure,procedures and 
responsibilities. The last named included the day-to-day running 
of the city, the control and maintenance of public buildings and 
works, lighting, water, fire protection, cleansing, transport, 
health care, education, tax collection and the control of trading~39 
A visitor to Ulaanbaatar in 1926 described it as 
" ... a city of deep contrasts, typical of a 
country that is experiencing a period of 
fundamental changes. Modern conveyances 
such as airplanes and motor cars, contest 
their right with the time-honoured means 
of transport - the long files of majestic 
camels and clumsy bullock carts." 140 
There were shining temples and palaces, colonies of gers, and wooden 
houses in the Chinese and Russian styles. Public buildings and gers 
of officials and educated Mongols were lit by electricity. The streets 
were sometimes so narrow that only one rider could proceed at a time 
and they were roamed by packs of fierce dogs who lived off dead beggars 
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and attacked anyone else who was not sufficiently careful. The 
same observer relates how a sentry was overpowered one night; in the 
142 
morning nothing was left but his sword, rifle and part of his coat. 
In each ward there were cells of party and Youth League 
members which were responsible to the city committees of each 
organization. These people were active in the City Administration 
114 
andalso performed many voluntary works on behalf of the city community. 
For instance Youth League members cleared away huge piles of rubbish 
143 
that had accumulated over many decades. From the end of 1925 the 
City Administration derived its income from taxes on land and buildngs 
and a variety of impositions on such things as motor vehicles, a share 
of the profits of industries and businesses and from public entertain-
144 
ment. However this income could not immediately provide all the 
services that were desired and the foreign community also made 
individual contributions. Some Russians are said to have run an 
orphanage from 1924 to 1926145 and Russian and Chinese traders clubbed 
together to provide a new fire engine to replace an old one which had 
been in service since the autonomy.146 Chinese coachmen bought 
gilded, painted carriages at an auction of Bogd Khaan's property. 
Pulled by pairs of shaggy horses, these were the first "buses" in 
147 Ulaanbaatar. 
In spite of shortcomings described above the establishment 
of permanent administrative structures in both the Party and the state 
was a considerable achievement given the conditions of the time. 
Moreover the administrative changes in central and local government were 
a potentially unifying factor within the state, giving the centre 
control of the peripheries and the peripheries the opportunity to share 
in the work and decision-making of the centre. 
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There were, however, limits to the full and effective 
functioning of government at all levels in these years and the 
Party could not claim to have completely fulfilled its aims to 
ardize the administrative and public organizations. The Party made 
considerable strides in increasing both membership and influence. 
Nevertheless with a membership of only 2% of the population and a 
similar number in the Youth League it was not possible to fill all 
official and representative posts with party members so other help 
had to be utilized. In 1927 there were 20,000 representatives in 
local and central government from the level of bag to that of the 
Great Khural~4B In addition there was a steadily increasing number 
of permanent civil servants and employees of public organizations. 
Even so, party membership was the key to success in the new Mongolia. 
All government ministers and senior officials were members of the Party 
as were all but one of the members of both the Trade Union Bureau 
and the Board of the Mongolian Cooperative!49In the army party 
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members accounted for 80% of the officer class. 
The achievements in structural change and administration in 
this period were chiefly the Party's. As we shall see in the next 
chapter many of the economic reforms of the period owed much to Russians 
who were working in the MPR. However, although the Mongols adopted a Soviet 
system of government there is little to suggest that Russiar.s actually 
worked in ministries and departments except as advisers or as spedalists 
like doctors and veterinarians. Nor did the Comintern interfere directly 
withgpvernment administration until about 1927 when it began to demand 
the removal of Manchu-trained officials. Even Amagaev the Comintern 
representa~e seems to have limited his contribution to criti~al remarks 
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at party congresses and reserved his major efforts for economic 
reform. Therefore the Party and government must be held mainly 
responsible for both the successes and inefficiencies but I would 
like to suggest that the former outweighed the latter. 
117 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE MONGOLIAN ECONOMY IN THE 1920s 
The real transformation of the economic life of the Mongolian 
state began in 1923. In that year the government drew up its first 
budget and began to consider economic planning. A favourable trade 
agreement was signed with the USSR and plans for a joint Mongol-Soviet 
bank were drawn up. Between 1923 and 1928 three major aspects of 
economic change can be defined. First, Mongolia was transferring from 
a mainly natural or barter economy to a money economy based on a new, 
national currency. Secondly, from being a region politically dependent 
on China with no specific income or practice of state budge:ing it 
became an independent country with a planned economy and budget. 
Thirdly it ceased to be a country whose sole economic resource was 
livestock and whose consumer goods were provided by trade with China 
and became instead one with a more diversified economy and, more 
important, acquired a new dominant trading partner, the Soviet Union. 
For two centuries the Mongolian economic system 
was a part of the Chinese system. The Chinese were the Mongols' 
chief trading partners and in addition they provided services that the 
Mongols either did not wish to or could not provide for the~selves. 
As an agrarian peasantry they tilled the earth and grew some grain and 
vegetables, as a proletariat they engaged in construction wo~k and 
mining and as a bourgeoisie they offered commercial services including 
credit facilities. However in the 19th century Mongolian society 
experienced the: 
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"breakdown of a traditional pattern of 
living under the impact of economic stag-
nation, and the collapse of a feeling 
of responsibility for the public welfare 
on the part of authority."l 
A few individuals and monasteries grew very rich but many people 
were reduced to vagrancy, theft and grinding poverty. In Khalkh 
the population began to fall and several western observers at the 
end of the century predicted the imminent demise of the Mongol 
2 peoples. Economic dependency on the Chinese system contributed much 
to this state of affairs but additional factors were the political 
organization of the Mongols during the Manchu period and the privi-
leged position of the Church which in economic terms took much from 
secular society but put little back in return. 
Dissatisfaction with economic conditions played an 
important part in the rise of Mongolian nationalism and the govern-
ment which came to power in 1921 determined to carry out some 
economic reform. By so doing it was hoped to create a prosperous 
state with sufficient revenue to provide a range of social services 
for the inhabitants and in addition to redistribute economic resources 
more fairly in order to raise the standard of living of the poorer 
sections of the population. The government expected to do this in 
part by tapping hitherto undeveloped resources, including manufacturing, 
mining, agriculture and forestry but it did not attempt to define in 
any detail its plans and methods for reform. 
The Soviet government had a much clearer notion of the 
kind of economic policies it wished to see the Mongolian government 
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applying. The USSR, like Tsarist Russia, looked on Mongolia 
as a valuable potential source of raw materials for the industries 
of Siberia and of food for the Siberian towns. For most of the 
1920s the economy was the Soviet government's chief interest in 
Mongolia and the main area of Mongolian affairs in which the Soviet 
government agents intervened directly. In other areas such as 
political or social affairs Soviet influence was indirect, either 
through the Comintern, which the Russian Communist Party dominated 
frcmabout 1923, or through the many Buriat Mongols who chose to work 
for the new Mongolian state. The Soviet government aimed to cut off 
the Mongolian economy from the Chinese system and to integrate it 
with the new Soviet system. In order to achieve this it made use of 
a variety of methods including financial loans to the Mongolian govern-
ment; Soviet financial advisers; trade, transport and communications 
agreements; joint ventures such as a bank which offered both central 
banking and credit facilities; and the exertion of ideological pressure 
through the agency of the Comintern. 
In effect, Mongolia was exchanging one type of dependency 
for another. The Soviet Russians justified this by saying that the 
Mongols were oppressed and exploited by Chinese and other foreign 
capital and at the Third MPP Congress in 1924 introduced Mongolian 
leaders to Lenin's concept of bypassing the capitalist stage of 
history as the basis of the economic development of the MPR. In 
1925 and 1926 Amagaev put the theory into a Mongolian context. 
He warned Mongols that if free trade, uncontrolled lending and 
speculation were allowed a native bourgeoisie would arise and with it 
private capitalism. Therefore the Mongolian government must resist 
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this by creating state capitalism and so protect the interests of 
3 
ards. The USSR and the Comintern used ideas such as these to 
persuade the Mongolian government to plan its country's economic 
development in such a way as to gain control of all economic 
resources. The surplus could then be channelled into the Soviet 
economic system. 
Until 1925 economic planning meant little more than 
estimating the government's income from various sources and super-
vising its expenditure through a Department of State Control. 
This department was founded in 1922 to prevent corruption and 
ensure that other government departments conducted their financial 
affairs according to the regulations. 4 In 1925 the full bureau-
cratic framework for promoting economic development was set up 
which included the reformed Ministry of Financ& which was the state 
treasury, the new Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Department of 
State Control, which became a full Ministry in November 1925 and 
the Economic Council. The Economic Counci1 5 formed in 3 February 
1925 was in charge of all economic planning and decision-making. 
It had overall responsibility for matters of finance, planning laws 
and regulations, and in 1926 it also assumed responsibility for the 
work of the Ministry of State Control when the Ministry was abolished 
. d 6 1n or er to save money. The Economic Council drew up the important 
economic reforms of the period such as those concerned with currency, 
customs and taxation but ~here is littre information on the Council's 
day-to-day activities. 
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In the latter half of 1925 Amagaev became Chairman of the 
Council. He already had considerable experience in economic 
planning in the governments of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) and 
the Buriat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSRh and in 
1923 the Central Committee of the MPP had requested his help in 
planning the Mongolian economy. At first it was said that he could 
not be spared but in November 1924 he was elected to the First Little 
9 Khural, even though he was not present, so some agreement must have 
been reached. He eventually arrived in Ulaanbaatar in the summer 
f 1925 t d · th M· . t f F· 10 o 0 a V1se e 1n1S ry 0 1nance. 
In a recent biographyllAmagaev is described as a man who 
worked hard night after night and who was not given to jumping to 
12 
conclusions but considered everything very carefully. He was 
not a Russian but a Buriat and it is possible that the Khalkh Mongols 
originally asked for him in person in preference to the Russian 
advisers who preceded him. Howeve~ unlike many other educated 
Buriats of this perio~ Amagaev was not a Pan-Mongolist but was 
staunchly loyal to the Comintern. By 1924 the Comintern was calling 
on all its members to protect the safety and stability of the USSR 
as their internationalist duty. Therefore Amagaev promoted economic 
poliCies which were in the interests of the USSR and did not attempt 
to draw up a plan based on an independent analysis of Mongolian 
conditions. 
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GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE 
Taxation 
In 1921 the Provisional Government took over a system whereby 
most of the state's income was obtained from customs dues, both on 
goods crossing the national borders and on goods transferred from one 
district to another within the country. This income had been used chiefly 
to finance the ministries of the government and the court of the 
Bogd Khaan. However the treasury had been emptied by Baron Ungern 
von shternberg and virtually no customs dues were being collected 
because most of the Chinese traders had fled. 
It was imperative for the stability of the government that 
it should become solvent as quickly as possible. The Soviet 
Union cancelled all the debts owed by the autonomous government to 
the Tsarist government and made a loan of a million roubles repayable 
in livestock, to the Mongolian government. 13 This immediately 
placed the Mongolian government under an obligation to the Soviet 
government. At the same time a number of former Russian-owned 
industrial enterprises such as tanneries and wool-washing plants in 
Niislel Khuree and Altan Bulag were handed over to the Mongolian 
government without charge. 14 Then as order was restored the Chinese 
traders began to return to Mongolia and the collection of customs duty 
was resumed. 
During the period of the Provisional Government revenue 
continued to be derived from indirect sources. In addition to 
customs duties these included profits from the newly acquired state 
. 15 h" h 
enterprises and from the Mongolian Mutual Aid Cooperative w lC 
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was formed in 1921; the state monopoly of alcohol sales; rents 
from property leased to foreigners; licences issued to trader~ and 
loans from the Soviet Union. 16 As more and more private traders 
began to operate in Mongolia the proportion of government income from 
customs rose from 22% in 1922 to 78% in 1924. 17 At this time the 
government's official currency for accounting was the Chinese silver 
Ian which was equivalent to 37.5 grams of pure silver. In 1924 an 
estimated 2,400,000 Ian was collected in customs dues and 40% of that 
sum came from internal customs. 18 
Bookkeeping and statistics in this period were rudimentary 
but there was some effort to plan the government's income and expend-
iture. In December 1921 representatives of the four aimags and the 
Ikh Shav' met to discuss this19 but the first real budget was drawn 
up in 1923 and fixed at 2,600,000 lan. 20 60.4% of that sum was set 
21 
aside to create a regular army. Although the White Russian forces 
had been fully routed by the end of 1922 Mongolia's long border still 
needed to be defended and SUkhbaatar's army had very little modern 
d . t 22 weaponry an equ~pmen. Other allocations were 15.8% for financing 
the economy, 7.3% for education, 5.4% for communications and 11.1% 
f d ·· t t' 23 or a m~nlS ra lone 
on its allocations. 
However the government regularly underspent 
In 1924, for example, records suggest that over 
one million Ian was not spent24 but this was certainly saved deliberate-
ly in order to finance the Mongolian Trade and Industrial Bank which 
opened in that year. 
In 1925 when the Mexican dollar replaced the Ian as the 
25 
official currency for accountancy purposes in the MPR state income 
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was approximately 8,300,000 MD and expenditure 7,400,000 MD. In 1926 
income was estimated at 11,800,000 MD and expenditure at 11,200,000 MD. 
Customs dues were still the largest regular source of income and 
expected to bring in about 3,700,000 MD in 1926. Other sources 
yielding more than one million MD were the state-owned industrial 
enterprises, the alcohol monopoly and the Veterinary Service. Approx-
imately one-third of government expenditure was on recurring items and 
the remainder on non-recurring items such as construction work. 40% 
of expenditure on government departments was on salaries and about two 
million MD was allocated for medical work, agriculture, post and 
telegraph services and education. Tugarinov, a bank official, analysed 
state income and expenditure and attributed the steady increase in 
the former to three factors: investment of new sources of income 
from taxation, improved fiscal apparatus and the development of profit-
making enterprises or services by the government. 26 
In 1925 the Second Great Khural decided to change the basis 
of government revenue from indirect taxes to a direct tax, the 
progressive livestock tax. 27 This had been under discussion for some 
years and in 1924 a census28 was taken to ascertain the amount of 
livestock owned by the Mongolian population. There are a number of 
reasons why a livestock tax should commend itself both to the Mongolian 
and the Soviet governments. Firstly, customs as a basis of state 
revenue is an unstable source being a prey to the fluctuations of 
the foreign trade market. Secondly the Soviet Union intended to 
attract the import and export trade presently operating between the 
MPR and China. High customs tariffs on many Chinese goods, especially 
those regarded as luxury items, were now being applied by the Mongolian 
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authorities to force the Chinese traders out. 29 The Soviet 
trading organizations, on the other hand, had the benefit of 
favourable customs agreements and as they won trade from the Chinese 
the amount of customs duty collected could be expected to drop. 
Thirdly internal customs duty which accounted for a considerable prop-
ortion of the total duty, was being deliberately phased out 
because it was a financial burden to the ordinary ard population. 
A fourth possible reason for the change to direct taxes is that 
the Mongols wanted to organize their state in the manner of other 
more advanced states. 
The economic planners also regarded the progressive tax 
as a powerful weapon for class discrimination. Taxes levied 
during the Manchu period were paid only by the free ards but the 
new tax was to be levied on all livestock including the monastic 
herds and it was to be applied uniformly throughout the country. 
Moreover Amagaev expressed the belief that the progressive character 
of the tax would act as a stimulus for increased production in the 
30 rural economy. Another important aspect of the tax was that in 
addition to replacing the customs dues as a source of state revenue, 
it was also to replace the various forms of imposition levied auto-
nomously by local government. Therefore it would serve also to 
strengthen the control of local government by central government. 
Although the Economic Council was largely responsible 
for the details of the new tax system the idea of a unified 
progressive tax had been put forward much earlier. In 1922 a tax 
law was passed which included a marginal variation in rates and to which 
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all were liable without exemption. 3l However it was not applied 
with any uniformity and it did not replace other forms of govern-
32 
ment revenue. The Progressive Tax Law was passed by the Third 
Great Khural in 1926 and came into force in January 1927. Those 
owning 21-50 bod of livestock were taxed at a basic rate. Less 
than five bod were fully exempt and between six and 20 were partially 
exempt. 51-100 bod were taxed at 3% above the basic rate and then 
the percentage increase on the basic rate rose steeply so that 
owners of herds of ~001-~00 bod were charged at 84% above basic rate 
33 
and of over 10pOO bod at 120%. Pedigree livestock and its offspring 
were exempt from tax if judged to be of a high standard. This was 
to encourage the improvement of breeding strains. Other tax 
privileges were offered to families wishing to supplement their incomes 
by taking up agriculture or to improve the quality of their herds by 
making hay or building protective structures against adverse weather 
conditions. The law took into account the seasonal variations in 
the livestock economy and directed that the taxes be collected at 
34 
times when there was likely to be a surplus of animals and produce. 
The livestock tax was intended to be a money tax payable in the new 
native currency, the togrog which was introduced in December 1925. 
Payment in kind was only permitted if products were needed for consump-
, b h '1' t 35 tlon in schools or y t e ml 1 ary. However it proved impossible to 
apply this rule rigidly because there were insufficient togrogs 
in circulation. In 1928 the Mongolian Cooperative was still 
36 
handling animals delivered in payment of tax in distant areas. 
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Because the progressive livestock tax was introduced in 
1927 and was drastically altered after a sharp political swing to 
the left in 1928 it is difficult to assess what it might have 
achieved as a tool for economic change in its original form. Nor 
is there much evidence to show whether it was fully applied 
at first or how the rural population received it,although we do 
know that the monasteries resisted it, in some cases quite violently. 
However there were at least two obvious political results. First 
local government autonomy was ended and this in its turn facilitated 
the campaigns of confiscation of livestock and the collectivization 
of the rural economy in the period 1928-1932 which were waged on the 
orders of the Comintern. 
Credi t and Banking 
Before 1921 Mongolia had no native banks. The Chinese and 
37 
some large monasteries ran an extensive money-lending system and 
indWiduals and central and local government made use of its services. 
Russian and Chinese banks operated for a brief period in the early 20th 
century but had withdrawn by 1921. 38 
The Mongolian and Soviet governments agreed to finance a bank 
jointly but it was the Soviet government which drew up the plans. 
In January 1924 these were delivered to the Mongolian government by 
the new Soviet ambassador A.I. Vasil'ev. The shareholders were the 
Mongolian Ministry of Finance and the Soviet government each of which 
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provided 250,000 roubles as founding capital. The Bank was to hold 
the accounts of all government ministries, departments and public 
organizations and the government was also entitled to borrow up to 
one fifth of the funds in circulation. The Bank opened for 
business in Niislel Khuree in June 1924 under the name Mongolian Trade 
and Industrial Bank (Mongolyn Khudaldaa ba Aj UildveriinBank.>39 
By 1926 there were also a number of local branches at Altan Bulag, 
San Beise, Sain Shav', Uliastai, Khovd, Tsetsen Khan and Yeguzir. 
The last two branches were open seasonally between April and 
40 December. 
When it was first founded, the Bank's prime purpose 
was to promote the development of Soviet Mongol trade and also industry 
and agriculture in the MFR. It provided credit for setting up new 
industrial enterprises, for construction, the state farms and also 
f 't 'It 41 or prlva e agrlcu ure. In addition the Bank offered an advisory 
service on the acquisition of breeding stock, the purchase of agri-
cultural equipment, setting up farm buildings and also gave credit 
f ' f" t' 42 or coverlng the cost 0 lmmunlza lone Since farm machinery was 
43 
difficult to obtain the Bank set up its own warehouse in Altan Bulag. 
44 
Other activities of the Bank included the provision of insurance, 
chiefly against fire, and trading in green tea and manufactured goods 
from China, often in collaboration with the Mongolian Cooperative 
d h ' d' ,45 an t e Sovlet tra lng agencles. The Bank also ran a Mongol 
Soviet Business Club which published the journal Khozyaistvo 
46 
Mongolii from 1926 to 1931. 
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By 1927 it was evident that the Bank was so profitable 
that delegates at the Sixth MPRP Congress were eager for the Mongolian 
government to take over the entire venture or else set up its own 
bank. This would mean that all profits would go to the Mongolian 
state and not have to be shared with the USSR. 47 The Fourth Great 
Khural ordered that a state bank be formed48 and this was official 
policy for some years. Nothing was actually done however, perhaps 
because the Soviet Union did not approve, and the MPR did not have 
a state bank until 1954. 
The existence of the joint Mongol-Soviet bank was an import-
ant weapon in the war to integrate the Mongolian economy with the 
Soviet economy and its support of trade was a particularly important 
part of this. The Bank's main clients were the Mongolian Mutual Aid 
Cooperative and the Soviet trading organizations. Together they 
formed 91% of all creditors49 and the Cooperative alone was respons-
50 ible for 40% of the Bank's assets. However the Bank was also 
important to the Soviet government because it gave that government a 
financial interest in the Mongolian government. Furthermore the 
d . 51 directorate and staff of the Bank were mainly Russian an Burlat 
which meant that foreign citizens were in a position to oversee all 
the financial activities of the Mongolian government. 
Establishing the TogrOg as a Do.estic Currencl 
The Mongols had no currency of their own but a variety of 
forms of exchange were in use in the first three decades of this 
52 
century. At the most basic level the barter system operated. 
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Livestock or its products were exchanged for agricultural products 
such as grain and tea or manufactured goods like fabric, books and 
vessels. Silver ingots had become wide-spread in the 19th century 
after the Manchu government started to levy tax in silver. Bricks of 
tea of various sizes were also a very common form of currency and 
some monasteries used the shar tsai ("yellow tea") as a unit of 
53 
accountancy. As the bricks passed from hand to hand they became 
worn and deteriorated in value. They were cumbersome to carry about 
but tea formed an important part of the Mongol diet so they were 
highly valued. From the beginning of the 20th century a number of 
different foreign currencies were in common use in Mongolia, both 
paper and metal, in particular the Chinese yanchaan or silver lan, 
gold and silver roubles, Chinese copper coins and the Mexican dollar 
which circulated widely in East Asia. 54 
In 1921 the Soviet government granted the Mongolian govern-
ment a loan to establish an official Mongolian currency. At the time 
there was some discussion in Soviet circles about whether or not a 
primitive country with a barter system of trading really needed its 
own currency55 and in 1923 the Mongolian government actually issued 
56 
some banknotes in denominations of Mexican dollars. At the same 
time the North China Herald newspaper reported that large amounts of silver 
were being moved into Mongolia and D. Mikhel'man, a Russian bank 
officiaL later reported that a million Mexican dollars worth of 
silver coins and ingots were imported which did not appear in the 
. 58 
accounts of the customs serVlce. We can only speculate that 
this activity was connected with the plan to establish an official 
currency. 
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It is not clear whether the Mongolian Trade and Industrial 
Bank was originally intended to function as a central bank issuing 
its own currency and controlling the circulation of money. However 
in February 1925 the Mongolian government decided to issue the togrog 
as the national monetary unit59 and this was done through the Bank. 
The first denominations were to be in the form of banknotes. There 
were initial fears that ordinary people would be suspicious of 
of 
these because~their experience with the paper rouble which had become 
worthless after the 1917 revolution60 but when the first notes appeared 
on 9 December 1925 it was reported that: 
"people turned them round with fascination, 
looked at them, read the writing, and were 
overcome with joy."6l 
Mikhel'man also commented: 
"The Mongolian population of Urga valued 
the banknotes as a symbol of their national 
independence on a new monetary front - they 
accepted them without any display of offence 
or obstruction. Of course, the city popu-
lation is the most sensitive and cultured 
but the factors operating within the city 
have, without doubt, their effect on 62 
the periphery too although to a lesser extent." 
The History of the MPR speaks of the opposition of Chinese traders to 
the togrog,63 but this is not entirely borne out by contemporary 
evidence. One Russian observer says that they received the togrog 
"h "f t" 64 wlt satls ac lone On the other hand anyone attempting to under-
mine general confidence in the new currency risked a gaol sentence of two 
t "t 65 years and one year if they refused to accep 1. 
The first notes issued were in denominations of one, two, 
. f"1 66 five and ten togrogs. each tagrag backed by 18 grams 0 Sl ver. 
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In February 1926 23,000 togrogs worth of coins appeared. 67 Notes 
and coins were put into circulation throughout 1926 both from the 
in n ~'sheadquarters~Ula~aatar and from provincial b~ches.68 From 
January 1926 all government employees were paid in togrogs. As the 
Bank's turnover increased and the exchange rate of the togrog against 
the Ian rose demand for the new currency rapidly outstripped supply. 
In September 1926 bank officials conducted a survey which revealed 
that the togrog had not yet penetrated all corners of the land. 69 
When new tax laws came into force in January 1927 all taxes and customs 
.. .. 70 dues were to be paid in togrogs but it is unlikely that this rule 
was applied very strictly for some time and there were still reports 
of currency shortages in some areas in 1929. 71 
There seems little doubt that the togrog appealed to 
Mongols for nationalist reasons. When it was first issued many 
wished that it should be on the gold standard as the strong currencies 
72 
of the world were. The Russians resisted this at the time but in 
73 April 1928 the togrog was transferred. The existence of the togrog 
as the only legal tender did release the Mongols from the tyranny of 
a multi-exchange system over whose rates they had little control. 
On the other hand it was linked to the Soviet currency system and, therefore, 
became another means by which the Mongolian economy was integrated 
into the Soviet 8{stem. 
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TRADING ACTIVI~IES 
In the early 1920s Mongolia's main trading partner was China. 
Chinese merchants and Chinese agents of English, American and other 
western firms bought Mongolian livestock and animal products, including 
74 80% of all Mongolian wool exporUrl. In return Chinese consumer goods 
were supplied according to the Mongols' taste. Chinese merchants 
had an excellent transport system and they had built up a long-standing 
relationship with their customers. They were willing to sellon credit 
and always treated customers sympathetically and hospitably. 
The Chinese did not have complete control of the Mongolian 
market however. A few individual Russian traders resumed activity 
when peace was restored in 1921 and a thim operator was the Mongolian 
Mutual Aid Cooperative (Mongolyn Kharil~an Tuslaltsakh Khorshoo). 
It was founded at the end of 192175 with the encouragement of the 
Comintern but for several years party members showed little interest 
in it. By January 1922 the Cooperative had a capital of 14,000 MD 
and there were 70 shareholders, the largest invester being the Bogd 
76 Khaan. Besides buying directly from herdsmen the Cooperative also 
bought Mongolian produce from Chinese middlemen and sold to Anglo-
A ' f' 77 mer1can 1rms. Many employees were actually Anglo-American or 
. , , hId 78 Russian em1gres 1n t e ear y ays. At this time the Cooperative 
was not especially popular with the rural population since, like the 
Russian merchants, it did not trade in the same free and easy terms 
as the Chinese. Cooperative employees were not always considered 
polite and the consumer goods that customers wanted were frequently 
unavailable. 79 Nevertheless by 1924 Cooperative outlets had increased 
to 24 branches, 86 sub-branches and there were offices in Moscow, 
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Kalgan, Tientsin and Khailar. 80 Unlike the Soviet cooperatives 
theMo~golian Cooperative did not restrict itself to one activity. 
In addition to trading it ran a number of manufacturing enterprises 
on the government's behalf, including the tannery and military 
uniform factories of Altan Bulag and several plants for processing 
. t t· h· 1 d . 81 ln es lnes, was lng woo an maklng sugar and soap. 
In 1923 the Soviet government began to influence the pattern 
of Mongolian import and export trade. 82 A trade agreement was concluded 
with the Mongolian Government and as a result a number of Soviet 
trading agencies began to operate in Mongolia. Tsentrosoyuz, an agency 
which had been active in Mongolia before 1921 had returned in 1922.83 
84 85 86 It was joined by others such as Sherst', Dal'gostorg, Torgpredstvo 
87 
and Sibgostorg. Some were only procurement agencies and their small 
capital enabled them to purchase limited amounts. Also seasonal 
products were only available at certain times of the year. The goods 
that the trading agencies could offer in return were few. The USSR 
was recovering from a civil war and there was a general shortage of goods 
even for home consumption. Moreover Soviet imports were not always to 
the Mongols' taste. Soviet cotton, for example, was considered inferior 
to the Chinese product. 88 Nor was the Soviet trading practice to the 
Mongols' liking. The Russians would not buy wool on wet days because 
it weighed more than on dry days. Neither would they buy wool that was 
d · t 89 very lr y. 
Under the terms of the trade agreement the Soviet agencies 
were instructed to coordinate their business with the Mongolian 
90 Cooperative. From this time the MPRP, under pressure from the 
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Comintern, began to involve itself more in the work of the Cooperative 
and to encourage party and Youth League members to join the Cooperative. 
Also the Second MPP Congress ordered that all employees of the Cooper-
ative be vetted. 9l In the same year the Ministry of Finance lent the 
Cooperative 300,000 lan92 to expand its activities and in 1924 a further 
million Ian was received. 
Although the ordinary Mongols of the countryside showed an 
obvious preference for Chinese goods and trading methods the 
authorities, influenced by Soviet attitudes to Chinese capital, began 
to display increasing hostility towards the Chinese merchants. The latter's 
trading licences were frequently held up, they were accused of falsifying 
accounts and smuggling, forced to pay customs dues sometimes to the 
full value of the goods and the Bank refused their drafts. This affected 
the small traders more quickly than the large firms and when their money 
was gone they were thrown in gaol. In 1927 It1a Ho-t' ien saw many 
Chinese shops in Ulaanbaatar empty of goods and said that the proprieters 
d 1 " btl d' 93 rna e a 1v1ng y secre money- en 1ng. Soviet traders, who were not 
subject to licencing and harrassment, took advantage of the favourable 
conditions and bought up Chinese warehouses to store their own goods in 
94 
or to set up industrial enterprises such as wool-washing depots. 
The Soviet trading organizations made efforts to investigate 
95 
the Mongolian market potential. In 1925 they held a trade conference 
in Ulaanbaatar where they discussed cooperation with the Mongolian 
Cooperative and criticized themselves for competing in the Mongolian 
market. The conference recommended the introduction of credit 
facilities by Soviet trading organizations, fixing purchase prices 
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for Mongolian products at world price levels, and a reduction in 
import prices of Soviet goods. The Mongolian Cooperative had the right 
to fix prices but the Russians continued to discuss the subject in 
1926. Some said that they must offer higher prices than the Chinese 
were willing to pay for Mongolian products. Others wanted lower 
prices because they said world prices were artificially high. 96 
The Russians also gave serious consideration to the type of 
goods they ought to offer the Mongols. The most important item 
97 imported from the USSR was grain or flour. In 1924 and 1925 over 80% 
f th fl d · th MPR f th S . t U· 98 o e our consume 1n e came rom e OV1e n10n. 
However it was expected that the MPR would eventually grow grain for 
itself. On the other hand sugar, another Soviet import, would always 
100 be required as would tea. One writer suggested that tea be 
imported into Vladivostok from China and then reexported to the MPR 
. h M l' f . t b . k . 101 Th R· 1 h d t 1n t e ongo s avour1 e r1C Slzes. e USS1ans a so ope 0 
break into the textile market and planned to import 25-26 million 
metres of heavy cotton for use as summer clothing in 1926. The 
first million metres were not apparently, highly approved of, although 
in the Russians' opinion the quality was higher than that of the 
Chinese dalemba and they thought that the Mongols only needed to get 
used to it. l02 
In 1927 the Soviet trading organizations attempted to 
consolidate their position in the Mongolian import and export trade 
market by eliminating the competition that existed among themselves. 
They were united into a single jOint stock company with a capital of 
103 1,500,000 roubles and traded under the name of Stormong. This 
137 
company now had the sole right to import and export goods between 
the Soviet Union and the MPR in cooperation with the Mongolian 
Cooperative. By autumn 1927 there were 100 permanent Stormong 
104 
outlets and 50 travelling shops. The bank official, B.I. 
Onishchenk~ was Stormong's first head. 
As a result of these efforts by the Mongolian government 
and Soviet representatives there was a sharp reduction in Chinese 
trading in the MPR from 1925. In 1924 there had been 1443 Chinese 
firms with representatives in Mongolia but by 1926 many had withdrawn 
so' that 1 60 . d 105 on y rema1ne. Also many of the 62 Anglo-American 
firms present in 1924 had ceased trading by 1926. 106 The Mongolian 
Cooperative had improved its position and was how handling 25% of 
107 the total trade turnover. Whereas in 1924 24.1% of exported 
goods went to the Soviet Union that share had risen to 57.8% by 
1926. 108 The Chinese share of the export trade fell from 86.3% 
109 in the 1923-1924 season to 14.6% in the 1928-1929 season. 
However in the same period the Chinese share of the import trade 
only fell from 86% to 42% in spite of the sharp turn to the left 
in Mongolian politics in 1928. 110 This was because the USSR was 
still unable to provide the range of goods the Mongols required. 
This willingness to accept Chinese goods even after the 
severe swing to the left raises the question of whether the Mongols 
were really whole-hearted in their desire to get rid of the Chinese 
trading presence. Until 1924 it was hoped that China and Mongolia 
could continue their economic relationship if on a more equitable 
basis and even after that when the Mongolian government's official 
138 
policy was to ease out the Chinese traders there is evidence of some 
ambivalence towards the latter. In August 1927 an international trade 
fair was held in Ulaanbaatar. lll Over 150 firms took part, 
there was a turnover of 1,500,000 togrogs and it was judged a great 
success. Among those represented were 149 private firms of which 99 
were Chinese, 22 were Mongol, eight were Anglo-American and 20 were 
private Russian traders. Stormong and the Mongolian Cooperative 
together did over 200,000 togrogs worth of business which suggests that 
the Chinese made a reasonable profit. Whether this is evidence of a 
stronger position of so-called "foreign capital" than the statistics 
suggest or whether it was a last-ditch stand by the Chinese and Anglo-
Americans to recapture some of their former trade is now impossible to 
say because of the political developments after 1928. 
In spite of the considerable efforts of the Soviet Union 
to gain control of the Mongolian trade market it was to some extent 
favoured by factors beyond its control. The Civil War in China 
and the effects of world trade also contributed to the changes in 
Mongolian trade patterns. For instance, banditry in Inner Mongolia made the 
transport of goods through that area very difficult. The reduction 
in the Chinese purchase of Mongolian wool also owed something to the 
fall in world wool prices. In 1925 Chinese and western firms had 
bought in excess of demand and they were in no haste to buy more 
in the early summer of 1926. Therefore the Soviet organizations 
and the Mongolian Cooperative were able to buy up almost the entire 
product of that year and at prices above the average world market 
. 112 prlces. By 1927 approximately 80% of the Mongolian wool trade 
f h R . 113 was in the hands 0 t e USSlans. 
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Transport and Commmications 
Soviet trading representatives frequently stated that Mongol-
Soviet trade could be improved with better transport facilities. In 
the 1920s most freight was carried by camel- or bullock-cart caravans 
over the route from Ulaanbaatar to Kalgan. There were altogether eight 
major routes but some had fallen into serious disrepair since the 
autonomy. At certain seasons they were not always passable because 
of adverse weather conditions and because there were few bridges. Even 
bridges on the Altan Bulag-Ulaanbaatar route, the second most important, 
were in great need of repair. Metalled roads did not exist and neither 
d1"d t t t "1 114 wa er ranspor or ra1 ways. Soviet trade experts pressed 
the Mongols to repair the northern routes saying that goods sent 
through Russia on the TransSiberian railway to Vladivostok at 
preferential tariffs could be forwarded to their ultimate destination 
1 d " th "K 1 t T " t" 115 Th more cheap y than by sen 1ng em V1a a gan 0 1en S1n. e 
116 
same route could also be used to import Chinese goods. In the 
second half of the 1920s the Ministry of Economic Affairs undertook 
repairs on routes from Ulaanbaatar to Altan Bulag, Uliastai 
.... 
and Khovd and between San Beise and Uud. The USSR also gave some 
d h t " of b"d 118 assistance for the repair of roads an t e construc 10n r1 ges. 
The Mongolian government gave consideration to the development 
of motor transport and was encouraged by the Soviet trade delegation 
of 1925 to buy a large quantity of oil products to store until required. 
This was an attempt by the Russians to forestall the Americans whom 
119 
they feared would corner that market for themselves. In the same 
year a motor vehicle service called Mongoltrans was set up to carry 




Motor transport was a government monopoly and on 
2 June 1926 the following announcement appeared in the journal 
Khozyaistvo Mongolii: 
"From 10 June all carriers of cargo, by 
cart or automobile, on arrival in a town 
where there is a Mongol-transport office 
must register their destination. Anyone 
other than Mongoltrans carrying cargo 
without a licence for private individuals 
and organizations, will be detained.,,121 
However other motor vehicle services did operate for some time including 
122 
a Soviet firm Transport. 
Water transport was also of interest to the Soviet trading 
agencies and Soviet experts conducted surveys of a number of Mongolian 
rivers to see how suitable they were for transporting goods. In 
1926 the Soviet and Mongolian governments signed a ten year agreement 
permitting the Selenga Steamship Company to work the Selenga and 
kh . 123 or on rlvers. Freight was carried on steamships and barges and 
because this reduced travel time by many days it also reduced costs. 
This was especially welcome in 1926 when there was a general 10% rise 
. t 124 in freight tariffs following a particularly severe Wln er. 
In May 1925 a Soviet pilot A.I. Lapin landed the first aero-
plane, a Junker, in the MFR. Between 1926 and 1928 there was an air 
125 
passenger and freight service from Moscow to Peking via Ulaanbaatar. 
The arrival of aeroplanes in Ulaanbaatar caused great excitement 
but the Church warned people: 
141 
"Bad times have set in. The flying iron 
birds bode no good. They portend the end 
of the world. He who will see them will 
turn grey and die early ..• ,,126 
Young Mongols were not put off, however. It is said that hundreds 
applied to train as pilots. 26 were sent to the USSR, and later 
t d t "th M 1" A" F 128 re urne 0 serve 1n e ongo 1an 1r orce. 
Telegraph communication was important both for trade and 
diplomatic purposes. In 1921 the Soviet government transferred the 
Tsarist Russian Telegraph Station in Niislel Khuree to the Mongolian 
128 government without charge. In 1924 and 1927 the Mongolian and 
Soviet governments signed telegraph agreements which enabled the MPR 
129 to have links with the USSR, China and western Europe. Inland 
telegraph lines were also erected and in 1926 Ulaanbaatar was linked 
130 
with the western part of the country by telegraph. 
The Mongolian postal service also underwent changes in the 
1920s. Official internal correspondence was carried on horseback 
by the or too service. Letters sent outside the country before the 
revolution often carried Russian or Chinese stamps. Mongolian 
postage stamps were first issued in 1924. They probably had the dual 
purpose of providing some revenue and at the same time of bearing 
witness to the MPR's independent status. It has been estimated that 
in 1926 and 1927 about 1000 items per month were being sent out of the 
country by registered post, mostly between April and December. Much 
of the external post was sent to China for reasons of trade and it 
went by rail through Siberia, entering China at Manchuli. Since 
142 
Mongolia was not recognized by the Universal Postal Union all letters 
had to be restarnped on the Siberian border. Besides the registered 
post there was a much larger quantity of unregistered mail. There was 
a sharp reduction in mail to China after 1927. 131 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
Livestock 
The traditional form of production in Mongolia was livestock 
herding. The Russians were anxious to acquire the surplus animals and 
animal products and they encouraged the Mongols to look on herding as 
the main form of production for the future as well as the present. The 
1924 census established the total animal population to be approximately 
132 17,000,000 head and the human population 615,878 individuals or 
80,064 families which works out at an average 20.2 bod133 of livestock 
h d f 1 t o 134 per ea 0 popu a ~on. However the Russians believed that the 
MPR was capable of supporting 15,000,000 head of large animals (cattle, 
camels and horses) and 100,000,000 head of small animals (sheep and 
135 goats). These figures were certainly far above what was realistic 
in a society where economic relations were still tied to traditional 
social relations and where traditional methods were being practised. 
The MPH, deep in Central Asia, suffers extreme weather con-
ditions in terms of precipitation, temperature variations and strong 
winds and until this century the herds had very little protection 
from these extremes. Although winter pastures were rather more sheltered 
than summer pastures large numbers of animals died each year from 
bitter cold, starvation or burial in snowdrifts. The Mongols did 
143 
not build shelters or enclosures nor did they regularly make hay 
for winter feed. Predators such as wolves carried off unwary 
animals despite the well-aimed stones of children or the ferocity 
of the Mongolian dogs and cattle plague spread by draft animals from 
Inner Mongolia was common. Other killers of animals were pneumonia, 
glanders, mange and rabies, the last caught by dogs from the wolves 
they attacked. 
The Mongolian government took very little action to increase 
the productivity of livestock herding. Tax concessions were offered 
to those who were willing to improve their herds by providing winter 
fodder and protective shelters but it is not known how many accepted 
the offer. However the Mongolian government, encouraged by the Russians, 
did give some consideration to animal welfare. The Russians were 
prepared to support this because welfare practices had a direct and 
positive effect on the quality of trade goods. Disease reduced the 
availability and quality of products such as milk, wool and hides. 
During the autonomy the Tsarist Russians had run a vaccination 
station at Songino near Niislel Khuree. In 1923 this was sold to the 
136 Mongolian government and run by a Veterinary Department under the 
Mi 't f F' 137 nlS ry 0 lnance. In 1925 the department was transferred to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and expanded into the Veterinary Admin-
istration under the headship of a Russian veterinarian called A.A. 
Dudukalov. By 1926 there were 22 veterinary stations and 38 workers 
in the MPR and it was hoped eventually to divide the country into 10 
138 
regions each with an animal doctor, ten technicians and 37 assistants. 
By 1927 there were nine branch offices each with a doctor, 23 stations 
144 
manned by veterinary assistants and two vaccination centres. 139 
In 1923, training courses for veterinary assistants were held 
at Songino and in 1927 another course was held in U1aanbaatar from 
which 12 students graduated in 1928. 140 It seems likely that 
some of the people who worked for the Administration were not Soviet 
Russians but White Russians. 141 In spite of Mongolian government's 
declared loyalty to the Soviet Union it was not uncommon for White 
Russians to be employed in public services. 
Since the Russian trading organizations refused to buy 
animals which had been infected by cattle plague, in the 1920s the 
Veterinary Administratianwas mainly involved in vaccinating animals 
against this disease of which there were a number of serious out-
breaks between 1925 and 1930. 142 This was not particularly easy, 
however. The service was not free, staff and medicines were in 
143 
short supply and the Church was opposed to vaccination on 
religious grounds. The ordinary rural herdsmen were very super-
stitious and needed little encouragement to refuse to have their 
animals vaccinated. Nevertheless 50,000 head of livestock were 
, d 1 2 d h 'd to be hl'gh. 144 vacclnate in 9 4 an t e success rate was sal 
On the other hand animals sometimes died from a secondary cause 
such as pneumonia after vaccination and that too made the herdsmen 
145 
wary of the needle. 
In addition to protecting Mongolian cattle the Russians made 
use of the Veterinary Administration to prevent the spread of 
the 
infection into Siberia or the region of/"'Chinese Eastern Railwa:'. 
This was not always popular with the rural Mongols. In 
145 
1926 there was a severe outbreak of plague at Sain Shave and the 
Veterinary Administration wanted to forbid all movement of animals 
out of the stricken area. The owners of livestock and draught 
animals protested strongly and the authorities were forced to give 
way a little. Only innoculated bullocks were permitted on the 
Ulaanbaatar-Altan Bulag route and loads had to be covered with tar-
paulins instead of the usual skins. A certified guard accompanied 
each caravan and small parties were encouraged to join together to 
reduce the cost of the guard. 146 
The Veterinary Administration also inspected and branded 
livestock conducted experiments in animal care and collected 
t t ' t' 147 s a lS lCS. In December 1926 a veterinary conference was held 
in Ulaanbaatar. Delegates recommended that the numbers of staff 
be increased and that veterinary services be publicized. 148 An 
interesting sideline of the work of the Veterinary Administration 
147 
was the vaccination of humans against smallpox. 
In 1926 and 1928 the total number of livestock was estimated 
, 1 150 to have risen to 19,200,000 and 21,300,000 respectlve y. The 
actual figures need to be accepted with caution but they do indicate 
that there was an increase in productivity during the 1920s. 
How far this was due to the restoration of peace in the countryside 
and how much to veterinary measures is impossible to say. However, 
given favourable conditions and improved herding techniques, including 
greater attention to animal health, it is clear that even higher 
increases could be expected but this was unlikely to occur while 
livestock was owned by a few rich men and monasteries and cared for 
by poor ards who reaped little personal benefit. 
146 
Industry 
Industry was not entirely unknown in Mongolia before the 
revolution and the Mongolian government was well aware of its potential 
for creating wealth. During the autonomous period there were a number 
of small enterprises for the semi-processing of livestock products, 
including the tanneries, wool-washing plants and an intestine processing 
factory, all of which were run by Russians. In addition there was 
an electricity generating station, a printing house and working coal 
and gold mines. The workers were mainly Chinese and Russi~ and Mongol 
workers were very few. The Chinese were especially prevalent in the 
construction and mining industries. 
After 1921 most of the Russian owned enterprises became 
the property of the Mongolian state and were run by the Mongolian 
Cooperative. The Mongolian government had no firm plan as to how 
industry should be developed and run. Geleta, the Hungarian engineer 
who designed an electricity station and the People's House in Ulaan-
baatar commented: 
"The Mongolians at first did not 
take kindly to industrial work •.• 
they considered industrial work, 
and particularly building, which 
involved the carrying of loads, as 
below the dignity of a self-respecting 
Mongolian and only fit for Chinamen and 
coolies.,,15l 
Even when persuaded to work in construction they had little idea 
of the principles of engineering. An Austrian visitor in 1926 
described a two-storey house designed and built by Mongols who 
. ,152 forgot to include the stalrcase. For this reason the Mongolian 
147 
government was obliged to continue employing the services of the 
Chinese. 
The Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, believed that Mongolian 
industry should not be independent and self-sustaining but closely 
linked to Soviet industry. Products of the livestock industry such 
as wool, skins, leather and intestines could be semi-processed in the 
MPR and then exported to the Soviet Union for finishing. Some products 
could then be returned to the MPR either as finished goods or to be 
made into consumer goods for consumption on the home market. 
In 1907 Russians in Mongolia began to process the intestines 
of sheep and goats for export to Hamburg as skins for sausages. The 
intestine factories were handed over to the Mongolian government in 
1921 and run by the Mongolian Cooperative which had a monopoly in the 
export of intestines. There were centres in the countryside for 
coUecting intestines at a price of 20 to 30 cents a set. From 1924 
the processed intestines were sold to the Soviet agency Kishpromtorg 
which exported about 600,000 km of intestines each year. The Russians 
hoped to persuade the Mongols to eat less themsaues and to sell even 
more. By 1926 there were several workshops for processing intestines 
in Ulaanbaatar, Altan Bu~ag and Van Khuree. The workers were all 
Russian but the Mongolian government hoped to train native operatives 
153 to man further plants. 
In the latter half of the 1920s industrial enterprises 
mainly in Ulaanbaatar and Altan Bulag werebeginnng to thrive as 
the demands for their products increased. In 1926-1927 the Altan 
l~ 
Bulag tannery processed 24,000 hides, 3,000 sheepskins and made 
154 5,000 felt boots. New factories using finished materials from 
the USSR were opening. In Ulaanbaatar a carpet factory went into production 
in 1925155 and a handicraft workshop for military uniforms was employ-
156 ing 300 women and another workshop opened in 1926 to produce boots, 
saddles and saddle straps. 157 
In general, agents of the Soviet government put their greatest 
efforts into production that was directed towards the exporting of 
trade goods to the USSR and much less into enterprises which only served 
the domestic market. The latter included mining, construction and forestry 
although there is very little known about the last in this period. 
These industries were run by the Mongolian government using mainly non-
Russian foreign expertise and Chinese labour. In 1926 the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs formed a building cooperative, known by the Russian 
name, Mongolstroi. The Bank and the Mongolian Cooperative each 
invested 20,000 togrogs in it. 158 Its task was to repair older 
buildings, design and cost new ones and also to repair and construct 
bridges, roads and wells. 159 Materials were supplied by sawmills, 
ironworks and brickworks which were set up to supply the necessary 
materials and a Swiss called Walder ran the brickworks from 1926 until 
1928. 160 Most of the labour for these enterprises was supplied by 
the Chinese. 
A number of buildings both large and small had been con-
structed by 1928, including several hundred family dwellings, schools, 
161 hospitals and workshops. The Central Customs building and 
162 Ulaanbaatar Middle School which opened in 1926, were among the larger 
149 
works and the showpiece, which attracted the attention of Mongols 
and visitors alike, was a large hall shaped like a ger and humorously 
.• 163 known as Tumbeger nogoon "The pot-bellied green one". It was 
designed by Jozs~f Geleta and was erected with Chinese labour. 164 
Geleta described the building thus: 
"The new theatre is 100 feet long and 
50 feet high, and is an up-to-date building 
in every sense. There is an imposing 
vestibule, a library and a restaurant. The 
auditorium is the usual horse-shoe shape, 
with boxes and stalls, and a total seating 
capacity of 1,200. The whole theatre is 
electrically ventilated and the stage has 
the most modern lighting equipment."l65 
In this hall Party congresses, Great Khurals, drama, films and 
concerts were held. 
Mining 
The Ulaanbaatar generating station built by the Russians 
during the autonomy ran on coal from the Nalaikh mines situated 
about 35 km from Ulaanbaatar. There was also a small coal mine near 
166 K~ which supplied the Khovd barracks and there were rumours of 
.. .. .. .. 
further deposits in the Olot khoshuu in the west which the Olots, 
167 
a group of Oirat Mongols, attempted to conceal. The mines 
were national property and worked by Chinese labour. They produced 
mostly lignite, a brown coal best suited for use in the production 
of electricity, but surveys revealed a better quality grey coal 
168 
at a greater depth. Mining operations were very primitive and 
in 1926 coal was still being brought up by hand-operated windlasses 
or 1n baskets. Facilities for transporting the coal were poor and 
150 
affected the price of the commodity. If bought on site one pood 
(16.38 kg) cost 7 cents. If transported to Ulaanbaatar by bullock 
cart it cost 40 cents a pood and 25 cents if taken by lorry.169 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs hoped to build a narrow-gauge rail-
way to alleviate this problem. 170 In 1925 32,000,000 kg were consumed 
and this was expected to increase to 80,000,000 kg in 1926. It was 
estimated that the Nalaikh stocks would last for 100 years. 171 
The Mongolian government was eager to lease mining concessions 
to foreigners but had little success. Some mining equipment was bought 
from Germany and a few Europeans spent short periods in the ~WR as 
mining advisers to the Mongolian government. Among them was Bernhard 
Waurik, a German,who stayed for a year. It is possible that the 
Soviet Union discouraged the Mongolian government from pursuing the 
matter of mining concessions on the grounds that they were a form of 
capitalist exploitation. However it is equally possible that the 
Mongols were just unable to contact those foreign companies which 
might have wanted to mine in the MPH. The Russians themselves had 
no immediate desire to exploit Mongolian mineral wealth but Soviet 
scholars did undertake a number of geological surveys in the 1920s 
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which indicates that the Soviet Union had future plans. 
The Formation of Unions 
Although the Soviet Union was less interested in the purely 
domestic industries of the MPR it did indirectly assist the Mongolian 
government to tackle the problem of the absence of a native proletariat 
by setting up native unions. The Comintern instructed the MPR 
to form labour unions in 1924 and Russians working in the MPR were 
active in the movement from its early days. 
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Labour unions were not entirely unknown in Mongolia 
because Russians who had set up the Niislel Khuree Soviet after 
the February 1917 Revolution had also organized a Union of 
Workers and Employees. Shortly afterwards workers at the Mongolor 
gold mines at ZUun Mod did likewise. When Ungern's arnwfell on 
Niislel Khuree the unions were forced underground and many of their 
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members were slaughtered. In June 1921 survivors formed a new 
union and cooperative with 300 members and other Russian unions were 
also organized between 1921 and 1924. However the movement in Mongolia 
was not without difficulties, including factionalism and a shortage of 
f d 174 un s. 
The First Great Khural instructed Oambadorj the Party Chair-
man to set up a Mongolian union organization. In 1925 the Russian 
unions came under its authority and employees of the Mongolian govern-
175 
ment and state enterprises were also en rolled .. The organization 
was in three national sections, Mongolian, Russian and Chinese, but this 
immediately caused problems. There were complaints in newspapers and 
in the Central Committee of the domineering attitude of the Russians, 
176 Chinese embezzlement and Mongolian squabbles. 
In 1926 the movement was reorganized into unions that were 
based on industries and they were responsible to a Union Bureau. 
Dambadorj was Chairman of the Bureau and other members were Oendev, 
177 178 Shatar, Bondarenko a Russian and Shen Chen-lo a Chinese. 
Shen Chen-lo was probably the Shan whom Ma Ho-t'ien met and described 
179 
as a Comintern agent. 
• 
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Ma attended a meeting of one of the unions, the Employees 
Society. Its members were small Chinese businessmen, tailors, bath-
house keepers and restauranteurs, whq Ma said,had been forcedby the 
Mongolian government to join the society. They paid a dollar 
to join, 50 cents a month in ordinary dues and 40 cents for medical 
dues. Over half of the income went to the Union Bureau. The 
meeting was attended by 10 members, incbding three who had recently 
been brought from Shanghai to operate new German printing presses. 
Ma was unimpressed by the conduct of the meeting. It was dominated 
by Shan, a self-important individual who shouted, interrupted and 
180 pushed everyone around. It is difficult to imagine what this and 
similar unions actually did for their members. Bondarenko of the 
Union Bureau openly admitted that the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
was reluctant to grant Chinese workers passports in spite of the 
state's need of their labour, and the unions were powerless to help 
their members acquire the necessary documents. 18l 
Until 1926 the unions were limited to Ulaanbaatar but 
afterwards they were organized in other industrial centres like 
Altan Bulag and Nalaikh. The first Trade Union Congress met in 
182 August 1927. Three principles were adopted: the Mongolian 
Unions should join the international trade union movement, the 
Profintern; the unions were a mass organization of employees and 
workers who were striving for the economic and political prosperity 
of the republic; because of Mongolia's geographical situation 
the unions should be orientated towards the USSR but at the same 
time they should offer all manner of assistance to the trade 
unions of China. The Profintern accepted the ~ongolian Unions as 
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a member, sent its greetings and ordered that trade union literature 
be translated into Mongolian:83 
There is insufficient data for assessing what the unions 
contributed to economic development in the 1920s. They seem to 
have been chiefly a means of organizing an additional political 
force in support of the MPR. By June 1928 there were 5,528 members 
including 728 government employees, 643 employees of trading 
organizations, 202 medical workers, 168 transport workers and 329 
tailoring workers according to the Mongolian historian of the 
M 1 . k' 1 V TOld 184 ongo lan wor lng c ass, . u eVe We may suspect that union 
membership was largely obligatory for these people and that their 
political awareness was limited as it was in other spheres of Mongolian 
life. Tudev writes that only 348 Trade Unionists were members of 
185 the Party and 153 were members of the Youth League. However, 
after joining the Profintern, the Mongolian union movement became a 
force that could be manipulated against the party leadership as indeed it 
was in 1928. 
Agricul ture 
While industry was beginning to make a modest contribution 
to the economy in the 1920s agriculture or crop-raising played a 
less significant role, in spite of frequent Party resolutions that it 
should be encouraged to develop. Many Mongols looked on agriculture 
as a way of life inferior to herding and preferred to acquire grain, 
which was an important dietary item, by trading. Nevertheless the 
cultivation of wheat, barley and vegetables was not unknown in Outer 
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Mongolia. From the 18th century the Chinese had farmed for the 
needs of the military and trading communities of KhUree, Khovd and 
other settled centres. In the Khovd region some Mongols also 
engaged in agriculture as a form of alba. Others hired themselves 
out as farm labourers and the monasteries had many fields which were 
cultivated by shav'nar, poor lamas or hired Chinese. 
The Soviet citizens gave very little practical assistance 
to improve the production of food crops in the MPR but the Mongolian 
government acquired from the USSR two models for organizing agri-
culture, the state farm and the collective. In 1922 the Provisional 
Government ordered state farms to be created on the Khar river, a 
tributary of the Orkhon, and in the Taryachin khoshuu of the Khovd 
region. The former was 100 hectares in area and had an income of 
40,000 Ian while the latter's income was 18,000 lan. 186 By 1924 
there were altogether 10,000 hectares under cultivation. 187 
the 
A description of~state farm in Taryachin khoshuu by 
Milyushin, a Soviet observer, suggests that the government exercised 
little control over state farms. The local ards who had formerly 
worked the land as alba under Chinese supervision did not earn a 
wage as workers on Soviet state farms did but were simply given 
seed and told to produce wheat andbarleyseven-fold. The harvest 
of 1923-1924 failed utterly because it was eaten by field mice and 
the wheat quota was not fulfilled. Tools were primitive and farmers 
th . 189 had to acquire them at elr own expense. 
In 1925 the government introduced measures to improve agri-
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culture and decided that state farms should be run as collectives 
whereby the means of production were owned by the workers. The 
obligation to produce a specified quota was ended although there 
was still a requirement to supply the army with hay. The govern-
ment agreed to supply equipment and some of it reached the Taryachin 
khoshuu from the USSR in time for the 1925 harvest. In 1925 the 
Khovd Administration was formed and the Taryachin khoshuu came 
under its control. However state farms continued to be under-
productive, in Milyushin's opinion,b~ause of high labour costs 
and the incompatibility of Mongols to the regular, often boring 
work which machineryonly partly alleviated. 190 
The Mongolian government had originally intended that all 
crops would be produced on state farms as early as 1922 but this 
was clearly impossible because of lack of money and a shortage 
of people with farming skills. However, Chinese and Russian 
farmers who had fled before Ungern's forces reappeared by 1922. 
Although no longer permitted to own land or property they were 
allowed to lease farm land from the khoshuus. Rents were fixed 
by the Ministry of Finance and paid to the local administration 
which retained 40% and sent 60% to the Ministry. Leases ran 
for three years and the Ministry of Finance was supposed to inspect 
the land each summer. Tenants were expected to keep the land in 
good heart, make use of timber only under controlled conditions 
and they could be expelled from the country if they did not observe 
th 1 t ' 191 e regu a lons. 
Agriculture was to be dogged by other problems such as the absence 
156 
of irrigation, wind erosion, a shortage of capital and expertise, 
and the lack of any real encouragement from the Soviet Union,for 
whom the livestock economy was of more immediate importance. At the 
Fifth Party Congress Amagaev said that agriculture was only just above 
subsistence level and that many of the farms which were productive, 
were worked wi th sweated labour. 192 There was a slight increase in 
the area of land under cultivation during the 1920s but,according to 
Ma Ho-t'ien, only 0.02% of the total area of the MPR was farmland 193 
and in 1928 90% of all farmers were Chinese. Therefore agriculture 
was a very minor branch of the economy at this time. 
Hunting 
Neither was there much change in the hunting economy of the 
MPR during the 1920s although game, like all other national resources, 
. 195 had been declared by the constitut10n to be the property of the People. 
There had long been a market for Mongolian furs in Russia and Russians 
came regularly to hunt and to purchase pelts from the Mongols. The 
skins they prized most were marmot, squirrel and fox. Game as a source 
of food was not used to a great extent although the Mongols had long 
eaten the flesh of the marmots they trapped for pelts. The rivers and 
lakes of the MPR teemed with fish but the Mongols generally disliked 
fish and preferred to rent lakes, especially in the south, to the 
Chinese. 
The Provisional Government introduced licensed hunting but 
it was extremely difficult to enforce the regulations in such an 
under-populated country. At the Third MPR Congress there were 
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accusations of foreigners poaching squirrel and sable. 196 In 1925 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs became responsible for licensing 
and conservation and a number of new laws and regulations were passed. 
Closed seasons and quotas were established for various species, although 
dangerous animals such as wolves could be killed at any time of the 
197 year. In spite of recommendations that the acquisition of pelts 
be strictly organized and controlled hunting remained in the sphere 
of private enterprise during the 1920s. Many of the hunter-traders 
were White Russians who had escaped the 1927 revolution and the life 
of a hunter kept them away from any dangerous attention. 
Summary 
The economic changes of the 1920s created a necessary ground-
work for future development. The most important achievements were the 
Bank and its regulation of money within the MPR, the steady growth in 
state income and the tax reforms. These permitted the state instit-
utions to function, offered hope of future well-being and helped to 
confirm the stability of the ruling group. Other developments in 
processing, manufacturing, construction and transport were also valu-
able because they demonstrate a commitment to exploit non-traditional 
resources in a non-traditional way and established a model for the 
future. 
The leading role of Soviet citizens in this transformation 
has to be acknowledged. In areas like banking where they were extremely 
active much was accomplished. In others like agriculture where Mongols 
were left much to their own devices little was achieved. It is not just 
l~ 
that they lacked direction; most of the resources were pressed into 
those areas where the USSR had an interest. It is a fact that the 
Soviet Union's chief concern was to extend the trade relations between 
the two countries and this is why banking, veterinary care and road 
repairs assumed priority. On the other hand the Mongolian government 
reaped considerable benefit also and it is certainly to its credit 
that it was prepared to cooperate fully with the Soviet workers in 
contrast to the grud~way the autonomous government accepted the 
services of the Tsarist Russian advisers. 
Whether we can describe the economic changes of the 
1920s as non-capitalist development is questionable. A number of state-
owned institutions were set up such as the Bank, Mongolstroi and 
Mongoltrans and there is little evidence of Mongolian initiative in private 
enterprise outside the traditional. The organization of livestock 
remained unchanged and the livestock tax came too late in the period to 
show whether it was capable of redistributing wealth to any degree. 
In truth, a socialist economy could not be achieved in four short 
years under ~he kind of conditions prevailing in the MPR and certainly 
not before the position of a wealthy church as a unit outside secular 
society was tackled. The concept of non-capitalist development is 
an important one in the history of 20th century Mongolia and its roots 
in the 1920s are particularly interesting but as a yardstick for 
examining and analysing this period non-capitalist development is some-
thing of a distraction. The achievements of the period need to be 
considered on their own terms. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS POLICIES AND THE LAllA REACTION 
The conservative, religious forces that dominated Mongolia 
during the autonomy saw no reason for social change. However, 
increases in foreign contacts and a genuine widening of perspectives 
among intellectuals of the capital led some sections of the population 
to appreciate that social change was crucial to the survival of an 
independent Mongolian state. The government that came to power in 
1921 displayed a greater commitment to reforms for promoting the 
well-being and improvement of Mongolian society, which in turn would 
enhance the prosperity of the Mongolian state. Political measures 
especially were used to encourage equality in social structures. 
Between 1921 and 1924 the princely class was abolished and after 1924 
ards were promoted in government and public organizations. 
Economic reform also encouraged social change by offering alternative 
lifestyles to Mongols but the effect on Mongolian society in the 1920s 
was minimal. Russians and Buriats dominated commerce and industry; 
poor Chinese continued to make up the proletariat and a considerable 
part of the agrarian peasantry; and the ordinary rural herdsman was 
generally slow to take up the challenge of the new Mongolia. 
In spite of a population of less than 1,000,000 the MPR 
had some surplus people who could in theory be transformed into new 
social groups. During the 19th century the towns attracted ~any 
desperately poor people to whom traditional rural society could not 
offer a living. Others wandered the countryside as vagrants and many 
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only marginally better off struggled to make a living in the country-
side. The Party was also conscious of the monastic populations which 
it considered to be engaged in no work that was useful to society. 
It also looked on some of the lamas who lived in monasteries as people 
suitable for transferring to other social groups. Neither they nor 
the ranks of urban and rural poor could form a proletariat, armed force 
or other class important to the new Mongolia in their present conditions 
however. They were illiterate, unskilled and a prey to disease and 
deformity. First they needed to acquire practical skills and new 
attitudes of mind suitable for playing a full part in the development 
of the state. Some investment in their physical well-being was also 
necessary. 
The Buddhist Church was by no means the only force holding 
back the development of Mongolian society but it was the most 
entrenched. During the 1920s political and economic reforms, 
education and a series of specific religious policies all contributed 
to loosen the hold of religion on society and its attitudes. As a 
result the Church represented the Party's most formidable opponent 
until it was destroyed in 1939. 
Mongolian Education and Medicine before the Republic 
Until 1921 a large part of Mongolian education was in the hands 
of the monasteries. Many young boys, aged six or seven,were sent to 
study with lama teachers through the medium of the Tibetan language. 
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Some acquired only enough knowledge to be able to chant a few prayers. 
Those who became fluent in Tibetan might attend the Buddhist university 
fG d . h·· 1 o an an 1n K uree or the monastic institutions of Tibato study 
subjects such as theology, philosophy, literature, astrology, medicine 
and other Buddhist sciences. 
In addition to the monastic schools there were also small 
khoshuu schools for training future civil servants to read and write 
in the Mongolian script, calligraphy and perhaps Manchu. These schools 
were not especially popular with parents, however, because they made 
their offspring liable to periodic . service in the khoshuu administration. 
In the towns of Ikh Khuree, Uliastai and Khovd, more advanced schools 
taught Manchu and Chinese. Graduates of the secular schools, when not 
engaged in administrative service, would take private pupils. In this 
way boys and girls of even poor families were able to acquire some 
reading and writing skills and perhaps mathematics. 2 One such pupil 
was the future Commander-in-Chief, D. Sukhbaatar. Yanjin, the wife 
of his teacher, O. Jam'yan, recalled: 
"One spring evening Damdin brought his 
fourteen-year-old son to my husband as a 
student. Like the other children, 
Sukhbaatar came to our home every morning 
with his books under his arm. He studied 
ailigentlY,was serious and feared his 
teacher. Sukhbaatar's education lasted 
for two to three years."3 
The treatment of sickness was in the hands of lama doctors 
who had studied Tibetan medicine. They were skilled in diagnosis 
and treatment with herbal medicines. However many ordinary people could 
not afford their services and resorted instead to the 
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spells and concoctions of itinerant and untrained quacks. Others put 
their faith in shamanistic-type ceremonies. 4 Neither the real doctors 
nor the quacks could cure the really serious infectious diseases, 
tuberculosis, influenza and syphilis,that were prevalent at this time, 
however. It has been estimated that almost the entire population was 
affected by venereal disease in the 1920s5 and,what is more, lamas bore 
some responsibility for its spread. In spite of taking a vow of 
celibacy many lamas did not deny themselves the pleasures of the flesh. 
They associated with prostitutes and took concubines. Indeed, in a 
country where one third of the male population was bound officially 
to celibacy ,there were large numbers of women unable to find marriage 
partners and many of these were forced into prostitution with both 
lamas and Chinese. 
During the period of Provisional Government social services 
for the general population were minimal because the government had 
neither the money nor the manpower to invest in such things. However 
a considerable portion of the government's budget was spent on the 
army at this time and some literacy and general education courses and 
health care were provided for soldiers. Even so the quality of all 
social and material provision for army personnel was criticized at 
the Third Party Congress in 1924. 6 Jarntsrano remarked: 
"When a cow gets sick, a doctor is at 
once called, but when a tsirik (soldie.,j is 
ill no attention is paid to the fact.1I 
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In 1923 the Second Party Congress issued a statement on 
economic policieswhich acknowledged that universal education and 
health care must be made available because they had an important 
role to play in the well-being of the economy.8 Nowadays it is 
accepted in most countries that people who are unable to read and 
write cannot take a full and active part in public life and that 
sick people contribute poorly to economic development. In early 20th 
century Mongolia, these were quite revolutionary ideas as was the 
concept that the state should provide the remedy to these problems. 
However, before the foundation of the MPR government expenditure 
on education was limited and on health non-existent so very little 
was actually achieved. 9 
Education 
The ~ovisional Government had a People's Education 
Department from its early days. In 1923 an official of that depart-
ment, a Buriat called Erdene Batkhan, was asked to draw up a policy 
for education. He recommended that between six and seven per cent of the 
state budget be set aside for education. 10 In 1924 the department 
was enlarged to a full ministry with a staff of 25, increasing to 36 
11 in 1925. The first minister was O. Jam'yan,who was also head of the 
Scientific Committee,12 but in December 1924 Batkhan succeeded him and 
remained Minister of Education until 1928. 13 
14 
Batkhan was born about 1888 and died about 1947. There 
is little information on his life before the revolution. In 1920 he 
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acted as guide to I.M. Maiskii who was gathering information for 
h · b k S M 1· 15 IS 00 ovremmenaya ongo lya. In 1921 he interpreted for the 
Mongolian delegationWhichsigned the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty. Serge Wolff met him in Germany in 1926 and described him 
in the following words: 
"He was •.• a rather vain and not a 
particularly brilliant man but he was 
wholly devoted to what he considered to 
be his Ministry's task. His own cultural 
standard was perhaps that of a teacher in 
a secondary school in a European provincial 
town. He seemed to me ... rather conscious 
of his high office •.• he was very 
obstinate and therefore at times difficult 
to deal with, especially with German 
businessmen or representatives of instit-
utions ... But in the main my work with 16 
him was interesting and went rather well." 
Batkhan is remembered with respect in the MPH for his work as Minister 
of Education. 17 Not only did he organize the state education system 
but he taught in its schools, arranged for the production and printing 
of textbooks and attended personally to the acquisition of educational 
materials in Europe. 
About the time that the Ministry of Education was founded, 
there were 16 primary schools in Niislel Khuree and Naimaa Khot 
(Maimaicheng) • They provided education for about 400 children under 
the age of 16. Other schools opened in 1925 in Khovd, Uliastai, 
Altan Bulag, the four aimag centres, the Ikh Shav', Khatgal Kharuul 
and at least two khoshuus.1 8 Many of the new schools had no permanent 
premises and no textbooks and it is difficult to imagine the pupils 
1 . h h h 1 . 19 earnlng muc more t an t e Mongo ian scrIpt. Even in the capital 
where facilities were a little better, standards were extremely low, 
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according to a German diplomat who visited a primary school in 1922. 
He compared it with what he called the native schools of Africa. 20 
There was a detailed report on education at the First Great 
Khural and it is clear that ordinary delegates recognized the importance 
of education. The discussions brought to light a number of drawbacks to 
the provision of schooling, including a desperate shortage of teachers, 
lack of educational materials and an overall problem of finance. 2l 
Short courses for training teachers were started in 1923 and had so far 
produced ten but Rinchino suggested that these teachers would 
require further training because knowledge acquired rapidly was soon 
22 forgotten. A further problem was that no-one knew just how many 
children of school age there were so that it was difficult to estimate 
the number of teachers needed. Jamtsrano suggested that 400 would be 
required to cover the aimags. 23 
When Ma Ho-~ien was in Ulaanbaatar at the end of 1926 the 
24 
majority of teachers there were either Buriats or Inner Mongols. 
In 1924 Baradin,head of the Buriat Scientific Committee, met one 
25 
Buriat teacher who had been educated in Japan and knew some English. 
Out in the countryside those who ran the schools were men who had been 
officials when Outer Mongolia was under Manchu rule. They were the 
rural intelligentsia and many had probably run the khoshuu schools. 26 
The young ards who were sent for teacher training in Ulaanbaatar after 1921 
27 
tended to remain there rather than returning to their native khoshuus. 
In addition to the training courses in the capital teachers were also 
expected to train new ones during their vacations but it is not clear 
28 
whether this had any great success. 
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Ma Ho-tien described a number of educational institutions 
in Ulaanbaatar. 29 He went to a primary school and included the 
30 Regulations for Primary Schools in his book Chinese Agent in Mongolia. 
He also visited the first middle school which was founded in 1923. 31 
At the time of Ma's visit the principal was a Buriat called Hajagoyev. 
The curriculum included sciences and foreign languages. The school 
had its share of the Bogd Khaan's property but books were very scarce. 
A Buriat teacher who was a graduate of a Russian normal school was 
teaching geology from a Russian textbook and the students made notes 
in Mongolian. The provision of books was the responsibility of 
~ 
each institution and because Mongolia had so few scholars capable 
of writing textbooks suitable for use in a Western educational system 
it is hardly surprising that Buriats able to use Russian texts were 
welcome in the teaching profession. 
In 1922 a College (Oyutny Surguul') was opened for the training 
of teachers and other public servants. In 1923 short courses in teacher 
training, bookkeeping skills for cooperative workers and law ~ere 
33 
being taught. In the beginning, many of the students had such a 
low level of literacy that they were first given a general education 
before proceeding to their special training. It was something of an 
embarrassment that when courses were advertised, the most sui:able 
applicants were often Buriats. In 1925 24 out of 30 students on 
a course for cooperative workers were Buriats. This offended Khalkh 
Mongols, one of whom remarked at the Fourth Party Congress: 
"I do not say we must not take Buriats or 
that they are not equally citizens of our 
Republic. But it must also be pointed out 
that Mongols too crave education." 34 
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When Ma Ho-tien visited the College in 1926 it was 
housed in the former summer palace of the Bogd Khaan. The Dean was 
an Inner Mongol from Jehol called Huo Kuan-sheng who had come to Mongolia at 
the time of Hsu Shu-cheng. He had a staff of eight which included 
Jamtsrano and Batkhan. There were then 70 pupils,of whom 20 were 
girls,studying on a teaching course. Two years were spent on general 
educational subjects to a standard Ma described as normal school, 
followed by a year of teacher training. Ma also said that the Dean 
t bl d b d·· 1· 35 was rou e y poor lSC1P lne! 
The College continued to run short commercial and technical 
courses and there were evening classes in politics for civil servants. 
Another institution taught crafts and technical skills. It was 
started in 1924 with 100 pupils learning mechanics, carpentry, boot-
making, wheelmaking, pottery, leather crafts, sewing, painting, 
d · d d .. 36 rawlng an rlvlng. 
The Ministry of Education financed the schools in the capital 
and provided buildings. Technical training was paid for by government 
departments. In the countryside, however the khoshuu schools were 
supported by the local administration on the basis of the special tax 
37 
ordered by the First Great Khural and were housed in gas.In some 
schools pupils were provided with all material needs including clothing 
but the Third Great Khural of 1926 decreed that only poor children 
h 1 1 . 38 s ou d receive free c othlng. Parents were expected to pay for 
the p~:il.' s board but, as Batkhan remarked to Anna Louise Strong, 
many parents were unwilling to do so, although they were happy enough to pay 
39 
for a son's keep in a monastic school. 
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Equipment and textbooks continued to be a serious problem 
throughout the 1920s. Batkhan said of European knowledge: "We must 
learn it - or perish." 40 In 1925 he wrote to the Russian author 
Maksim Gorky asking advice on what kind of material, primarily Russian 
fiction, ought to be translated into Mongolian. Gorky replied: 
" as far as I can judge about the soul of 
the Mengo1 from the books I have read about 
Mongolia, I think that your people would 
benefit mostly by the advocacy of the principle 
of activity. Europe ~es all that is beautiful 
and worthy of respect by other races precisely 
to its active attitude to life ..•.. I think 
that the biographies of such personalities as 
the men of science Pasteur and Faraday, as 
Franklin, Garibaldi and others would be 
useful... Such biographies are no less 
important from the standpoint of education 
than works of fiction." 41 
In 1926 Batkhan travelled to Germany where he ordered maps 
and charts in the Mongolian script~2 projectors, films and cameras43 
and also 100 typewriters, the first to be built for writing the 
Mongolian script. They were made by the Berlin firm of Wanderer 
Werke which accepted the order as a pioneering challenge and, in the 
hope of receiving further orders, supplied the first hundred 
44 A new printing press was purchased from at very little profit. 
45 
Germany at the same time and although neither it nor the typewriters 
were specifically for educational purposes, education benefitted 
nevertheless. In 1927 Jamtsrano was able to publish a textbook of 
46 geography. 
The link with Germany also included a unique and fascinating 
47 
educational venture. The German ambassador to the USSR, Count 
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Brockdorf von Ranzau invited a number of Mongolian children to be 
educated in German schools. 48 In 1926 a group of 30 boys and five 
girls aged 13-17, all former pupils of the Ulaanbaatar Middle School , 
arrived in Berlin. One of their German teachers described them as 
"children of workers, orphans and half-orphans" and Ish-dorj,the government 
official who -accol.'lpaniai them said they had been chosen "for their 
ability and behaviour.,,49 The children became pupils of the Freie 
Schulegemeinde Wickersdorf and the Schul-und Werkgemeinschaft 
Letzlingen where they studied German language and general subjects. 
Several went on to special training in tanning, mapping, agriculture, 
mechanics, brickmaking, textiles and photography, either in 
technical schools or as apprentices in German firms. Four went to the 
Paris Lyc~e, one studied with the German orientalist Erich Haenisch in 
Leipzig and yet another went to Sweden. The headmaster of the school 
at Wickersdorf described the application of the children to their work: 
"Their behaviour is striking. They have their 
own laws. It appeared to us as if it were 
commandments and prohibitions which were given 
to them to take with them. An over-stepping 
of those is out of the question. Their reserved, 
~ubborn consistency leads again and again to the 
thought that they possess rules. On the other 
hand, whatever hap~8ns they carry out what they 
have undertaken." 
This calls to mind a remark that Batkhan made to Anna Louise Strong 
51 
in 1927: .. When the ftPngol is interested, he will work to the end." 
Unfortunately the stay in Germany was cut short in 1929 as 
a result of political changes introduced by the Seventh Party Congress 
but, brief as the students' education was, it provided the MPR with a 
range of new skills which could be put into practice immediately. 
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Wolff who had undertaken all the practical arrangements of the 
education venture was able to renew his acquaintance with many of the 
students when he visited the MPR in 1964. Some had become doctors 
and teachers, others worked for the government, one was a theatre 
52 
director and another an associate of the Academy of Sciences. 
In 1925 some 80,000 children of school age53 were said to 
be livingm the MFR, although this figure may not be entirely accurate. 
In 1927 Natsov recorded a much higher estimate of 135,000 aged 8-16 
54 years who did not receive any state education. In 1925 less than 
1,000 were attending state schools55 and in 1927 there were just under 3,00056 
1 . 1 57 of whom 55 were g1r s. The Third Great Khural of 1926 stressed 
. . 58 that state education for all should be introduced w1th1n ten years. 
~eanwhile the monastery schools were still attracting far larger 
numbers than the state schools. Dambador.j told Anna Louise Strong 
in 1927 that 66,000 boys were monastic pupils,59 although the 
Mongolian historians Purevjav and Dashjamts give a much lower figure 
60 
of 15,000. In the words of Batkhan 
"For three centuries our people have been 
used to their schools and the boys are all 
ambitious to go to them." 61 
Nevertheless by this time 75 khoshuus were offering some kind 




Health and Hygiene 
Education made considerable progress in the 1920s, given the 
conditions prevailing in the region at that time. Health and hygiene, 
on the other hand, received rather less attention and public money. 
Education was the responsibility of a full ministry from 1924 while 
health care was left to a department of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. While the education service was able to attract Buriats with 
the necessary skills, no Buriats were available either to organize the 
health service in the way that Batkhan organized education or to treat the 
sick of the MPR. Article Three, item ten of the Constitution declared 
"So as to give the labouring people true 
access to knowedge, the Mongol People's 
Republic will organize for them complete 
general instruction free of charge." 63 
However the only reference to health care was that sanitary matters 
were the responsibility of the Great Khural. 64 Individual party 
members nevertheless began to make demands for health care and Jamtsrano 
proposed to the Third Party Congress that Mongols be sent to train as 
doctors of western medicine. 65 This was not feasible then however 
because no Mongols had reached the necessary standard of general education 
and proficiency in foreign languages. The only possible, immediate 
solution was to make use of the available skills of lama doctors and 
the service of foreign doctors. 
Ordinary people had great confidence in Tibetan medicine 
and the Party wanted to open state clinics offering both Tibetan and 
t d ·· 66 wes ern me lClne. Within the Party there was some debate as to the 
relative meri ts of ei ther system and some wanted to dispense '",i th T i.betan 
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67 medicine and use only the western system. Foreign doctors were not, of 
course, unknown in Mongolia; a Swedish visitor to Niislel Khuree in 
1919 met several foreign nationals claiming to be doctors, including 
Russ ;ans J P K d Cho 68 • , a anese, oreans an ~nese. Yet in spite of a 
professed reverence for western medicine Russian doctors were not 
given a great deal of encouragement by the authorities as Jamtsrano 
revealed to the Third Party Congress: 
"It is easy to pass a resolution about 
European medicine, but shall we be able to 
carry it out? You will remember the last 
year a very good physician, Doctor Shastin, 
was invited. But what a lot of trouble it 
cost to get the funds for the fitting up of 
a hospital. We met with the greatest 
obstruction and the matter dragged on for 
many months. The doctor was almost sent 
away. And now the same people ask: 
'is it possible that your doctor has done 
nothing all this time?' "69 
Dr. P.N. Shastin was then in charge of the Mongolian Army's medical 
70 
department and remained in practice in the MPR until 1934. 
While the authorities procrastinated missionaries of the 
Swedish Mongol Mission attempted to alleviate the plight of the sick 
of Niislel Khuree. In 1919 a mission station including a school and 
a clinic,opened and by 1924 up to 1,000 Mongols a month were being 
71 h treated. Judging from the mutilations described by Sven Hedin, t e 
Swedish explorer, the patients included some of the poorest people 
72 
of the capital. Mongolian soldiers, Chinese residents and lamas 
73 
also attended. In return for treatment the nurses were offered khadags, 
long strips of silk, on which were placed one or two dollars. 
These donations kept the clinic open and it was hoped that a fuller 
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service could eventually be offered. 74 However the clinic was 
closed down in 1924, a week after the Bogd Khaan died, and the 
missionaries were sent packing because soldiers were showing some 
interest in the religious tracts they received with their medicine. 
The Russian officers in the barracks confiscated the tracts and 
protested to the authorities. 75 
The First Great Khural ordered that the health of school 
children be cared 76 for but what was actually done is not clear. 
A state clinic providing western and Tibetan medical treatment opened 
in 1925 and in 1926 a Mother and Baby Clinic 77 was started but there is 
little information available on these services. The Second Great 
Khural of 1925 issued a number of resolutions on health, calling for 
a public hygiene campaign, doctors for rural areas, the study of the 
medicinal virtues of mineral waters, of which there are many springs 
in the MPR, and the training of young people as medical assistants.78 
Also in this year the government allocated 2.71% of the state budget 
79 for health purposes. 
Already in 1923 the Military Council had organized a 
commission to clean up the capital. They had the assistance of the 
Russian trading organizations, the Tibetan Office 80 and European 
doctors in this task. In 1924 it was announced that fines would be 
levied on those who polluted the city, although quite what this implied 
is not clear, and anyone who reported such behaviour could be rewarded 
with as much . 81 as 75% of the flne. Members of the Youth League 
helped by removing large mounds of rubbish that had accumulated over 
many decades. Even so, changing old habits was a slow process. 
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The Chinese cemetery with its coffins above ground gave off an 
82 
unbearable smell. Mongols continued to relieve themselves in 
public places, refusing to make use of a number of public lavatories 
erected by a Hungarian refugee at the behest of the government. 
They considered it was more hygienic for the scavenger dogs to dispose 
of human faeces. 
Society and Religion 
The education and health services were not universally popular 
and that was mainly because of the influence of the Buddhist religion. 
Between 1921 and 1924 the Party restricted the political power of the 
Church to some extent but its economic power and its spiritual influence 
were largely untouched. There were over 100,000 lamas, 600 large monasteries 
and temples and over 1,000 small foundations. 84 The Party had only 
11,600 members by 1927 and therefore it could not afford to offend 
either the lamas or the faithful laity. But while the Church stood 
firmly in the way of change the MPR had little hope of becoming a strong 
and prosperous state. Therefore the Church had to be reformed, controlled 
or broken but initially the Party was undecided as to what kind of 
religious policy it should adop~. 
Until the time of the death of the Bogd Khaan the regime 
aimed chiefly to control the political power of the monarch. His 
power was drastically reduced by the Oath-taking Treaty the Civil 
List was cut down, collecting taxes from the faithful in the form of 
enforced donations was forbidden and expenditure on religious 
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observances was restricted. Any imagined attempt to restore the Bogd 
Khaan to his former p0sition as a monarch with unlimited rule was handled 
ruthlessly by the Secret Police as the affairs of the Saj Lama and 
Tserenpil bear witness. 
Even so relations between the Church and the Party were confused. 
The Party was not, in the beginning, an anti-religious organization. 
The Mongolian army fought to protect the Yellow Faith and the Javzandamba 
Khutagt in 1921. Lamas were among the founder members of the MPP and 
some of ~he secular members were kn~ for their loyalty to religion. 
The Diluv Khutagt recalled that Choibalsan kept Buddhist statues in 
his ger until 192885 and Jamtsrano defended Buddhism in the press. 
Nevertheless the Church was fully aware that the Party's closest allies, 
the Bolsheviks, were no friends of religion and it was quick to take any 
action or remark against the political and economic position of the 
monasteries as opposition to the faith itself. The Youth League was 
especially hated by Churchmen because its members were far less 
cautious in their criticism of the Church and the degeneracy of some 
lamas than were members of the Party. 
The matter was further complicated by the fact that there were 
also lamas who supported the Party and its policies for change. It 
is not particularly surprising that lamas should support the independ-
ence movement of 1921 because a number of monasteries had come under 
Chinese attack in 1920. Some in the south of the country were completely 
ransacked with serious loss of life and Gandan and 0 ther monas te r i es 
of Ikh Khuree were fired on. Yet when the euphoria of victory in 1921 
had died away and rumours were circulating that the Party intended to 
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persecute religion, there were lamas, even incarnations, who joined 
the Party as a result of the recruitment campaigns of 1923 and 1924. 
It was later suggested that they had done so merely to save their own 
skins or to increase respect for lamas and monasteries but as we 
have no record of the lamas' own point of view, it is better to retain 
an open mind and assume that some, at least, joined out of genuine 
conviction. 
There was a body of religious opinion in the 1920s that 
was deeply offended by the immorality of some professed lamas and by 
the accumulation of monastic wealth when so many went poor and hungry. 
Religious writers had long raised their voices against the evils of 
drink, smoking and fornication but the senior academics of Gandan were 
particularly repulsed by the lifestyle of the Seventh and Eighth 
86 Javzandamba Khutagts. In the latter part of the 19th century a 
Buddhist revival occurred among the Buria'ts as a resul't of the clash of 
Russian and Mongol culture and education systems. This movement 
became known as "Purer Buddhism" and its central tenet was that 
lamaism had become degenerate and only concerned for its own power 
and prosperity. The reformists wanted to return to the Buddha's 
teachings of celibacy, the renunciation of private property and a 
87 
sacred respect for all living creatures. Buriat and Khalkh 
churchmen were in regular contact and a number of Khalkh lamas 
were receptive to the ideas of the Purer Buddhism movement and its 
reformist ideas. It was not just high lamas who expressed these 
sentiments. Professed lamas of the lower degrees also favoured 
change and some wanted to end the institution of khutagts and 
88 ~uvilgans . Incarnations were not found in the ea~liest 
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form of Buddhism but had been introduced into the faith by the 
Tibetans. 
The support and sympathy of progressive lamas, active 
or passive, was however outweighed by the more traditional and reaction-
ary sections of the religious establishment. Therefore Party members were 
uncertain whether they could trust lamas, and became 
uneasy about admitting them to the Party. It was also realized that 
there was an ideological conflict between a lama's vow to preserve 
life and the party oath which required members of the Party to be ready 
89 to take up arms when required to do so. By the time that the 
Republic was founded the Party had a clearer conception of its aims 
and policies. Under the influence of changing Comintern policies as 
directed through its agents in Mongolia, some factions were pushed out 
of the Party and those who were left were prepared for a closer 
alliance with the international Communist movement. 
As a result there were changes in policy towards religion and the 
mmasteries from 1924, although the Party retained an ambivalent attitude 
towards the Yellow Faith until 1928. 
The Search ~or the Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt 
Although the high lamas of Ikh Khuree we4e refused permission 
to search for a Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt they sent out envoys to 
investigate boy children who were born within nine months of the death 
of the Eighth. According to a Manchu ruling the Javzandamba 
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~hutagts had to be reborn as Tibetan cor-moners, DU~ tne jo~~~ey to 
Tibet was dangerous at the best of times and the cost of bringing an 
incarnation to Mongolia prohibitively expensive so there had been attempts 
in the past to overturn this ruling. By 1925 such a jour~ey was 
almost impossible because of banditry and warlordism in China. 
At the beginning of 1925 it was rumoured that the Ninth 
incarnation had been reborn as the son of a poor woman called Tsendjav. 
The woman was said to be a shaman who heard mysterious voices 
and her son was said to have prophesied the future glory of a 
. 90 Buddhlst Mongolia. Three lamas were sent to prepare the child for 
91 
discovery and a delegation went to Tibet to inform the Dalai Lama. 
The Central Committee issued a statement saying that the~e '~as no 
evidence that the child was the Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt and in order 
to discourage further speculation set up a commission of its own to 
92 look into the matter. 
The lamas continued to put pressure on the civil a~thorities 
by making requests to initiate a search and by putting forward the 
names of children of appropriate age. Rumours of discoveries circulated 
93 
constantly including a candidate in Inner Mongolia. 
time the lamas launched a propaganda campaign through 
At the same 
their own 
vast publishing and distribution machine. A Buddhist writer called 
Choizon is credited with wanting to make Mongolia the centre of 
Tibetan Buddhism in Central Asia and spoke of the "religion of 
94 
the Javzandamba Lama of the north." Many books and pamphlets were 
printed which predicted great disasters for unbelievers and protection 
for those who prayed and spread the teaching. The campalgn ~as as 
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effective among the illiterate as the literate: a work called the 
"Book of Stone" (Chuluuny Bichig) was printed in miniature so that 
it could be worn as an amulet.95 
The Party refused to be moved by this pressure however, 
and instead cast doubt on the existence of a Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt 
by referring to a widely believed legend of Sharrbala. According to 
this legend the Ninth would not appear until he marched into the country 
in the person of the General Khanamand, leading a force of the mythical 
realm of Shambala. 96 There was considerable propaganda value in this 
legend because Shambala could be identified with the powers of the day. 
Some said it was Russia, others Japan. The Fifth Congress of the MPRP 
passed a resolution that the Dalai Lama must be consulted before any further 
action could be taken:7 This was most effective as a further tactic 
of delay because by now all travel between Mongolia and Tibet had 
virtually ceased. Indeed nothing further was done until 1929 when 
98 
the discovery of any more Javzandamba Khutagts was forbidden. 
Meanwhile a more positive line was adopted concerning the Bogd 
Khaan's property. The usual practice was that the personal property 
of a khutagt or khuvilgan was inherited by a new incarnation on the 
death of the previous one. The Bogd Khaan had accumulated all 
manner of curious and valuable objects. Many were of religious sig-
nificance but he also owned clothes, furniture, clocks, musical 
instruments, art treasures , .. h he ... as partic-and mechanical toys, ot wnlC . 
ularly fond- There was even a menagerie of animals which have 
since been stuffed and can be seen in the Sogd Kha mMuseum in 
Ulaanbaatar. The Fourth Party Congress deliberated at length over 
• 
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these objects. Some maintained that they belonged to the Church 
while others said they were really the property of the people because 
they had been acquired as taxes and enforced donations. T~~ Second 
99 Great Khural finally instructed that they be distributed i~ three groups. 
Religious objects were to remain with the Church and the re~ainder 
were to be used for the purpose of education and public health. 
In fact many of the Bogd's worldly goods were actually sold in the 
market in Ulaanbaatar and costly objects went for a fraction of their 
. . 1 1 100 J 1 orlglna va ue. oZ'ief Ge eta, a Hungarian refuge~ was engaged 
to turn the Winter Palace into a museum and the objects he describes 
can still be seen there.10l The dispersal of this property and the 
transformation of the Ikh Shav' into a secular aimag were decisive 
blows to the institution of the JavzandammKhutagt. In the unlikely 
event of a new incumbent there would be very little in the ~ay of a 
material inheritance. 
The Regulation o~ Lamas 
In 1925 the Central Committee formed a special cc~mission 
with arbitrary powers over religious affairs. Its members included 
Amar, Magsarjav, Tserendorj, Jamtsrano, Rinchino, Gelegsenga !adamba, 
102 
Dambadorj, Khayankhyarvaa and oamdinsuren. Party policy towards 
religion and the future of religion in the MPR was defined in a 
published document. It discussed the political consciousness 
of lamas, the opposition of high lamas to the Party and explained 
the principle of discrimination of different ranks of lamas ",·hich 
103 
the Comintern had instructed the Party to adopt. 
advice had been given in 1922 but was then ignored. 
In fact that 
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Three classes of lamas were officially defined in a decree 
104 
of May 1925. High lamas included khutagts and khuvilgans and 
also senior monastic and shav' administrators. In the middle group 
were ordinary lamas who had passed their examinations and taken vows, 
105 106 
the gavj and gevsh. The lower lamas were the disciples and lama 
servants who waited on halls, prepared food and engaged in other menial 
tasks because their families were too poor to support the cost of full 
ordination. Because the middle group were seen as unstable, having 
the opportunity to rise further in the hierarchy, some writers speak 
only of higher and lower lamas. 
The reasons for attempting to set one group of lamas 
against another was not simply to attack the power base of religion. 
The Party and government were also anxious to make use of the huge 
reserve of manpower in the monasteries and tried to draw some of this 
pool into the general labour market. 
The Second Great Khural of 1925 orde~ed that lamas should be 
allowed to leave monasteries, be given some animals from the monastic 
herds and start a new life. 107 Between 1924 and 1927 large numbers 
108 
of lamas did leave the monasteries and a figure of 35,000 has 
recently been suggested. Attempts to encourage lama craftsmen to fo~m 
handicraft arte1s with government assistance met with little success 
however. 
The Second Great Khural also tried to rest~ict the number of 
d .. h . 109 un er 18 year olds jOlnlng t e monasterles. It was declared illegal 
to force anyone to become a lama against his will. There are indeed 
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many sad tales of pious parents returning unhappy, runaway sons to 
the monasteries where they might have been punished severely for 
insignificant misdemeanours or the inability to learn their lessons 
quickly. 110 In 1926 it was made illegal for more than two male 
III 
children in a family to become lamas and according to another law 
anyone found guilty of becoming a lama without permission could be 
112 fined between 50 and 300 to grogs or spend up to six months in jail. 
In spite of these measures the overall number of lamas was not 
113 
reduced and we can therefore assume that the laws were not applied 
with any strictness. 
The number of lamas of military age was also a serious 
problem for a country with a small population and a huge border to 
control. Not all lamas lived in monasteries, however. Many 
left after their schooldays were over and returned to live 
permanently with their families although they still enjoyed lama status. 
The Second Great Khural declared that all lamas not living in monasteries 
114 
or not fully ordained should be liable for military service. 
Furthermore any lamas found guilty of administering torture (by no 
115 116 
means unknown~) were to be secularized and mobilized immediately. 
117 
All lamas were obliged to pay the military tax. Again, how 
effective these laws were and just how many lamas were mobilized 
into the army is impossible to say. 
lB3 
Monasteries Submit to Secular Control 
Initially class discrimination was intended not so much to 
break up the monastic structure altogether but to give those lower 
lamas who wanted to remain in the monasteries a better deal. In the 
mid 1920s some lower lamas began petitioning for a fairer share of 
monastic doles and a voice in the administration of the monasteries. 
Two lamas of Ikh Khuree, G. Choidabra and Erdenepil, with a following 
of 50-60 ordinary lamas, drew up a six-point plan for democratic 
reforms in monasteries. However it is said that the high lamas 
called them enemies of religion and,with the support of government 
officials, drove them from their monasteries. llB If this is correct 
it suggests that the government was not only unwilling to antagonlze 
powerful senior lamas but also u~pared to allow unregulated reform 
of monastic administration. 
In 1925 the government set up a temporary Office of Religious 
Affairs through which to have a greater influence over monastic affairs. 
It was replaced by a permanent Office in 1926 and in the same year the 
relationship of government with the Churchwas defined in the Law of 
119 Separation of the Church and State. Like the constitution this 
law stated that religion was a matter for the individual conscience and 
incarnations were denied the right to rule. In the second section of 
the new law the monasteries and lamas were subjected to the secular ~ule 
of law and government, and the system of administration was briefly 
described. An office in Ikh Khuree was given responsibility for the 
monasteries of Ikh Khuree and Gandan while other monasteries were to 
have an elected administration. To ensure that the government's 
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instructions were carried out and that the law was not violated, special 
120 government representatives were to be appointed to all these offices. 
Limiting the Church's Wealth 
Although the government now had administrative control over 
lamas and shav' nar the Church still had great economic power. 
Monastic livestock was supposed to be transferred to the shav' nar 
in 1923 but in practice the monasteries continued to administer the 
121 herds as before. Thus there was little change in the lives 
of the shav' nar and because nothing was contributed to the state 
budget from these herds, the rate of national economic development was 
slow. 
Monastic wealth was based on livestock acquired as taxes or 
as donations which would bring merit to the giver. The 1918 census 
122 
estimated church holdings to be approximately 2,000,000 head. 
In spite of the upheavals of 1920 and 1921 and a severe winter in 1923-24 
in which many animals died, the monastic herds increased to 2,900,000 
123 
by the time of the 1924 census. They accounted for 20% of the 
entire livestock population of the MPR and 20% of all monastic animals 
actually belonged to the Javzandamba Khutagt and the monasteries 
.. 124 
of the Khul"ee. 
Livestock and other church property was administe~ed in units 
called jas125 of which there were sane 3.&X)1~roughout the country. 
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Professional lama administrators were responsible for these funds. Animals 
were distributed into the care of shav'nar families who were required 
to give back to the jas specified quantities of products such as wool, 
felt, butter, milk and milk products. The amounts differed from jas 
to jas. Any surplus could be retained by the herdsman and in favourable 
circumstances they could expect to keep about 30-50%. On the other 
hand if animals were lost in epidemics or natural disasters or even 
if they just died of old age the caring family was liable to ~ake 
up the loss. The family also had to recompense the jas if the 
127 
animals failed to produce sufficient wool, milk or other produc~. 
This situation led the Church to prosper even in bad times 
when the rest of the country was suffering. Between 1924 and 1927 a 
number of regions were struck by severe weather conditions and poor 
families owning less than 10 head of livestock rose from 28% to 35% 
of the population. At the same time monastic livestock holdings 
l~ 
increased to 3,343,785 head, that is 24% of the entire national 
livestock population. 
Livestock accounted for 40-50% of the average monastic 
129 
income and in some cases it could reach 60-70%. Other monastic 
property included buildings and precious religious objects, like 
books, statues, paintings, vessels and musical instruments. During 
the autonomy the Ikh Shav' especially, acquired a good deal of 
farmland, as a result of enforced donations. Monastic farm land was 
worked by poor lamas or shav' nar or else rented out to Chinese. 
186 
The farmers had to produce fixed quotas or make good the loss. 
At Ulaangom in the northwest, for instance, a tenfold increase was 
required on a sack of seed. 130 
The great prosperity of the Church was due to its privileged 
position in Mongolian society and the careful exploitation of its 
income and property by professional administrators. 131 The latter 
were responsible for trading animal products, farm crops and artistic 
objects made by lama craftsmen. Monasteries also engaged in large-
scale transport, land rental and usury. They were willing to lend 
almost anything - animals, bricks of tea, tiizl~nd silver - and in 
return charged even higher interest rates than the Chinese. 
Even in the late 1920s when the Mongol-Soviet Bank was offering credit 
facilities the monasteries continued to provide local government with 
loans. The monasteries were also bases from which Chinese 
traders could operate. The lamas adopted Chinese methods of trading 
and collaborated with the Chinese ln commercial activities. 
The Provisional G~vernment did not immediately attempt to 
tax monasteries. Instead it tried to divert ~ sources of church 
income into the secular sector by forbidding monasteries and incarn-
ations to impose taxes on shav'nar and extract enforced donations 
from the population generally. However there were calls to tax jas 
animals and the monasteries reacted by concealing some of their 
livestock from the census of 1924. In 1924 Choijilsuren, a 
government special representative (toloonu tushme1) in Tsetser1eg 
MandaI aima& devised a tax of monastic herds and in 1925 ~agsarav, 
l~ 
ofKhovsgol in the northwest, planned to impose taxes on three 
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local monasteries. This plan was discussed at the Second Great 
Khural and a resolution to tax the monastic herds was passed. 41 
voted in favour of this,ll were against and 5 wanted only half of the jas 
135 holdings to be taxed. However these figures still leave a possible 
20 or so who presumably abstained or were not present which could mean 
that the dissention was greater than the given figures imply. 
The rates for taxing monasteries were laid down in the 1926 
tax law passed by the Third Great Khural. The rate for a jas of 
50-100 bod was 40 mongo; of 100-500 bod, 70 mongo; of 1,000-5,000 
136 
bod 1.20 togrogs; of over 5,000 bod, 1.50 togrogs. In 1927 
monastic buildings became liable for tax and monasteries were obliged 
•• " II 137 to provide ortoo service. 
The Religious Opposition 
The reaction of the Church to the Party's religious policy 
was summed up at the Fifth Party Congress by Oambadorj in the 
following words: 
"Extremely typical is the present growing 
activity of reactionary lamas. A series of 
measures undermining the former privileged 
situation of the lamas, which were carried 
out in recent years have weakened in no small 
way the former influence of lamas over the 
masses of the people. Moreover, the abolition 
of the theocracy, the regulation of the (Ikh) 
Shav' administration, the equalization of 
lamas to the rest of the population for the 
purposes of taxation etc., all these things 
have kept the lamas politically passive for 
some time. Reactionary lamas kept to their 
monasteries, large and small, waiting for 
better times. At the pr~t time this 
period of hibernation has come to an end. 
Lamas are showing great activity in their search 
188 
for a form of organization which expresses 
their political existence and influence." 138 
The suggestion that lamas had been largely passive until this time 
was perhaps a little too simple. In response to the propaganda of 
the Party cells, newspapers, pamphlets, posters and drama, all of 
which attacked the lamas and the Church quite openly, the Church itself 
issued a flood of propaganda of its own~39 The Church's capacity 
for printing, distribution and preaching was far greater than anything 
the Party could draw on at this time and it was no problem for the 
Church to muster the nationwide support of the faithful by a mixture 
of threats and promises of great blessing. However the Church did 
not organize any formal, united opposition to the regime. 
In 1925 a new kind of reaction in the form of riots and 
violent demonstrations began to take place. Most of what is recorded 
seems to have been a spontaneous response to government interference 
in monastic administration and the imposition of taxes. In 1925 
senior lamas at Ulaangom monastery in the north west arrested the 
government's special representatives, Dogsom and Luvsantseren. The 
elected local khural was preven~ from meeting and communications with 
Khovd were cut off. Unrest spread to adjoining areas and had to 
140 
be put down by soldiers from Khovd. This incident is particularly 
interesting because it appears to have some connection with Dorvod 
separatism ,although Khalkh Mongols living in the surrounding areas 
were also involved. The Dorvod were a group of western Mongols who 
were not fully integrated into the administrative system of the MPR until 
1927. The unwillingness of Dorvod and Khalkhs to be ruled by one another 
had a long historical tradition. After the 1921 revolution some Dorvod 
189 
families migrated across the border to Sinkiang and others ~a11ied 
around the Ja Lama. Sambuu, later premier of the MPR, who '«rote 
b k 1 d 1 . . 141 11 d a 00 on amas an re ~g~on, a ege that the uprising at Ulaangom 
was organized by high lamas in collusion with local former princes 
and had the dual object of overthrowing the revolutionary government 
142 
and separating the western part of the country from Khalkh. Sambuu also 
143 
mentioned a similar uprising in Khovd in 1927. It was led by an 
official called Shaalov and also involved high lamas who objected to 
the taxation of jas livestock. These insurgents also wanted to 
detach the western region and make it a border province of China. 
In general Mongolian historians have emphasized the 
role of high lamas as initiators of violent reaction and played 
down the involvement of the lower lamas. The policy of the MPR to 
discriminate between the high and low lamas aimed to increase the 
lower lamas' awareness of the exploitation, harsh treatment and 
unfair share of temple doles by their superiors. It is true that 
there were increasing demands for more equal treatment as the affair 
of Erdenepil and Choidabra mentioned above shows. However the 
Mongolian historians overlook the fact that even low lamas had a 
genuine interest in maintaining the traditional order, however short-
sighted that might have been. They had, after all, chosen to remain 
in the monasteries after their school days and take their vo~s. 
. oppo~tunities for the ambitious, There was social status in being a lama ana ~ 
and the power of religious feeling should not be underestimated. There 
is evidence to suggest that some lower lamas reacted as violently as 
their superiors to the new administrative measures imposed by the 
government and they ~oo organized riots. 
190 
In 1926 rioting broke out at BayantUmen monastery in Khan 
Khentii uul aimag when 200 ordinary lamas, led by two of thei~ number, 
Ishjamts and Molom, wrecked the local administration office. The 
government acted swiftly and ruthlessly. A special commission was 
set up under the chairmanship of Jadamba, the D.eputy Party Chairman, 
and soldiers were dispatched to suppress the violence. Ishjamts and 
Molom were shot as examples to anyone considering doing likewise 
and other leaders were thrown into prison:44 In its report to the 
Fifth Party Congress the commission maintained that the true leaders 
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were not the ill-fated Ishjamts and Molom but high lamas. 
However no specific evidence was offered to support this. The fact 
remains that 200 ordinary lamas felt strongly enough to take action 
against the new administration. 
A similar incident took place in Namnam Uul khoshuu in 
Tsetserleg MandaI aimag. It has been described in the memoir of 
G. Genden who was working for the Party in that district: 
"In 1926 a man called Jambal who worked for 
the aimag party committee of Tsetserleg 
MandaI aimag, came to Namnan Uul khoshuu 
and carried out propaganda work there. The 
high lamas of Namnan monastery started a riot. 
They seized the flag from the door of the party 
office, tore it to pieces and beat the 
propagandist Jambal against a wall. At 
that time Jambal and I were working in this 
aimag's office:146 
As far as we can tell these demonstrations were spon~aneous 
and localized but that did not dispelf~that some la~ger initiative 
against the Party and the government, similar to the Tserenpil affair 
of 1923, was being planned. Between 1925 and 1928 these susricions were 
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especially associated with the Tibetan Panchen (Tashi) Lama or the 
Panchen Bogd as he was known among the Mongols. The Panchen Bogd was 
second only to the Dalai Lama in holiness. In 1924 he was forced to 
flee Tibet for political reasons and he spent the winter of 1925-26 in 
P k · 147 e lng. Amar, the Deputy Prime Minister and member of the Religious 
Commission, and Navaannerin, the Internal Affairs Minister went to 
Peking on official business at this time. The Diluv Khutagt has recalled 
that: 
"They used this opportunity to go to see the 
Banchin tPanchen1 Bogd, it is said, and 
pressingly invited him, saying that it was 
imperatively necessary that he should make 
a visit to the territory of North Mongolia." 
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This visit is not recorded in any other known source but it raises speculation 
about whether the Mongols were trying to pursue an independent foreign 
1 . 149 po lCY. A similarly curious incident is the 
"embassy" of 30 Mongols and three Russians which Nikolai Roerich 
mentioned as travelling to Tibet in 1925. Most of the members of the 
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delegation died in mysterious circumstances. Then in 1926 the 
Third Great Khural ordered the appointment of a special envoy to 
formulate a treaty of friendship with Tibet to allow for closer 
151 
relations although nothing ever came of it. These three events 
must surely have had some religious purpose as well as attempting 
to maintain an independent line in foreign policy. However without 
further information it is difficult to say how far they reflect 
the regime's ambivalence towards religion and its desire to make use 
of the spiritual influence of Tibet in general and the Panchen Sogd 
in particular, for political purposes. 
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There was great propaganda value in the Panchen Bogd for 
both the Party and the Church because many other groups were trying 
to make use of his religious prestige. Inner Mongol nationalists 
wishing to achieve independence sought his blessing, Japanese Buddhists 
tried to win his support for a Pan-Buddhist region in North Asia and 
the Peking government endeavoured to make use of him against the Dalai 
Lama. Most serious for the MPH was the Panchen Bogd's connection with 
Chang Tso-lin whose links with the Japanese were considered a threat 
to the security of the Far East, including the MPR and the USSR. 152 
In 1926 the government of the MPR produced a propaganda 
leaflet which attempted to discredit a rumour circulating at the time.153 
According to this rumour, the Panchen Bogd was about to lead an 
invasion of the MPR by 80,000 soldiers and 88 heroes, Chinese soldiers, 
Chang Tso-lin and the Changjia Lama, who was the most senior incarnation 
in Inner Mongolia and traditional rival of the Javzandamba Khutagt. 
The numbers of the troops are strongly reminiscent of Buddhist mythology 
and call to mind the potent legend of Shambala. The founder 
of the line of the Panchen Bogd is said to have lived in Sha~bala before 
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he was reincarnated to live in the monastery at Tashilhunpo. 
The PanChen Bogd was a potential and powerful focus for 
counter-revolutionary activity in the MPRwhere he already had many 
supporters and great wealth. In 1920 a Tibetan called Eregdelb~relguu 
came from Tashilhunpo and began soliciting large donations of silver 
and livestock for the purpose of building a temple on Mongolia for 
the Panchen Bogd to stay in. Ere~elburelguu remained in ~he 
country for over ten years and preached that men and women s~ould prepare 
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themselves for the war of Shambala. 155 The high-ranking incarnation 
the Yeguzir lama is also said to have invited the Panchen Bogd to 
stay in his monastery during the 1920s although he never came. 156 
It is not at all clear whether any genuine counter-revolutionary 
plot involving the Panchen Bogd ever existed and we may be sure that 
the Tibetan incarnation made as much use of all the groups trying to 
enlist his support as they made of him. Nevertheless the whole situ-
ation made the Comintern extremely nervous and in January 1927 the Far 
Eastern Secretariat issued the MPRP with the following instructions: 
. "Given the present political situation in 
the south, the lamas, who are objectively 
opposed to the Party and the people's 
revolutionary government, could establish 
contact with Chinese militarist groups and 
particularly with Chang Tso-lin and with 
Japanese imperialism which is backing him. 
From this point of view the Buddhist con-
ference which is now being called together 
by Mukden and Japan in Peking and the 
luring to it of the Panchen Bogd represent 
a great political danger which could lead 
to the consolidation of internal and foreign 
counter revolutionary forces in Mongolia." 
The Party must not forget that reactionary 
lamas are still not finally broken but have 
only retreated. Therefore we can expect 
a new attack from these lamas. The Party 
must be prepared for this. The Party must 
first of all work out a united and fundament-
ally firm policy on the lama question."157 
The demand for a firmer line against the Church caused great concern 
within the Central Committee and Gelegsenge of the Religious Affairs 
Commission and ~garjav, head of the Organization Department of 
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the Central Committee,were sent to Moscow to plead that it was not 
appropriate to conditions in the MPR. The appeal met with little 
success and the delegates returned with orders to implement the 
directive forthwith. l58 From this point the Party's religious 
policy became caught up in the general argument of whether the leader-
ship was guilty of deviating to the right of a "general line", a subject 
which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. However the 
issue does focus strongly on the question of how much the Party was 
in favour of religion in its reformed state enjoying an official role 
in the MPR and how far the so-called gentle treatment of the Church 
until now was the careful tactical approach of a regime which was 
basically opposed to religion, particularly in its organized form. 
The answer must be that there were different schools of thought within 
the Party and perhaps always had been. One of these schools which had 
a powerful presence in the Central Committee honestly believed 
that reformed Buddhism had an acceptable role to play in the MPR. 
This is stated no-where more clearly and officially than in the Law of 
Separation of Church and State. Article Two of that law states: 
"Because the religion of Shakyamuni is not 
specially harmful to the present democratic 
system and independence and scientific progress 
and because our people's government looks 
favourably on the Buddhist ShakyamUOi religion, 
the preservation, the study and propagation of 
its teachings are protected by la;." 159 
Within two years this article was taken as evidence that rightist 
opportunists had wormed their way (in Mongolian shurguulakh) 
into the Party and distorted the Party's true policy. Yet among 
the leaders. who made positive statements in favour of reformed 
Buddhism were men who had been Party members since its early days. Dambado!'j 
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the Party Chairman who was a member of the Central Committee in 1921, 
Jamtsrano who drew up the Party's Ten Aspirations at the First Congress 
and Choibalsan, Consular Hill Group member, who~t Buddhist 
images and suggested at the Fourth Party Congress that the religious 
objects belonging to the Bogd Khaan ought to remain with the church. 
Jamtsrano has been treated as spokesman of the Purer Buddhism 
movement in the MPRl60 although the ideas he expressed about the 
relationship of Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism are to be found in the 
writings of other highly educated Buriats of the day, notably Agvan 
Dordjiev,who was a close adviser of the Dalai Lama for some years, 
and Baradin, head of the Buriat Committee of Sciences. Their thesis 
was that unlike Christianity and Islam there was no conflict between 
Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism, and indeed it was sometimes claimed 
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that Buddhism was an atheistic religion. In a book called Foundations 
of Buddhism quoted, it must be admitted,in a hostile article in 1932, 
Jamtsrano made the following statements: 
"The great Gautama gave to the world the perfect 
teachings of Communism. All attempts to make 
agod out of a great revolutionary lead to 
amurdity The present understanding of 
community makes a beautiful bridge from Buddha -
Gautama to Lenin. We pronounce this formula 
not to exalt it or to lower it but as an obvious 
and indisputable fact .•.. The prinCiple of 
fearlessness, the principle of denial of owner-
ship, the principle of the value of work, the 
principle of the dignity of a human being without 
class or other difference, the p~inciple of 
reality, the principle of love on the basis of 
self-awareness are the legacy of the teachers 
(e.g. Buddha and Lenin) of continual joy for 
humanity We know how Lenin valued 
Buddhist truth." 162 
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In 1926 Jamtsrano published an article in the Mongolian Youth League 
Journal which t>ok readers to task for criticizing religion and 
urged them to learn to distinguish between what was correct and what 
. 163 
was 1ncorrect. Another book which was published anonymously in 
Ulaanbaatar about this time also draws parallels between Buddhism 
d M . L " 164 an arX1sm- en1n1sm. It was variously attributed to Jamtsrano 
and E.I. Roerich, the wife of Nikolai Roerich, although quite why a 
well-known writer like Jamtsrano should publish anonymously is not 
clear. 
These were confused times when traditional ideas and beliefs 
were being increasingly challenged by foreign, supposedly scientific, 
new ones and the MPRP was rapidly approaching a point where it had 
to choose between Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism. But until 1928 
there were enough people who believed that both ideologies could co-
exist. As late as the summer of 1928 an international meeting of 
Buddhists was planned in Ulaanbaatar and it was only cancelled when 
the Com intern put strong pressure on the so-called Rightist leader-
ship. However, the Purer Buddhist movement came to the world of 
Tibetan Buddhism too late to offer the latter a chance of survival 
in a region dominated by the Comintern. Moreover the methods 
the MPRP used to control the Church were precisely those methods 
which had been devised by the RCP to destroy the Orthodox Church 
and religious faith altogether in the USSR. Larry Moses has drawn 
attention to the close parallels in the treatment of the Russian 
165 
Orthodox Church and the Mongolian Buddhist Church. In the early 
days of p arty rule in both countries the main attack was on the 
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political power of the religious institution. In 1925 the 
Metropolitan Tikhon died and the RCP used manipulative and obstructive 
tactics in the election of a successor. At the same time the 
Russian Party fostered discord and schism in the Russian Church which 
led to a proliferation of sect-like groups such as the Living 
Church and Renovationists. Energies were dissipated in doctrinal 
disputes instead of mounting a united opposition to the RCP's policies. 
Like the ~ongolian Church, the Russian Orthodox Church was bound by 
a series of legislation beginning with a Law of Separation of Church 
and State in 1918, which limited its control over its own administration, 
economic affairs and education. Since the Comintern increasingly held 
up the example of the Soviet Union as a model for states working for 
socialism it is hardly surprising that the MPRP was pressed to adopt 
the Soviet religious policy. We ought not to forget, however, that 
many members of the MPRP were not avowed atheists in the way that the 
members of the RCP were. This, rather than tactical cleverness, 




THE JlPR, THE COIfiNTERIt AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 
When the MPP joined the Comintern in 1921 its main object 
was to gain international support for its aspirations for national 
independence. It soon became apparent that membership carried a 
wide range of obligations Which affected the organization and outlook 
of the Party and,consequentl~ the range of policies implemented by 
the Mongolian government. As a result of Comintern influence the 
nationalist leaders of the MPP, some of whom had been in power 
since 1920, were overthrown and a new younger group came to power 
prepared to implement policies favourable to the Comintern. The 
Mongolian policies were formulated to complement policies of the 
Soviet government because, as the Fourth Comintern Congress of 1923 
had decreed, it was the duty of all workers of the world "to proclaim 
1 
their moral, political and economic solidarity with Soviet Russia." 
The Comintern's demands affected the MPR in three areas: 
the economy, the political structure of the Party and the state, and 
foreign affairs. Guided by representatives of the Comintern the 
administrative structures of the MPRP and the Mongolian state were 
modelled on their Soviet counterparts and the Mongolian economy 
.. 
was integrated with the Soviet system. These changes were described 
in Chapters F~ur and rive respectively. They were introduced 
gradually and hence the traditional and the new coexisted for a time. 
This tended to obscure the fact that the ultimate results were 
indeed going to be radical. The MPR's conduct of foreign policy 
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was affected in the same way but it was also fundamentally 
influenced by the Soviet Union which was the only country prepared 
to give diplanatic recognition to the new Mongolian state. 
This to some extent concealed the fact that the Comintern was trying 
to limit and manipulate the MPR's right as a de facto independent 
state to determine its own foreign policy. In spite of this the 
MPH did enjoy new international relationships and a wider range 
of foreign contacts than before. 
Foreign Relations of the MPR 
The embassy which the Mongolian government established 
in Moscow in fact presented an opportunity for Mongolian diplomats 
to meet representatives of other states and in practice to enjoy 
fruitful if informal relationships with a number of western European 
countries. The most encouraging contacts were the trade and 
educational links with Germany, but Mongolian officials also had 
opportunities to visit France, Switzerland, Sweden and Italy. 
Clearly the Mongols felt that they could pursue these contacts to 
only a limited extent. For instance while the Soviet government 
had diplomatic relations with Germany at this time the Mongols were 
apparently not free to develop similar links themselves. In 1926 a 
German businessman offered to take up this question with his govern-
ment but Ishdorj, head of the Mongolian mission in Berlin, was 
politely non-committal. 2 
Similar restrictions seem to have applied to the Mongols' 
Asian connections. In China the Mongolian Party and government 
had contact with the KMT and with the warlord Feng YU-hsiang but 
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the Comintern issued dire warnings about the predatory intentions 
of other warlords like Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin. 3 It was 
unlikely in fact that the Khalkh Mongols would wish to have any 
association with the warlords who openly claimed that the territory 
of the MPR was part of China. Chang Tso-lin even planned to 
invade the area in 1921 and 1923 but was only distracted by more 
pressing developments at home. 4 The Comintern also warned about 
Japan's intentions5 but there is little evidence to suggest that 
the Mongolian government was seeking an alliance in that direction. 
In fact by 1926 Japanese citizens who had found their way to the 
MPR over the last two decades were rounded up and either imprisoned 
or expelled for alleged spying. A physician and a few prostitutes 
were then the only Japanese citizens left at liberty in the MPR.6 
The controls exerted on the MPR are even more clearly 
illustrated by the manner in which the USSR and the Comintern 
manipulated the association of the Khalkhs with other Mongols. 
Efforts apparently aimed at establishing a united state of all Mongols 
were the MPR's only significant attempt to formulate an independent 
line in foreign policy. This the Comintern put a stop to in 1925, 
as was described in chapter four, and then the Comintern took upon 
itself the responsibility of monitoring contacts between the Khalkhs 
and other groups of Mongols. 
In 1926 the MPR was compelled to sign a treaty of friendship 
7 
with the Tannu Tuvan People's Republic (TTPR). By so doing the 
Mongolian government renounced all claims to the territory of Uriankhai. 
The treaty was in fact more a means of keeping the Mongolian and Tuvan 
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peoples apart than of bringing them together for it does not appear 
to have led to any substantial trade or cultural links between the 
MPR and the TTPR. The only obvious link was the Tuvan Central 
Cooperative which had an office in Ulaanbaatar. 8 The Mongolian 
Mutual Aid Cooperative did not have a branch in Kyzyl, the Tannu 
Tuvan capital, as far as we know. 
The Comintern and the USSR, for strategic reasons, were 
interested in developments among Inner Mongols as well as in the 
progress of the MFR. However apprehension regarding Pan-Mongolism 
made them hesitant to encourage contact between the MPR and Inner 
Mongols. Nevertheless it was the case that some Inner Mongols 
had chosen to come to live in the MPR and many more in China looked 
to the MPR for support forthernationalist aspirations. The 
Comintern tried to manoeuvre the Khalkhs into relationships that 
were acceptable to itself and to the USSR. In the mid 1920s this 
•• . 9 Comintern activity was associated with efforts of Feng Yu-hs1ang 
who controlled a large area of northern China including parts of 
Inner Mongolia. Feng was opposed to Chang Tso-lin and was in alliance 
, 
with the Soviet government and the Comintern for a time. 
In the winter of 1924 Feng sponsored a conference of Inner 
Mongolian nationalists at which an Inner Mongolian People's Party 
10 (IMPP) was formed. By 1925 some 300 full members and 3,000 
candidate members had been enrolled. In October of that year an IMPP 
Congressll was held in Kalgan and among those who attended were 
Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern representative to the KMT, Feng and 
an MPRP delegation. Among the last were Oambadorj and Buyannemekh, 
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the writer who had narrowly escaped death at the Third MPRP Congress. 
Th I unp C . d 'f 12 e l~ ongress 1ssue a man1 esto to the people of Inner Mongolia 
which reflects the Comintern policies for peoples seeking independence 
at that time. In typically Marxist language the manifesto condemned 
feudalism and called for an elective system of local and national 
government. The IMPP was presented as a branch of the freedom move-
ment of China rather than as a Mongolian people's movement and the 
aims of the Party included the overthrow of so-called imperialists and 
militarists in China. Little is known about the activities of the 
IMPP after the congress and it seems unlikely that it was encouraged 
to look towards the MPRP for guidance or material assistance. 
Buyannemekh was left in Kalgan for a period to edit the IMPP news-
13 paper but this was more a means of isolating him from the MPRP 
for a while on account of his former involvement with Danzan. In 
1927 the IMPP split as a result of the KMT's defection from the 
C . t 14 om1n ern. 
Relations between the MPR and the Buriat Mongol Autonomous 
Socialist Republic (BMASSR) were more extensive but they were often 
conducted according to the rather formal pattern of exchange visits 
by official cultural, economic and friendship delegations. The 
S ' t'f' C' 15 f f th A ademl' clen 1 lC ommlttees, orerunners 0 e c es of Science, 
cooperated and Baradin, the Chairman of the Buriat Scientific 
16 
Committee,was also a member of the Mongolian Scientific Committee. 
There were other educational contacts and a group of children from the 
Ulaanbaatar Middle School visited the BMASSR 'n 1925 and gave perform-
17 
ances of a play. In this period also there were several study visits 
to the BMASSR to "learn of Soviet experience" and trade between the two 
areas increased considerably.IS 
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Coaintern Involvement in Internal Affairs of the JlPR 
In contrast with the constraints imposed on the MPR's 
external relations, policy making within the country appeared to 
be allowed a greater degree of freedom. There was certainly room 
for a range of options within the MPR in the mid-1920s but this 
relatively free atmosphere reflected the climate of opinion in 
the USSR which was still operating under the terms of Lenin's 
New Economic Policy, even though this was being challenged by 
factions formed after Lenin's death. The MPR was also a less 
immediate concern to the Comintern than the larger and more advanced 
countries of Asia such as China and India, where revolutions were 
expected in the near future. Indeed, in the structure of the 
Comintern the MPRP was not under the Asian Bureau at all but part 
of the Far Eastern Secretariat. This placed the MPR on a par with 
the non-Russian republics of the USSR and policies implemen~ed in 
those republics were, in some ways, very similar to those that the 
Mongolian government was encouraged to adopt. The Mongolian govern-
ment was able to exercise some personal initiative in the way it carried 
out those policies but Amagaev and Natsov, the Comintern's represent-
atives in the MPR, always made sure that they had the support of 
sections of the Mongolian leadership. The memoir accounts of the 
period were of course written, in most case~ after an officially 
approved interpretation of the events had been established but if 
accepted at face value they indicate that Amagaev was largely respons-
ible for causing a divide in Mongolian party and government circles. 
19 
In January 1926 the Comintern had sent a letter to the 
MPRP urging it to act against Pan-Mongolist tendencies, to resist 
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attempts to protect the property and rights of lamas and former 
princes, to guard against exploitation by Chinese traders and to 
block alleged moves to keep rural citizens out of public service. 
There was nothing unusual about these instructions and although 
no copy of the text is available there is no reason to suppose 
that the letter contained any direct criticism of Mongolian party 
leaders. However on the que~tion of placing young rural ards in 
positions of authority some differences of opinion apparently develop-
ed among the Mongolian leadership during 1926, perhaps because 
older and more experienced leaders felt that many of these country 
youths lacked the necessary experience and political awareness to 
'0 
be employed in senior executive posts. Olziikhutagt,a delegate 
at the Fifth MPRP Congress in September, remembers that there 
were disputes about the merits of older and younger people in the 
service of the Party and the state and similarly over rural and 
.. 
. t b 20 Cl Y mem ers. According to Navaannamjil,the editor of Unen~ 
someone referred to the 59 year old Prime Minister Tserendorj as 
. 21 
"an anachronism in a revolutlonary state." Dambadorj,the Party 
Chairman, also remarked that old officials were generally hostile to 
22 the regime and had to be carefully watched. Memoir literature 
also suggests that there were disputes between leaders of the Party but 
does not give any reasons for them. Navaannamjil mentions differences 
23 
between Dambadorj on the one hand and Amagaev and Genden on the other. 
tn Amagaev's biography also there is an allusion to a dispute between 
24 
Amagaev and "the Right" which lasted for two years. Amagaev was 
evidently dissatisfied with the congress resolutions on rural ards 
in positions of authority and reported this to the Comintern. 
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In January 1927 the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat 
sent a further directive to the Central Committee of the MPRP. 25 
The tone of this directive seems to have been stronger than that 
of earlier communications. It ordered that older Manchu-trained 
officials were to be replaced by younger party members; that all 
compromise with the Church must be set aside and a policy of firmness 
adopted instead; and that external connections with Japan, Chang 
Tso-lin and the Panchen Bogd be abandoned on the grounds that they 
were counter-revolutionary. The MPRP discussed the directive but 
concluded that the Party was developing along correct lines and it 
upheld the resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress. 26 
Nevertheless the Central Committee was concerned about the 
severity of the directive concerning lamas and religion. It had 
previously understood that any action concerning the Church had to 
be taken very cautiously to avoid offending the religious sentiment of 
the laity. The apparent change in the Comintern's attitude and its 
refusal to make allowances for conditions in the MPR was decidedly 
confUSing if not disturbing. Two members of the Central Committee, 
Gelegsenge and Dugarjav, were sent to Moscow to plead that the 
instructions were inappropriate to Mongolian conditions as described 
in chapter six. The Comintern was in no mood to grant concessions 
and sent the delegates home with strict instructions to do as the 
January directive had ordered. 
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Why a Mongolian Right Deviation?: the Soviet Union 
This change in the Comintern's behaviour had, in fact, very 
little to do with Mongolia itself, but was influenced by changes 
in international affairs as they affected the USSR. The USSR had 
enjoyed reasonable relations with the capitalist world as it pursued 
its United Front policy in the hope of promoting revolution in Europe. 
By 1927 these hopes had receded and as a result of a series of events 
in that year the USSR began to feel itself increasingly isolated and 
surrounded by hostility. In the spring Germany joined the hated 
L f N t · 27 d· U G t B· . b k ff 1 eague 0 a 10ns an 1n ~ay rea r1ta1n ro e 0 dip omatic 
relations with the USSR. 28 In June there was an attack on the Soviet 
embassy in Warsaw and Voikov a diplomat was killed. 29 The Soviet 
government was convinced that Britain was involved. Events in the 
east were equally alarming. In April Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the 
KMT in China broke with the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party 
1 . b . . "Ch" 30 thus dashing expectations of an Asian revo ut10n eg1nn1ng ln 1na. 
Japan also, under its new prime minister Tanaka, was showing signs 
of taking up an independent attitude to world politics. Soviet 
fears of Japanese aggression in the Far East3l were heightened in 
32 
July 1927 when a document known as the Tanaka Memorial was published. 
The authenticity of the document has never been established but at 
the time it was widely accepted as genuine. It outlined Japanese 
1 · 33 f intentions to colonize and develop Manchuria and Mongo 1a or 
the benefit of Japan's surplus population and to feed Japanese 
industrial dev~lopment. The policy was a threat to the eastern 
borders of the Soviet Union and Soviet economic interests in the 
area in particular the railway interests. 
/ 
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Faced with hostility east and west Soviet leaders called on 
the international Communist movement to be ready to protect the USSR 
as its first duty. In August 1927 Stalin declared: 
"An internationalist is one who without 
reservations, unconditionally, openly, 
honestly, is ready to defend and protect 
the USSR, because the USSR is the basis of 
the revolutionary movement~34 
These were all compelling reasons why the MPR should be 
prevailed upon to narrow its circle of international relationships, 
but there were other reasons too why loyalty should be linked with 
demands for considerable internal change in the MPR. By 1927 Stalin 
had manoeuvred himself into an extremely powerful position in the 
Soviet Union, by playing off first one and then another group of 
Soviet leaders. 35 When the likelihood of a socialist revolution 
in Europe began to appear remote Stalin reasoned that the USSR must 
be prepared to build socialism alone. He propounded the theory of 
"Socialism in One Country,,36 and planned to achieve it by means of 
a massive drive for industrialization backed by resources squeezed 
from the agricultural sector. The resources of the MPR and also 
the TTPR were to be integrated into this vast plan. Therefore 
it was necessary that the governments of these allegedly independent 
republics have full control of the rich resources that were in the 
hands of private individuals and the monasteries. Unwillingness 
to carry out the necessary reforms was regarded as a deviation from 
theirPartie~ general line and consequently a threat both to their 
national independence and to the stability of the Soviet state • 
• 
When the MPRP challenged the Comintern it did so r.ainly on 
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grounds of national interest but it is not unlikely that they also 
acted with a certain stubbornness at the peremptory orders. 
37 According to an article published in 1929 a prominent member of 
the government, who was not named, was threatened with dismissal 
but remained at his post because "feudal theocrats" and the"rising 
bourgeoisie" put pressure on the leadership. It is possible that 
the official concerned was Tserendorj and if so the reluctance to 
name him even in 1929 is understandable. Tserendorj was immensely 
38 popular and the state funeral granted to him when he died in 
February 1928 is evidence of his standing and the respect felt for 
him. The official could, alternatively, have been Magsarjav, 
39 Minister of the Army, a former prince who was equally popular. 
Whoever the official was, his continued presence in the 
government angered the more radical faction of the MPRP which began 
to promote slogans such as "Back to the decisions of the Party 
Congresses and the Khurals" and "Struggle against the distortion of 
the general line.,,40 The same article of 1929 identifies the leaders 
" 
of this faction as P. Genden, Chairman of the Little Khural and o. 
Badrakh, Minister of Finance and close colleague of Amagaev in the 
E "C "1 41 conomlC ounCl • 
The Sixth IIPRP Congress, 1927 
When Chiang Kai-shek withdrew from the Comintern in 1927
42 
M. Borodin, who had been the Comintern's representative to the KMT 
was forced to flee China and he broke his journey to Moscow at 
43 Ulaanbaatar. A number of senior Comintern officials came to meet 
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him there. The Sixth MPRP Congress was about to open and Borodin 
was given leave to address the assembly. This was the Comintern's 
first public statement on events in China. It also gave the Comintern 
an opportunity to teach the MPRP an object lesson. 
Borodin outlined conditions in China up to the time of 
Chiang's defection and said that subsequent events were the result 
of the Chinese Communist Party's failure to follow Comintern 
instructions, causing a collapse of the united front of the CCP and 
the KMT which had existed until then. Instead of supporting agri-
cultural revolution and class struggle in the Chinese cities the 
CCP had continued to support the petty bourgeoisie. Alliance 
with the bourgeoisie had been acceptable to the Comintern earlier 
but Borodin implied that the CCP had erred by continuing that policy 
for too long. However Borodin is reported not to have gone into great 
detail for the whole affair was actually a great embarrassment to the 
C . 44 omlntern. Trotsky, who was now out of favour in the USSR, had 
maintained for some time that the Comin~'s policy towards China 
45 
was entirely wrong. 
The Mongols apparently were very interested in what Borodin 
had to say and asked many questions. Unfortunately these were 
scarcely recorded even in the contemporary press because, in the 
46 
opinion of Borodin's biographer, the questions were "dangerous." 
vi The Comintern may well have had fears that the MPRP, or at least 
the section of the leadership that was challenging its instructions 
in 1927, might be attracted by the KMT's example although no state-
ment suggesting this has been brought to light. This was a reason 
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for Borodin to show how disobedience to the Comintern's instructions 
could lead to grave error. 47 The Sixth MPRP Congress responded with 
resolutions to improve national defence and it reaffirmed support 
for the Comintern and "true revolutionaries of the Far East." Parties 
which made pacts with the capitalist countries were condemned. How-
ever, as we shall shortly see, the MPRP leaders did not entirely 
abandon their policy of independent relations with other leaders in 
the East. 
48 Contemporary accounts of the Sixth MPRP Congress do not 
suggest any great disagreement among the delegates about internal 
affairs. The Central Committee was given a vote of confidence for 
the way in which it was handling the economy although there was 
49 
some suggestion that economic development could be speeded up. 
The desire to bring the Mongol-Soviet Bank under the full control 
of the MPR50 may well have been considered a means to that end but 
course it may also have substantiated in part the later charge 
that the MPR intended to end its alliance with the USSR and the 
Comintern. 
From what party members later recalled it is clear that 
the leaders of the Party were subject to some criticism at the Sixth 
Congress for having rightist tendencies. One delegate says he was 
. ,,51 
k d t . h' . , .. on of the "Rl' ght Devia tlon . even as e 0 glve 1S a1mag s opln1 
Several delegates have since suggested that the leaders were afraid 
52 
to face criticism and called for unity instead. Some of the 
criticism concerned disputes about the employment of young rural 
party members in the official posts. It is curious to read that 
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the Comintern representative spoke in support of the existing 
53 leaders although for exactly what reason and against whom he 
defended them is not made clear. This representative was not 
Arnagaev, although he was still in the MPR at the time of the Sixth 
54 Congress, but A.I. Shotman. He did not remain long in Ulaanbaatar, 
possibly because he was not firm enough with the MPRP Central 
Committee. 
Amagaev left the MPR soon after the congres~ probably to 
attend the tenth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution 
. M 55 In oscow. A party of Mongols also made the journey, including 
.. 
the editor of Unen, Navaannamjil. Oambadorj asked him to take a 
letter to Com intern headquarters. Navaannamjil was not told what 
the letter was about but he was asked to observe the reaction of 
the recipients carefully and to make sure that any reply was 
telegraphed to Oambadorj.56 Unfortunately Naavaannamjil tells 
us no more about this but he does add that a representative of the 
Youth League visited the offices of the youth Comintern and received 
" t" 57 some Instruc 10ns. 
Party Disuni ty Deepens 
In January 1928 Petrov, head of the Comintern's Far Eastern 
Secretariat, wrote a personal lette?Bto Oambadorj repeating the 
earlier directives that the Party must exclude Manchu-trained 
officials and high lamas from government and strengthen its alliance 
with the working masses and their rural representatives who~ he 
called the "conscience of the masses.,,59 Petrov also said that 
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the Party must also adhere to the general line and to the alliance 
with the USSR which, the latter maintained, was crucial to the MPR's 
'd d 60 1n epen ence. The letter was intended for Dambadorj's eyes only 
but he divulged its contents to the rest of the Central Committee 
and it was published in pamphlet form. 6l Dambadorj answered the 
62 letter and the Comintern replied with a 58 point plan for defeating 
the Right. 63 
When the Central Committee met in Apri164 the dispute between 
the Right and the Left could no longer be disregarded by making pleas 
for uni ty. 65 A memoir of Tagar, a Buriat who had been appointed to 
, t t f R 't 66 th C' h 1n erpre or a1 er, e new omlntern representative, shows w at 
the atmosphere was like: 
"People like leading members of the Central 
Committee Jadamba and Dugarjav, Head of the 
Propaganda Department were extremely hostile 
to the Comintern representative Raiter. 
At this meeting, while the Comintern represent-
ative Raiter was speaking Jadamba stared through 
the window as if he were not paying attention 
and then when Raiter went to sit down he looked 
towards him and said 'What is this nonsense you are 
talking?' He also asked him in disgust if he 
was saying it to cause a split in the Party. 
Comrade Dugarjav said he should stop talking 
about inconsequential matters such as the 
town and the countryside and the old and the 
young. 'The unity of our Party is 
, t t' 67 1mpor an ••••.•. 
Left wing members like Badrakh and Ts. Jigfdjav who was head of the 
Mongolian Cooperative complained that democracy was being stifled 
68 
and the struggle against the so-called feudal classes hindered. 
The supremacy of the Right was sustained. Resolutions were 
passed69 expressing confidence in the way that the decisions of the 
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Sixty Party Congress~re being carried out. Local government was 
obeying instructions energetically, and ards and women were being 
attracted into the Party. It was acknowledged that capitalism was 
stabilizing and that Japan was emerging as a state that must be 
taken into account. It was also acknowledged that "elements of 
the old ideology" were prospering. In spite of this the Central 
Committee believed that all such problems could be overcome and 
did not constitute any great danger. 
~Since the deep disunity within the Central Committee could 
not be ignored a commission of Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission members was formed to investigate it. 70 The chairman 
was Choibalsan and although he later emerged as a leader of theL eft 
it is by no means clear whether he was so aligned at the time of 
this commission. In fact the Right dominated the commission but the 
Left was supported by the presence of Raiter the Comintern rep!es~n~-
ative. His popularity had not increased since the April Plenum. 
-
According to Tagar, whenever Raiter said something that pricked the 
conscience of the Rightists, they complained that what they had said 
h d d h " 71 a been wrongly interprete to 1m. vThe commission concluded that 
it was not Rightist policies that were endangering the Party but the 
actual disunity and recommended strong disciplinary measures to 
control this. 72 Dambadorj reported the findings to the Comintern, 
and stated yet again that what the Comintern was asking was 
"completely i.ncompatible wi th actual present condi tions." 72 
The Comintern was no more prepared to give consideration to 
these findings than the right wing of the MPRP leadership was to 
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listen to~ ~omplaints of the Left. Petrov sent yet another 
letter back ordering a firm, leftist course. 74 He specified 
the confiscation of livestock and property from so-called feudalists, 
the use of monastic funds and livestock for the benefit of ards 
and measures to restrict the activity of capitalists. Dorligjav, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then made a number of proposals 
in support of Petrov's directive but according to B. Shmeral', 
a Comintern official who visited the MPR later in 1928, they were 
75 
"swept under the carpet." 
The Sixth Comintern Congress 
~ The Sixth Comintern Congress met in Moscow from 17 June 
76 
to 1 September 1928. By this time in the USSR Stalin had 
defeated the supporters of Trotsky on the left and then those of 
Bukharin on the Right. The RCP was purged and Bukharin himself 
was only saved from expulsion by confessing that he had deviated to 
the Right. The New Economic Polic~ which Lenin had instituted to 
build an economy devastated after the Civil Wa~ was outlawed and 
replaced by a grandiose plan for the rapid industrialization of 
the USSR. ""'The Sixth Comintern Congress_expressedi ts approval of 
other RCP purges and ordered that all other member parties eradicate 
the Right Deviationfram their ranks. Furthermore the Comintern, 
dominated as it was by the RCP, ordered the parties of the MPR 
and the TTPR to implement the same economic strategy as the USSR. 
This explains why the Comintern was now placing greater emphasis on 
the need for the MPRP to return to the so-called general 1~ne of non-
capitalist development. In former disputes between the Comintem crd the r4'RP the 
issues of pre-revolutionary officials in public service and the 
religious question had been more prominent. 
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'lbe Rise o~ the Graduate Opposition 
At this point opposition to Dambadorj, Jadamba and their 
circle began to harden as members of various state and party organizations 
began to support the Left. The Party Central School was split. 
N. Nasanbat the director, who was Jadamba's elder brother, supported 
--7 
the Right/' but several teachers including Lkhumbe~8 shagdarjav79 
d . 1 80 an a Bur1at ca led Konyaev joined the Left. Students of the 
school, especially those who had graduated recently were also divided 
in their views. Other divisions were apparent in the Central Control 
Commission and the Military Training School. 
~ Another group whose left wing was to be a profound influence 
in turning the tide of opinion against the Right comprised young 
graduates of the KUTV. About 20 had just returned from the USSR 
and one of them, a woman called Densmaa81 later recalled: 
"At the time we were studying at KUTV the 
activities and ideology of the Right 
Deviation which existed in our party 
leadership were explained to us .•.• We 
returned to our country in the summer of 
1927 [1928] to put our skills into 
practice and went to work in the countryside 
as propaganda b~igades of the Central Comm-
i ttee of the Party. ,,82 
The propaganda work of these young graduates, coupled with the efforts 
of graduates of the Party Central School, many of whom were now working 
in the aimag and khoshuu party committees, gives credence to the idea 
V of a Rural Opposition which Mongolian historians say ~aused th~ down-
fall of the Right Deviation. Without this agitation it is difficult 
...--_. 
to imagine the rural part~which was portrayed as confused and apathetic at 
successive Party Congresse~ opposing anything. 
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The Right leadership still treated the split as a purely 
domestic concern and when it was realized that the breach was not 
going to be healed by persuasion it determined to use coerc~n. 
viaadrakh lost his position on the Central Committee and Genden was 
removed from the Little Khural. 83 Shortly afterwards, a number 
of prominent left wing sympathizers were arrested. 84 They included 
Laagan, a member of the Central Control Commissio~ and two teachers 
of the Party Central School, Lkhumbe and Shagdarjav. All three were 
Dorvod Mongols. A young army officer called Dashzebge was also 
detained. 
News of the arrests reached the Comintern during its Sixth 
Congress and Dambadorj, who was in Moscow for the occasion, was 
interrogated. He told the Comintern that the men were probably 
arrested for involvement in an attempt to separate Chand'man Uul 
aimag in the west of the MPH from the rest of the country.85 When 
they were released in September, Lkhumbe maintained that the charge 
86 
was trumped up. It was no secret that the Comintern disapproved 
of Dorvod separation and therefore it seems unlikely that loyal 
supporters of the Comintern would allow themselves to get involved 
with this. 
There is no record of what else passed between Dambadorj and 
the Comintern or in what frame of mind he returned to the MPR, but 
about this time~ours began to circulate that the MPH intended to 
end its alliance with the Comintern and the USSR. A man known as 
Oros Gombo,8 7 an employee of the Mongolian embassy in Moscow, returned 
to the MPR to attend the Seventh MPHP Congress in September 1928. 
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Gombo informed the Left that while Dambadorj was in Moscow he had 
entertained a group of officials from the Japanese Mission. One 
of the Japanese had remarked that the USSR had seized Uriankhai 
88 
and therefore was an unreliable ally. The implication was that 
the MPR should look to the Japanese instead for friendship. At 
the &wenth Congress Darnbadorj firmly denied that he had any 
89 intention of allying with Japan. Nonetheless it would be strange 
if senior leaders had not even considered the possibility of alter-
native alliances. In the summer of 1928 the Diluv Khutagt came 
~ 
to Ulaanbaatar seeking permissionto makeAPilgrimage to the 
Panchen Bogd who was in China then. There seemed a distinct poss-
ibility that the Diluv Khutagt would travel for Jamtsrano asked him 
if he would undertake a mission for the government at the same time. 
Permission to travel was eventually refused, ostensibly because 
of unrest in China. However Jamtsrano told the Diluv Khutagt in 
private that there was a certain amount of disagreement in the govern-
ment but that if this was settled he might still go and a car would 
ro 
be sent to fetch him from his monastery. The Diluv Khutagt did 
not discover the nature of the mission and we can only speculate 
whether this had anything to do with the MPRP's alleged desire to break with 
the Comintern. 
The summer of 1928 was clearly a dangerous time in the 
Mongolian capital. According to Mrs. walder,9l wife of the Swiss 
manager of the Ulaanbaatar brickworks, a sense of impending disaster 
hung in the air. The European community had very little idea of 
what was happening. Mrs. Walder records that there was much whispering 
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behind locked doors; anxious political refugees, White Russians 
who had lived in Mongolia since the 1917 Russian Revolution or even 
the 1905 revolution, went about white-faced then sold up and fled to 
92 J. China. Supporters of the Mongolian Left were also forced to meet 
in secret. ' Tagar, the Buriat interprete~ believed he was being 
93 
watched. and Choijil, a rural party secretary, tells how he was 
approached by a man with a queue whom he recognized as Perene£i,a 
former prince, whom he thought had been appointed to spy on him. 94 
/ 95 
v During the Summer the Youth Comintern sent a letter to the 
Mongolian Youth League ordering its members to oppose the Right of 
the MPRP. News of this letter spread rapidly to the aimags and party 
officials visiting the rural khurals, which were being held at the 
time, were questioned closely about whethe~t~her~_wa~_ indeed a_ Right 
'" 
96 Deviation in the Party and tbe I.ea2ue. In Ulaanbaatar the KUTV 
graduates began campaigning in the Party and the youth League cells. 
According to Densmaa: 
" only two or three people among the 
League and Party members to whom I went 
were in agreement with the letter: the 
majority disagreed .•. When Comrade 
Eldev-ochir and the others sent me,he said 
'Go and make a list of the people who 
agree with the KIM [Youth Comintern) letter.' 
So three of us, including Gombo and myself 
went off made the list and returned. In 
general, in the places where the comrades 
went, they met with great opposition. 
After this we carried on the struggle against 
the Rightists in secret."g] 
A month before the Seventh Party Congress delegates began 
to arrive in the capital, and supporters of the Left met to dlSCUSS 
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how they could overcome the Right. Among them were the graduates 
of KUTV, the Party Central School, the Tver Military Academy of the 
98 
Soviet Union and groups of army cadets. B. Eldev-{) chir emerged 
as the leader of this section of the opposit~n, and it is more 
apt to describe it as a Graduate rather than a Rural Opposi tion. 
In all probability Eldev-Ochir was specially trained for this role 
at KUTV. Other prominent leaders of the left who were present at 
the meetings were Genden, Badrakh and Jigjidjav~9 
The Graduate Opposition drew up a programm~ 'f measures 
for "protecting 
Ziiiin 
the general line," entitled "Aspirations of the Left" 
piguuri inkhni i 
100 
Ermelzekh Sanal). 29 ~eople signed includl~g 
seven from Chandman' Uul aimag Badrakh, T~gs, Dadan, Erdene, Borbandi, 
M Sh d · d Lk" bIOI • ag arJav an hum e. Shagdarjav and Lkhumbe 
were the teachers of the Central Party School who had been under 
arrest but were released by the intervention of officials of the 
Comintern who arrived in the MPR in September. The involvement of 
so many Dorvod among the Graduate Opposition raises the interesting 
question of whether there was a substantial Dorvod dimension to the 
Left. 
The Comintern Delegation and B. Sru.eral ' 
Memoirs of party members leave us in no doubt that it was 
the Comintern presence, with the backing of the Graduate Opposition 
that brought about the downfall of Dambadorj and his supporters. In 
September a seven-man Comintern delegation whose leader was Bohumir 
Shmeral '. 10 2 arr i ved in UI aanbaatar. Shmeral' was a Czech who had 
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been the leader of the Czech Communist Party when it was created in 
1921. In 1922 he became a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern and was given special responsibility for the East and China. 
A member of the Mongolian Left described him as "a very tall man, 
103 
with a gentle face and a rosy complexion." He adopted a fatherly 
attitude towards the MPRP during his stay in the MPR but his high 
office and the size of his delegation must have made it clear that 
the Comintern would offer no concessions. Shmera1' 's colleagues 
included McDonald, an American labour leader and journalist whose 
104 
real name was William F. Dunne, Amagaev, the former Comintern 
105 
representative in the MFR, Vartanian, a Finn who represented the 
106 Youth Comintern and three more whose names are not recorded. 
None of those named were Russians and this may have been intentional, 
to deflect any potential anti-Russian feeling and to emphasise the 
international character of the Comintern. 
The delegation proceeded to investigate the Party and its 
allied organizations and many groups and individuals were interviewed 
in private. Choijil for instance recalls being asked whom of Jadamba, 
107 
Dambadorj, Badrakh and Genden he thought was "correct." Then one 
day Eldev-Ochir and other graduates of KUTV, the Party Central School 
and the Tver Academy called on Shmeral'. Although most of them had 
not been elected as official representatives, Shmeral' told them they 
must attend the Seventh Party Congress and "If it is necessary you may 
all speak." He asked them to prepare statements on the recent letter 
100 
of the Youth Comintern and on the Right Deviation. 
At this point the tide turned against Dambadorj and his 
supporters. When the Second Congress of the Mongolian Trade Unions 
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vlmet the party leadership was condemned as rightist and the Comintern 
delegates prevailed upon the congress to elect a new and very left 
" " t" 109 wlng unlon execu lve. The Central Committee of the Youth League 
met in October. ~This too condemned the Right of restricting the 
political transformation of the MPR and made several radical proposal~ 
including the confiscation of property of former princes and church-
men, in order to set up a fund for the benefit of the poor, and the 
withdrawal of credit facilities and tax benefits from the rich. The 
youth League also criticized party leaders for allegedly failing to 
110 
rebuff Chinese accusations of Red imperialism by the USSR in the MPR. 
The resolutions of the League were set out in a pamphlet and put before 
" III the Central Comrnlttee of the MPR. In 1924 the Youth League was 
similarly used to break the opposition of those party leaders who 
resisted Comintern demands. Then it was done covertly but in 1928 
it was done quite openly. 
There were angry scenes at the October Pl61rn of the Party's 
Central Committee. A fierce argument broke out between Badrakh and 
Genden on .. the- -one hand and_pambador j, Jadamba and Gelegsenge on the 
. - ----- -- ------.---.-- . -
other. 112 It was only settled when Shmeral' took charge of the 
meeting. His speech is preserved in the Czech Communist Party archives 
II:) 
and a part is available in a French translation. Much of it was 
vi taken up with standard Comintern arguments for the supposed danger 
of Rightist policies. Shmeral' also stated: 
/ "During the past months the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern no longer 
doubted the existence of a Right faction 
in the MPRP and concluded that if the danger 
was not immediately eliminated it would 
bring about the collapse of the ruling power 
of the MOngolian people, the rupture of links 
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with the Comintern and the distancing 
of the MPRP as far as breaking off 
relations with the USSR.,,114 
This seems to confirm certain earlier impressions that the alleged 
rightistcharacter of policies over the past two years was no~ clear. 
Shmeral' also said that as late as August when Dambadorj was 
in Moscow~the Comintern was unable to pinpoint just which leaders 
t 11 Ro htO t 115 ac ua y were 19 1S s. From Shmel~al" swords it can be 
concluded that the Right Deviation has to be seen as an assessment 
of potential developments and tendencies rather than a description 
of political activities that had already occurrred. This must be 
borne in mind when reading the statements of some historians who 
have later described this period of Mongolian history in a way that 
makes it appear that tendencies had become fact. If Dambadorj had 
been guilty of anything more than "tendencies" he may well have 
suffered the kind of retribution that Danzan had at the Third MPP 
Congress. 
Even so the way that the Right was overthrown has much 
in common with the way Danzan was ousted. In both cases the Youth 
League was used to divide the Party and the Comintern and Youth 
Comintern representatives in both cases were largely responsible. 
/-
JThat Amagaev played a similar role to that of Rinchino in 1923_ 
'--
and 1924 seems to be confirmed by another statement of Shmera1' 's 
at the October plenum of 1928: 
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"Certain comrades are of the oplnlon that 
former representatives of the Comintern 
have made errors and therefore our commission 
has been sent to clarify this question. 
The facts only show us that Comrade Amagaev 
had foreseen the existence of the Right in 
your Party.,,116 
The Seventh MPRP Congress 
J 
The Right leadership of the MPRP was defeated by the alliance 
- ---- --- - --
of the Left and the Comintern delegation at the~en~s~l ComlTtiJ;t~e J~leJlum, 
- . _. _. ~~ --.- - .----~ 
"r--- -
but it still had to face the Seventh Party Congress. This met from 
117 23 October to 10 December. 
which had once belonged to the 
~ambador~rrived in the green palanquin 
118 Bogd Khaar.. Around the assembly 
hall there was a cordon of secret police because shots had been fired 
119 through the windows shortly before. Inside the building 192 elected 
representatives had gathered and there were 100 more who had consult-
120 
ative status. Many of the latter were probably invited to attend by 
Shmeral'. Shmel"al' continued to have discussions with all kinds of 
people and delegates made their criticisms openly. 
There were 25 days of reports and discussions and t~e delegates 
asked more than 2000 questions. 121 Then one day an anonymo~s document 
was found on the congress executives' table. h ···1 122 According to C Oljl , 
who was a delegate at the Seventh Congress this revealed a third faction 
in Mongolian politics which was led by Oros Gombo, the former employee 
123 
of the embassy in Moscow, and Bayar of the Security Services. 
The Diluv Khutagt also stated in his memoirs that Oros Gombo ~ade a 
total of 62 accusations against Dambadorj at the Seventh MPRP Congress 
224 
and it is possible that they were contained in this document. 124 
Oambadorj apparently defended himself successfully against all 
125 
the charges but it was too late to save his position as Party 
Chairman. 
The Congress made extensive changes in economic policyl26 
and ordered that a five-year plan be drawn up as had been done 
in the USSR. The socio-economic classes were redefined so that any-
one owning more than 200 bod of livestock was regarded as rich. 
The new tax laws, implemented in 1927, were to be reformulated 
so that the rich would pay at even higher rates. Property was 
also to be confiscated from wealthy former princes and high church-
men and used to help the poor develop their own livestock economies 
or to take up new activities such as crop-raising. Severe 
restrictions on credit facilities were ordered, and customs tariffs, 
veterinary charges etc. were to be levied according to the ability 
to pay. 
After the Congress Dambadorj and Jadamba were taken into custody 
for a brief period and the atmosphere in Ulaanbaatar was very unpleasant 
for Mongols and foreigners alike. This can be understood from the 
reaction of Oambadorj's wife. She sent a servant to the Walders to 
tell them of her husband's arrest and to ask for their help. She 
believed that unlike Mongols or Russians the Swiss could offer some 
assistance without coming to harm themselves. There was little the 
Walders could do, but they did take Dambadorj's camera and field 
glasses into safekeeping. These objects were discovered shortly 
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afterwards when the Walders' own home was searched. Then an army 
post was set up between the house and the brickworks, obviously to 
intimidate the foreigners. The soldiers erected a target on a nearby 
slope and anyone coming out of the house was directly in the firing 
line. When the family dog was shot Mrs. Walder lost her temper and 
frogmarched the offending officer to the brickworks. Her h~sband 
seized a gun and pointed him in the direction of the authorities. 
There and then Walder handed in his notice but it was two months 
before the family received permission to travel. 127 
The Fifth Great Khural 
The Fifth Great Khural was held between 14 December 1928 
and 23 January 1929. 128 Many of the delegates of the Seventh 
129 Party Congress were present at the Great Khural and their 
enthusiasm had not abated. They sat through three weeks of govern-
ment reports, questions and answers when the principles and plans 
of the Seventh Party Congress became firm government policy. The 
resolutions were drawn up rapidly in the final three days. 
There was extensive discussion on international affairs as 
they related to the MFR. Evidence of Japan's predatory intentions on 
130 Mongolia was presented and there were also reports of incursions 
from the east in the summer of 1928 by Chinese and Barguts and of 
131 border disputes in the south and southwest. The Khura1 declared 
it had no confidence in the Nankinggovernment which maintained 
th f Ch O 132 at the MPR was part 0 lna. 123 Amar who had succeeded 
. 
Tserendorj as Prime Minister, emphatically dened Chinese accusations 
226 
of Red imperialism by the USSR in Mongolia. l34 The Great Khural 
readily reaffirmed its support for Mongol-Soviet friendship and 
the telegraph agreement between the USSR and the MPR was extended 
until 1931. 13 5 
The assembly followed the Party Congress in basing franchise 
and eligiblity for public service on social class. Not to do so, 
it said, was a violation of the constitution. l36 A special commission 
was ordered to purge all government, trade and economic institutions 
of such "alien elements" as former princes and Manchu-trained officials, 
and White Russians were no longer welcome in the Mongolian public services. 
It was said that they caused friction with the Soviet advisers. 137 The 
Buriats were not similarly singled out as unwelcome but a number lost 
their position in the leadership for supporting the Right. A represent-
ative called Tsedenjav complained that many Buriats cared more about 
138 
their wages than their work. Tsedenjav was from Chandman' Uul aimag 
and that gives some further support to the notion that Dorvod Mongols 
now entering national politics were perhaps seeking a means of making 
their mark in the MPR as the Buriats had done since 1921 and perhaps 
of replacing the Buriats altogether. 
The Khural also discussed the economy. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was accused of not doing enough for the poor andmiddle 
~, and of caring more about increasing income from trade than 
working for the good of the masse~ T.here were complaints that 
13~ 
the development of industry had been unsystematic. At the Fifth 
Khural the MPR moved closer to establishing a state trading monopoly 
by ordering that a department of trade be set up to direct 
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national commercial activities. Suggestions that this should come 
under the authority of the Mongolian Central Cooperative were resisted, 
however, since it was felt that the Cooperative should be simply a 
trading organization and not a body regulating trade. 140 Cooperative 
associations of herdsmen and cropraisers were approved and the Khural 
was specially concerned that more land be opened up for growing grain. l41 
The Ministry of Finance was instructed to revise the livestock 
142 . tax and to calculate tax on immoveable property WhlCh would have 
considerable consequences for the monasteries. As regards the establish-
ment of a national bank which the Fourth Great Khural had approved. 
it was reported that no action had been taken because there were 
insufficient funds available. The Fifth Khural was therefore asked 
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to give directives to enable work to commence. 
The chief resolution on religious policy was the ban on 
. 144 
the search for the Javzandamba Khutagt or any other reincarnatlon. 
The Khural also ordered that lamas in monastic schools be taught to 
read and write in the Mongolian script. the intention being to break 
145 
down further the influence of religion and Tibetan culture. In 
the allocation of available school places the principle of class 
discrimination was to be applied and the cost of medicines based on 
ability to pay. 
There were no reports from the aimags but there was a 
discussion on the minority peoples of the west. such as the Darvod, 
Zakhchin and Kazakh. It was agreed that not enough had been done 
for these people and reformsin local government and, political education 
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were ordered. The government's interest in this area was not 
merely benevolent. Torgut Mongols were still nomadizing back and 
f th th S · k· 147 or across e 1n 1ang border and hereditary rulers had great 
influence. In other areas Kirgiz bandits from the USSR were rustling 
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and harrassing the local population. 
The Turn to the Lert 
The Seventh MFRP Congress and the Fifth Great Khural were 
not just a means of ousting one set of leaders and replacing them 
with a younger set. They did, in fact, mark a dramatic turning point 
in the history of the MFR. This began immediately in 1929 with a 
drastic purge and large numbers of people lost their voting rights 
and the opportunity to take part in public life. More stringent 
tax laws and confiscations were implemented to effect a transfer of 
wealth from those deemed to be rich in order to assist the ard 
poor. At the same time a state monopoly of foreign trade and the 
refusal to have relations with any state but the USSR and the TTPR 
effectively completed the process of aligning the Mongolian economy 
with that of the Soviet Union. The Chinese trader virtually disappeared 
143 from the Mongolian scene overnight. 
The Eighth Party Congress which met in April 1929 drew up 
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a Five-Year plan of impossible proportions. Meanwhile between 
1929 and 1931 individuals and monasteries were relieved of herds 
and immoveable property in a series of confiscations just as the 
Russian kulaks had their land, animals and machinery taken from them. 
At the same time as in the USSR there were campaigns of enforced 
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collectivization and also many Mongolian ~ were compelled to 
. P t 151 jo~n the ar y. Unfortunately all this led to a great deal 
of confusion. Many people were either apathetic or showed 
resistance to being herded into advanced cooperative production 
units. They were quite unable to cope with the demands of this new 
lifestyle so that huge debts were run up in the first year. 
The Party seemed totally blind to the implications of 
its actions. A number of show trials of the dispossessed took 
152 place, one of the most famous being that of the Diluv Khutagt. 
The ards, for whose benefit the confiscations were carried out, 
were deeply offended at such treatment of a holy man. They were 
further antagonized by the severe anti-religious campaign which was 
conducted during these years. An Anti-Buddhist League similar to 
153 
the Soviet "League of the Militant Godless" was formed. Statues 
of the Buddha were desecrated, stupas were destroyed and young 
lamas were thrown out of their monasteries. It was all more than 
the population could stand. Ard~ churchmen and members of 
the old aristocracy joined forces and the country erupted into civil 
war. At least one rival government, known as Ochirbat's Vamen, was 
154 
set up in the Khovsgol region of the northwest. Instead of 
producing more for the Soviet industries the whole of the MPR was 
in danger of being lost to the Soviet camp altogether. In 1932, 
Soviet troops descended on the country and pacified it with ruthless 
efficiency. h M 1 · 1 d h· changed yet agal· n and a "New T e ongo lan ea ers lP 
155 d d Turn" policy was introduced. The five-year plan was discar e 
and most of the collectives dismantled. The general verdict was 
that the Mongolian Party leaders had completely misunderstood the 
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Mongolian situation and pushed the revolution into a stage for which 
the country was not prepared. The Mongols themselves were held 
entirely responsible for what had happened and the Com intern 
accepted no responsibility whatsoever. That was laid at the door 




The first four years of the Mongolian People's Republic 
was a period of restructuring. All aspects of Mongolian life were 
affected to some extent but the most extensive changes concerned 
the political organization and the economic system. Mongolian 
society, on the other hand, remained relatively undisturbed with 
the Church retaining its position of privilege. The traditional 
framework of social relationships was to some extent maintained 
with many herdsmen still tending the livestock of former princes 
and of monasteries. This period from 1924 to 1928 was a transition 
from a native order which had been part of the Chinese world to a 
new structure that derived ultimately from a European political and 
economic model - the Soviet Union. That Mongol peoples with their 
society deep in central Asia and their profound beliefs in Tibetan 
Buddhism, should have embarked on such a transformation at all suggests 
either that their new leaders had undergone something akin to a 
religious experience or else that they were acting under some form 
of duress. 
The underlying objective of the Khalkh Mongols in their 
revolutions in 1911 and 1921 was to achieve independence fro~ China. 
Some leaders did cherish a desire for social reform es~ecially 
1n 1921, but this aim was definitely secondary to the struggle for 
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national independence. The successes of 1921 were possible only 
because the MPR which spearheaded the revolution had as an ally 
the Soviet government, which was prepared to give military assistance. 
The Soviet Russians were in control of a state which was itself under-
going cataclysmic changes and their leaders were filled with zeal 
and revolutionary ideals. Moreover they were struggling for the 
very survival of their state, their political system and their 
own ruling power in the face of worldwide hostility. This situation 
had a profound effect on their relationships with surrounding peoples. 
the Mongols included. It shaped Soviet policies towards the Mongols 
and especially the manner in which they encouraged the Mongols to 
consolidate independence from China. The new Mongolian government 
can be seen as being caught up in the aftermath of the Russian 
revolution and finding itself having to agree to the demands the 
Soviet Union placed upon it either directly or indirectly through 
the Comintern. 
Outside observers at the time, and no doubt many Mongols 
who were excluded from the ruling circle, believed that the Mongolian 
government adopted Soviet-style policies not by choice but because 
they were compelled to do so. That is not entirely correct. 
When the MPP aligned itself with the international Communist 
movement, no doubt as a prerequisite for receiving Soviet aid in 1921, 
it could conceivably have drawn up a plan for its own political and 
economic development. In fact the kind of changes that the Party 
wished to see taking place in the new state were never clearly defined 
and neither were the processes and methods by which they should be 
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accomplished. Instead, the Party devoted its efforts, not 
unnaturally, to driving the Chinese and Ungern from Mongolian 
territory but remained vague about what should be done after 
victory was achieved. When Niislel Khuree was liberated in July 
1921 the Party suddenly found itself faced with the day-to-day 
problems of running a state. The priorities were national defence, 
restoring the solvency of the government and establishing the 
legitimacy of Party rule. However, party membership was small, 
and there was little time for mulling over political theories and 
drawing up detailed manifestos. In this respect the MPP was in a 
different position from most other modern political parties which 
had many years of experience in opposition during which time they 
formulated their theories and their programmes and built up a net-
work of politically conscious supporters. Because state power 
came to the MPP before it could establish its own identity and gain 
any insight into political planning and organization, it perhaps tended 
to ask few questions about the advice and instructions coming from 
the USSR and the Comintern and the motivation behind them. 
Nevertheless there were tensions between the Mongols on 
the one hand and representatives of the Comintern and the Soviet 
Union on the other throughout the 1920s. These tensions were at the 
heart of the conflict between the Mongolian Party and the Youth 
League between 1921 and 1924 and led to the execution of Danzan during 
the Third MPRP Congress. The specific cause of the tension between 
the leaders of the MPRP and the Comintern in 1927 and 1928 was the clash 
of Mongolian and Soviet national interests or, to use the language 
of the Comintern, nationalism versus internationalism. How the 
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Comintern resolved these differences has been described in the 
previous chapter but the Mongols were finally brought to obedience by 
standard Comintern methods: through persuasion that its policies 
were "correct" and that to adopt any alternative model put the 
independence of the MPR in jeopardy; by the manipulation of 
individuals and groups associated with the Mongolian Party and 
manoeuvring them into opposing positions on the left and right; and 
the 
finally bYAopen coercion ~f senior officials of the Comintern. 
The fact that the Mongolian leadership was prepared, in 
the end, to submit to Comintern demands of absolute obedience shows 
that in spite of deep unease with some of the policies it was 
being told to implement it was not yet felt that the demands were so 
intolerable that the only response was outright refusal. There is 
little direct evidence of the Right having serious intentions of 
breaking off relations with the Comintern. Indeed the rumours 
of this which circulated at the time may well have been manipulated 
by the Comintern as a further ploy to warn party members of the 
potential dangers of ignoring advice. A number of possible reasons 
why the MPRP did not break away from the Comintern in 1928 can be 
suggested. The first is the existence of a growing body of opinion 
within the Party that was genuinely convinced by Comintern arguments, 
however shallow the political understanding of many people may have 
been. Secondly leaders may not have been prepared to put at stake 
the growing economic prosperity of the Mongolian state that owed much 
to the Bank and the trade and other agreements in force between 
the MPR and the USSR. Thirdly it should not be forgotten that men 
like Oarnbadorj and Jadamba had come to power having contributed, not 
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merely to the overthrow of Danzan and Bavaasan, but also to their 
execution. When it became apparent that Schmeral' and his team 
were not in the MPR to discover whether or not the Mongols' argu-
ments about the unsuitability of Comintern policies were valid, but 
only to compel obedience, the leaders of the Right, remembering 
that Danzan and his supporters had been condemned for rightist 
opportunism, may have fel t that a confession of error was preferable 
to a martyr's death. 
A fourth reason for continuing the alliance with the Comintern 
and the USSR was the desire to protect Mongolian independence. In 
spite of the obviously subordinate nature of the relationship of the 
MPR with the USSR, the term "independence" still has validity when 
considered from a Mongolian point of view. The MPR was not colon-
ized by the USSR, paid the Soviet government no taxes and was not 
directly governed by Russian officials. The 1921 friendship treaty 
guaranteed a separate structural existence of the two states and the 
Soviet Union did not attempt to absorb the MPR formally into the 
Soviet Union as it did Tannu Tuva. The USSR upheld its role of 
protector of Mongolian independence out of strategic considerations 
vis-~-vis China. Had it not been that the MPR was an important 
factor in Sino-Soviet relations it is possible that the USSR might 
have produced reasons for admitting the MPR into the Union. Such 
considerations were not so clear cut in the 1920s and Mongols may 
have felt it was unwise to abandon the guarantor of its independence 
when there was no other power to replace it. In Mongol eyes no 
leader of China could be trusted as an ally since mne recognized that 
Mongols had a right to be separate from China. Japan was too far 
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away and whatever it was that Japanese officials suggested to 
Dambadorj when they met in the Mongolian embassy in the summer of 
1928 it was clearly less attractive than the alignment they had with 
the Soviet Union. Moreover the Mongols were well aware of the 
Japanese occupation of Korea. Taken together these four factors 
provided sufficient reason for the MPRP to choose to remain within 
the international Communist movement for the time being, however 
distasteful it might be. Internationalism was chosen for reasons 
of nationalism. 
For the Khalkh nation the overthrow of the so-called Right 
Deviation was both a beginning and an end. It was the end of most of 
the nationalist aspirations still surviving from the decade between 
1911 and 1921 and Mongols were obliged to give up hopes of maintaining 
a religious dimension in public life. The centuries-long orientation 
of Mongol society towards China was over and the Mongolian government 
no longer exercised any independence in the pursuit of its foreign 
policy. 
From this time the character and organization of Mongolian 
society went through radical changes. The Buddhist Church was 
systematically destroyed and Buddhist philosophy was eliminated 
from all aspects of Mongolian life. The livestock herding economy 
was largely disrupted. From a long term perspective the overthrow 
of the Right Deviation marks the beginning of state economic planning. 
not simply on a national scale but as part of a group of socialist 
nations with the USSR as Patriarch. It also looks forward to 
the present activity of the CMEA. For this reason the development 
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of the MPR from 1928 is a valid starting point for the study of the 
relations and workings of the present day Communist Bloc. 
The experience of the Mongolian People's Republic is 
unique because it is strategically situated between two major 
powers, the Soviet Union and China and has had longstanding historical 
associations with the latter. However, the MPR may also be regarded 
as a development model for pre-industrial nomadic societies. The obvious 
comparisons that come to mind are the newly emerging states of black 
Africa. This kind of development is celebrated in the terminology 
of modern Mongolian and Soviet historians as bypassing capitalism. 
In western historical analysis the tendency to examine Mongolia only 
in terms of its relevance to Sino-Soviet relations and to categonze 
the MPR as a 16th republic of the USSR has led students to ignore the 
important example of the MPR as a development model. 
Another area of potentially interesting comparative research 
would be an extended study of .count"ries peripheral to China 
and traditionally under Chinese influence but which, in modern times 
have been drawn towards the USSR. Obvious examples are North 
Korea and Vietnam, both of which offer extremely interesting comparisons 
and contrasts. A further and slightly different subject for com-
parative study would be the experiences of the Mongolian and Tibetan 
peoples in modern times. Close political and religious relations 
existed between the two countries for over three centuries. Both 
experienced a growth of nationalist feeling in the early years of 
this century and both were courted by representatives of the govern-
ments of St. Petersburg and Moscow. However their paths of develop-
ment have diverged radically since the 19205, the MPR in associatiJn 
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with the USSR and Tibet with China. Study of the MPR In the 
period 1924 to 1928 offers not only insights into the life of a 
particular emerging central Asian state but also raises issues 
relevant to other states in Asia and the Third World facing 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Buriat Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
Chinese Communist Party 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
Far Eastern Republic 
Inner Mongolian People's Party 
Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezh 
(Youth Comintern) 
Kuomintang 
Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchikhsia 
Vostoka 
Mongolian People's Party 
Mongolian People's Republic 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 
New Economic Policy 
Russian Communist Party 
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic 
Tannu Tuvan People's Party 
Tannu Tuvan People's Republic 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
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GLOSSARY OF MONGOLIAN WORDS 
Aimag: province 
Alba: service to the state 
Ard: commoner, people 
Ardchlalch: to democratize 
Arv: a local government administrative unit of 10 families 
Bag: an administrative unit of local government comprising 50 families 
Beis: a Manchu title for a prince of the fourth rank 
Bod: a unit for calculating livestock 
Chuulga: league assembly: an assembly of all khoshuu princes 
in pre-revolutionary Mongolia 
Dalemba: a type Chinese cotton fabric. 
Deel: a traditional Mongolian gown worn by men and women 
Gavj: a rank of professed lamas 
Ger: Mongolian conical felt tent; yurt 
Gevsh: a rank of professed lamas 
Jas: the contents of a monastery treasury including livestock, land, 
trade goods etc. administered as a unit 
Khaan: emperor 
Khadag: a strip of silk presented as a mark of respect 
Khamjilga: families tied in the service of princes 
Khan: king 
Kharuul: border guard duty 
Khoshuu: banner: a subdivision of a province 
Khural: meeting, gathering, assembly 
Khutagt: a Buddhist incarnation 
Khuvilgan: a Buddhist incarnation 
Maraaash: tomorrow 
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chief administrator of economic affairs in a monastery 
to worm one's way into something, to infiltrate 
families tied in the service of Buddhist incarnations, 
especially of the Javzandamba Khutagt 
Sum: the local government organization below the khoshuu. Original 
meaning an arrow 
Taij: a prince. 
Tamga: seal; public office where a seal was kept 
Tiiz: banknotes issued by some monasteries based on units of tea 
bricks 
To1(:>O",., tushmel (pl. tushmed): special government representative 
Tuslagch: highest administrator in the pre-revolutionary khoshuu 
government 
Zakhiragch: pre-revolutionary administrator deputy to the tuslagch 
in the pre-revolutionary khoshuu government 
